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Even though there are critical views suggested by some economists on whether there is 
a market failure, it legitimizes the intervention of the government into private investment 
activities. There are two kinds of primary work that must be implemented by the 
government in a where it is believed that the government has to make up for the market 
failure. Above all, the government leads the implementation of R&D projects, which may 
be transferred to the private sector. In this case, the research institute established by the 
government may raise social welfare by carrying out the R&D tasks, of which the social 
rate of return is high but the private rate of return is low. Secondly, the government may 
implement policies that activate private investment, so that the investment is induced up 
to the level that is considered to be desirable by the society. 
Currently, the private R&D investment accounts for a great part of total R&D 
investment, and the private sector is regarded as the main factor that determines the 
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national R&D capacity. Accordingly, in order to attain the sustainable growth through 
technological changes, first and foremost, the government shall activate the investment 
activities in the private sector. In this context, the government has been implementing 
various policies to attract investments in the private sector. 
The investment-attracting policies that are commonly implemented by most countries, 
including the South Korean government, include the tax incentive, subsidy, financial 
support, human resource support, public procurement, institutional infrastructure, 
technology transfer transaction, technical instruction and consultation, and so on. With 
the various policy instruments being used to pursue the unique purpose of policies, the 
discussion on how the government can allocate resources effectively, in order to activate 
the innovation-oriented activities of the private sector, has come to the fore. 
From the viewpoint of supply-push, the state subsidy and tax incentive scheme are the 
most focused policy instruments. Though both the state subsidy and tax incentive scheme 
have similar functions in terms of supporting the innovative activities with financial 
resources, they have opposite characteristics from each other as the state subsidy is a 
direct means, in which the level of government intervention is high, but the tax incentive 
is an indirect means. Accordingly, it is required to establish the policies on the basis of 
comparative evaluation of the effects of both policy instruments in order to design the 
policies efficiently. However, most of existing empirical studies have analyzed each 
policy instrument individually, so that there is a limit to what we can suggest with regard 
to relatively excellent policy instruments. 
On the other hand, the economists have recognized the importance of demand-pull 
policy through debates, however, most of governments have mainly implemented supply-
push policies. However, recently, the issues regarding limitation of the supply-push 
policies have been raised, which are centered around the EU and member countries, 
calling for the introduction of demand-pull policies positively. Recognizing the 
importance of demand-pull policy, the South Korean government has been making efforts 
to supplement the institutional strategies that will be used to implement the demand-pull 
policies. 
In this context, this study is designed to carry out a comparative evaluation of the 
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effects of direct subsidy and tax incentive, which are regarded as the typical policy 
instrument to attract investments from the viewpoint of supply-push. Along with this, the 
effect of national defence procurement will be analyzed, which accounts for a greater part 
of government expenditure among the public procurement that is a typical means of the 
demand-pull policies. 
In order to achieve the purpose of this study, the knowledge-based Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model has been introduced. As for the model presented in 
this study, the knowledge is regarded as a capital, and the knowledge capital will be used 
as a factor of production, along with the labor and physical capital. In addition, the 
knowledge capital is the source of spillover effect on external economy. So, the 
knowledge has been capitalized according to the recommendation of System of National 
Accounts 2008 (SNA 2008) and OECD (2010), so that the knowledge-based social 
accounting matrix (SAM) could be built up by reflecting the knowledge capital formed 
through the capitalization in a new account. 
According to the study results, both the state subsidy and tax incentive appeared to be 
effective in promotion of R&D investment of the private sector. However, the tax 
incentive appeared to be more efficient than the direct subsidy. This result suggests that 
an effective government intervention is the attraction of investment activities through the 
market-oriented decision-making. Along with this, it suggests that the government shall 
have a more comprehensive view of the production and investment environment of each 
industry in advance in order to apply the direct intervention method effectively. On the 
other hand, according to results of the analysis of the national defence procurement, 
which was divided into the general defence procurement and the special defence 
procurement limited to the weapon systems, both cases appeared to promote the private 
investment. Especially, the weapons procurement system appeared to have relatively 
larger effect, which was because the purchase of Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA) accounted for the greatest part of the defence industry market. 
This study has an academic significance as it is differentiated from the existing 
literature as follows. Firstly, the effects of state subsidy and tax incentive have been 
compared with each other and evaluated directly by using the same dataset and analysis 
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model. Secondly, the investment-inducing effects of national defence procurement have 
been presented at the industry level. Thirdly, in comparison with the existing studies, in 
which the partial effect of investment-inducing policies was analyzed, this study has been 
focused on the analysis of the full effect of policies, in which the effects of knowledge 
spillovers have been applied according to investment activities. Fourthly, the effects of 
each policy instrument on innovative activities and economic growth have been analyzed. 
Accordingly, the degree of achievement of the ultimate goals of innovative policies has 
been evaluated quantitatively, which was designed to promote the economic growth 
through technological changes. Fifthly, the knowledge-based SAM and the CGE model 
will provide the foundation on which various policies can be evaluated in the future. 
 
Keywords: R&D policy, Defence procurement, Market failure, Knowledge capital, 
CGE 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background 
 
Some economists believe that the market failure must be corrected by the intervention 
of the government. The primary reason of the market failure related to R&D investments 
is the positive knowledge externalities, namely the spillover effect (Arrow, 1962). 
Because the principal agent carrying out R&D cannot monopolize the fruit of innovative 
efforts, the motivation to carry out R&D projects decreases. As a result, the innovation 
effort is made at the level which is lower than the level regarded as optimal by the society. 
Another major factor of market failure is the uncertainty of innovation activities 
(Tassey, 1996; Wu et al., 2007). The uncertainties include the technological uncertainty 
and market uncertainty, and they exist throughout the innovation process. When the 
uncertainty rises, the investment decreases in general. Besides, other economist argued 
that the government support shall be given because of incomplete capital market, high 
entry barrier to the market, and lack of technological infrastructure (Cerulli, 2010). 
There are two kinds of primary work that must be implemented by the government in a 
where it is believed that the government has to make up for the market failure. Firstly, the 
government leads the implementation of R&D projects, which may be transferred to the 
private sector. In this case, the research institute established by the government may raise 
social welfare by carrying out the R&D tasks, of which the social rate of return is high 
but the private rate of return is low. Secondly, the government may implement policies 
that activate private investment, so that the investment is induced up to the level that is 




                                            
1 In reality, the debate on whether there exists a market failure, or the governmental intervention is 
reasonable, is in progress. However, this study will be carried out on the premise that such a market failure 
exists. 
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1.2 Motivation and purpose 
 
The government has been applying various investment-inducing policies in order to 
raise the investment level in the R&D of private sector. Each policy instrument has a 
peculiar object and institutional characteristic, and such policies may be divided into two 
types of confrontational relations, such as the supply-push vs. demand-pull, and influence 
vs. regulation (King et al., 1994). 
In the situation where various policy instruments are being used simultaneously by the 
government, the effects of each policy instrument shall be scrutinized in order to prevent 
governmental failure and allow the government to intervene in the market effectively.  
Especially, when there exist a number of established policies with the same purposes, it is 
very necessary to choose relatively effective policy instruments in order to plan for and 
implement innovative policies. 
Figure 1 shows the scale and share of direct and indirect government funding provided 
by OECD members in order to support the investment activities of enterprises. The 
weight of state subsidy and tax incentive, which are focused on the same policy 
objectives to support R&D activities with necessary financial resources, differs from 
country to country. The countries with a larger part of direct government funding include 
Russia and Slovenia, specially, the countries like Finland and Sweden do not provide 
indirect government support at all. On the other hand, the indirect government support 
accounts for a great part in Canada, Australia and France. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Direct and indirect government support for private R&D in OECD members 
  Source: OECD, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2013 
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The reason why the preferable instruments of support differ from country to country is 
that the economic and social environment and the impact evaluations of policy means 
differ when each country chooses the optimal policy instrument. In this context, it is 
required to carry out a study focused on the analysis, evaluation, and comparison of the 
effects of each investment-inducing policy, in consideration of our own economic 
environment, in order to promote R&D investments in the private sector and maximize 
the effect of ongoing policies. 
Accordingly, this study aims to analyze, evaluate and compare the effects of state 
subsidy and tax incentive, which are regarded as the typical policy means in terms of 
supply-push, and the public procurement, which is implemented from the viewpoint of 
demand-pull. It is expected that this study will provide some useful implications for the 
designing of effective investment-inducing policies. 
 
1.3 Research outline 
 
This thesis is composed as follows. In Chapter 2, the types of policy intervention and 
theoretical system will be examined. And after reviewing the effects and characteristics of 
the state subsidy, tax support and public procurement, the results of empirical analysis on 
each policy means will be examined as well. And in Chapter 3, the scheme for 
construction of knowledge-based Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) will be introduced, 
which is necessary for realization of CGE model. In Chapter 4, the effects of investment-
inducing policies will be analyzed. Especially, the effects of state subsidy, which is a 
direct means of government support, and the tax incentive that is an indirect means, will 
be evaluated and compared from the viewpoint of supply-push. To achieve this, a 
literature research on investment models will be carried out first, in which the flow of 
technologies among industries and tax policy variable may be applied. And then, the 
simulation results will be presented after explaining the overall structure of knowledge-
based CGE model. In Chapter 5, the effects of investment promotion caused by the 
national defence procurement are analyzed. In this study, the national defence 
4 
procurement will be subdivided into the defence procurement, which includes the full 
expenditure of national defense, and the expenditure limited to weapons systems, so that 
both of them will be analyzed separately. For this reason, a literature research will be 
carried out first, which is aimed at examining the economic characteristics of the demand-
pull policies focused on the national defence procurement and the defence industries. And 
then, the simulation results will be analyzed after building up the two types of SAM 
related to national defence procurement. Finally, in Chapter 6, the full contents of this 
thesis will be summarized and policy implications will be discussed. The thesis concludes 
with future directions of research. 
  
5 
Chapter 2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Types of policy intervention and theoretical system2 
 
Recognition of the background and viewpoint, in which each policy means is devised 
and used, is the preferential procedure in order to analyze and evaluate the effects of 
policies. That is because we need to consider the background and purpose of the 
establishment of each policy in order to evaluate individual policies. And also, through 
such examinations, we may judge whether the policy is biased or not. 
King et al. (1994) put emphasis on the institutional factors regarding promoting the IT 
innovation, suggesting a theoretical system that helps classify and understand the policy 
instruments applied by the government in order to promote the technological innovation 
in the IT domain. 
King et al. (1994) suggested that the government intervention aimed at promoting such 
innovative activities could be considered from the viewpoints of influence vs. regulation, 
and supply-push vs. demand-pull. The influence of an institution is the exerting of 
persuasive control over the practices, rules and belief systems of those under the 
institution's sway (Kimberly, 1979), and the regulation by institutions is the direct or 
indirect intervention in behavior of those under the institution's influence, with the 
specific objective of modifying that behavior through sanction or other affirmative means 
(King et al., 1994). The supply-push policies are related to the direct and indirect 
provision of many factors required for the creation of innovation, and the demand-pull 
policies are connected with the creation and articulation of demand for the innovation. 
King et al. (1994) argued that the policy means seen from each viewpoint are not a 
substitutive relationship, but a complementary relationship, so that the government would 
choose a specific policy means according to the decision it made regarding which power 
is dominant in an innovation process. 
Table 1 shows the classification of typical innovative policy means currently used by 
                                            
2 The contents of this clause is based on the study carried out by King et al. (1994). 
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the government according to the analysis framework suggested by King et al. (1994). 
 






Support with investmentㆍloan security 
Provision of human resources 
Operation of government-funded 
research center 
NEP compulsory purchase system 
Selection system for excellent 
products at the procurement agency 
Preferential purchase system for the 
products developed by small and 
medium businesses 
Regulation 
Human resource development project 
Support center for globalized 
professional manpower 
Technology commercialization 
Ttechnology transfer projects 
Defence industry appointment system 
Various certification system 
 
Taking a look into the R&D policies that are being implemented by the government, 
we may know that the government is making use of the policies with the aspect of 
influence-regulation-supply-demand simultaneously. However, though regulation-based 
systems, which aim to guarantee the self-regulating innovation activities of the private 
sector by creating a general environment for innovation activities, are being operated 
actively, the influence-oriented policy instruments have been applied with more attention 
than the regulation-based policy instruments. Meanwhile, the supply-push policies have 
been adopted more aggressively than the demand-pull policies. The supply-push policy is 
a comparatively direct method as it is used to provide essential elements and resources to 
the innovation activities of the private sector. And also, such policies have been used as a 
major means of government intervention in the market since 70~80s, when the 
government was leading the industrialization. 
On the other hand, the government implemented demand-pull policies for the defence 
industry from the earlier years as it was directly connected to the national security. The 
government restricted the competitive market entry, allowing the specific enterprises to 
7 
produce military supplies and sell the products to the government, which was aimed at 
protecting and fostering the defence industry. However, despite the demand-pull policies 
for such defence industries, the innovative demand-pull policies as a whole have been of 
little importance among the innovation policies, and only recently the necessity of 
demand-pull policies has come to the fore. 
 
2.2 Effects and characteristics of each policy instrument 
2.2.1 State subsidy and tax incentive 
2.2.1.1 Effects of state subsidy and tax incentive 
 
The studies which were focused on the effects of existing investment-inducing policies 
have presented the results of econometric or qualitative analyses without concrete 
discussions about the mechanism in which each policy instrument had an impact on the 
R&D investment. On the other hand, David et al. (2000) suggested a clear framework of 
the mechanism in which the tax support, direct subsidy and government contracts had an 
impact on the R&D activities of the private sector. 
The optimal level of investment in R&D project is determined at the point where the 
marginal rate of return (MRR) and marginal cost of capital (MCC) intersect. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Optimal level of private R&D investment 
Source: David et al. (2000) 
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In this figure, the MRR curve appears to have a left-downward incline. This is because 
an enterprise will carry out a project with high rate of return first, and then it will move 
on to another project with lower rate of return gradually. On the other hand, the MCC 
curve represents the opportunity cost of capital at the various R&D investment level, 
showing a right-upward incline. The reason why the curve shows a right-upward 
inclination is that the company uses the internal funds as the investment funds first, and 
then the company starts to rely on external funds (equity and debt) as the amount invested 
increases. 
A policy instrument causes the changes in level of R&D investment by shifting the 
MRR and MCC curve. 
 
 MRR = f(R, X) 
 MCC = g(R, Z) 
 
In this context, the exogenous variable X is a policy variable affecting the MRR, which 
includes the technological opportunities, the state of demand in its potential market area 
or line-of-business potential market, and the institutional and other conditions affecting 
the appropriability of innovation benefits. And the Z variable, which is an exogenous 
variable affecting the MCC, includes technology policy measures that affect the private 
cost of R&D projects, macroeconomic conditions and expectations affecting the internal 
cost of funds, bond market conditions affecting the external cost of funds, and the 
availability and terms of venture-capital finance (David et al., 2000). In short, the level of 
R&D investment can be determined by the exogenous policy variables. 
 
 R*=h(X, Z) 
 
Because the tax incentive directly causes the reduction of MCC of the R&D investment, 
it is expected that the tax support will not crowd out the private R&D investments, so that 
we may expect that the tax incentive would shift the curve to the right, increasing the 
R&D investments to the some extent. The direct subsidy may increase the R&D 
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investments, shifting the MCC curve to the right. It is because the fact that enterprises 
have received the state subsidy may facilitate financing by raising the awareness of 
enterprises in the financial market. On the other hand, the state subsidy may shift the 
MRR curve to the right through the indirect effects. In this case, the demand in the market 
increases sharply as the benefit of subsidy is recognized as a sign of creation of a new 
market. 
However, some empirical studies have shown the results that are different from the 
policy means which may be expected on the basis of such conceptual analysis 
frameworks. In order to understand the background in which the results derived from 
theoretical analyses and empirical studies are not in accordance with each other, we need 
to review the characteristics of each policy means. 
 
2.2.1.2 Characteristics of state subsidy and tax incentive 
 
The state subsidy has effectiveness in activation of investment by raising the earning 
rate and reducing the private-sector R&D expense (Wu et al., 2007). Especially, the merit 
of subsidy is that the government can get the specification of R&D projects that will be 
carried out by enterprises in the concrete. In other words, the government can put 
restrictions on the types (product and process) and all purposes of R&D activities when 
providing the enterprises with a subsidy. And through the direct support to the area where 
the products have the nature of public goods, and the social rate of return is high but 
private rate of return is low, the government can create a strong ripple effect in the 
socioeconomic field (David et al., 2000). And also, the state subsidy granted to a start-up 
company, which lacks financial resources in the initial stage, though it wants to invest in 
R&D, may create a prompt effect in innovative activities (Avellar, 2011). 
However, the subsidy system has some weak points as follows. Firstly, the government 
subsidy may crowd out the private R&D investment. For example, if the government 
provides subsidy to a project that is supposed to be implemented without subsidy, the 
private R&D investment itself may be crowded out. And an enterprise may hold off 
making a decision on other R&D projects in order to make progress in the project that has 
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been provided with a subsidy (Howe & McFetridge, 1976). In this context, the 
fundamental problem of state subsidy is that the government is not able to investigate the 
investment environment of enterprises or industries accurately. For another example, we 
may consider the circumstances with inelastic supply of scientists and engineers in the 
technology market. When the state subsidy increases the demand for R&D, the prices for 
R&D may rise, which results in crowding out the R&D investment in the industry 
(Goolsbee, 1998). 
Secondly, the enterprises with relatively less technical capacity may be excluded in the 
process of selection of an enterprise that will be provided with subsidy, so that an 
enterprise with excellent technology can be selected. In other words, the state subsidy 
may not be in accordance with the intrinsic function of government policy, which shall be 
focused on the weak in terms of marketplace. And also, there is a possibility that the 
winner is not picked by the function of a market, but by the government, as an 
unqualified enterprise is subsidized (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003). 
Thirdly, the government may force the enterprise to comply with the specific terms in 
return for the subsidy. The restrictions may play a negative role in R&D activities of 
enterprises. Finally, the subsidization process cause a lot of administration cost, which 
leads to the tax burden to the people. 
And the pros and cons of tax incentive are as follows. The tax incentive is a system that 
focuses on reducing the MCC of the R&D investment. Accordingly, unlike the state 
subsidy, the tax incentive is less likely to crowd out the firm’s own R&D investment (Wu 
et al., 2007). And the merit of tax incentive is that all the enterprises participating in R&D 
activities can qualify for tax cut without discrimination (Wu et al., 2007). Accordingly, it 
may be helpful for the enterprises that cannot qualify for the various government support 
policies, including the state subsidy (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003). 
Above all, the most important characteristic of the tax incentive is that it is a market-
oriented means. In a word, in the tax incentive, the type of R&D, implementation method 
and time are based on the decision made by the enterprise. Accordingly, unlike the direct 
subsidy system, there is slim chance of government failure, and the efficiency of the 
policy may be improved (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). 
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Despite such merits of the tax incentive system, there are several weak points which 
are caused by the characteristics of the tax support, regarding the fact that it is an ex-post 
tool which supplement the R&D expenditure. Firstly, enterprises will prefer the project 
that may create bigger profits in short time in order to receive tax support. As a result, 
they will not consider the projects that ensure high-level social rate of return, or the 
projects such as research infrastructure, which requires a long-term implementation plan, 
as a priority factor of investment. Therefore, even though the enterprise investment is 
activated by the tax incentive, the ripple effect that can be enjoyed by the society may not 
be large (David et al., 2000; Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). 
Secondly, the newly-established enterprises, which cannot afford R&D investments at 
the initial stage due to lack of liquidity, may be excluded from the selection of beneficiary 
(Hall & Van Reenen, 2000; Elschner et al., 2011). Accordingly, the tax incentive may act 
as a useful means only for the existing innovative enterprises (Avellar, 2011). 
Thirdly, the tax incentive is reward for the efforts made in the past, so that the tax 
incentive may be recognized as an unexpected income from the viewpoint of enterprises. 
As a result, there is possibility that the tax incentive may not have no effect on the R&D 
strategies for enterprises (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003). 
Fourthly, the effects of various support policies and tax incentive may overlap with 
each other, and some enterprises in a specific situation may not feel an effect of the 
support due to the existence of upper bound of R&D tax credit and depreciation rate 
(Elschner et al., 2011). 
Fifthly, in the case of incremental tax credit system, the current increase in R&D 
investment expands the foundation of future tax credits, so that there is a probability that 
the enterprises may put off or scale back investments (Eisner et al., 1983). 
 
2.2.2 Public procurement 
2.2.2.1 Definition of public procurement 
 
The public procurement refers to the activities in which goods and services are 
acquired by the government or public agencies through a purchasing process (Hommen & 
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Rolfstam, 2009; Uyarra & Flanagan, 2010). Edquist et al. (2000) divided the procurement 
into the regular public procurement and public technology procurement in terms of the 
degree of innovation inducement. The regular public procurement refers to the case in 
which public agencies purchase the goods that do not need an additional R&D as such 
goods have already been launched into the market, or the decision on purchase and 
selection of the supplier is made on the basis of available information of price, quantity 
and performance (Edquist et al., 2000). 
On the other hand, the public technology procurement refers to the purchase action in 
which a public institution buys goods, services or systems that can be developed within a 
reasonable period of time by an enterprise, which is willing to produce and sell the 
products through an additional R&D or new developmental work (Edquist et al., 2000). 
Similarly, we may use the 'innovative procurement' or 'procurement of innovation' in 
order to describe the procurement process which includes broader effort for innovation in 
R&D activities (Edquist et al., 2000). 
 
2.2.2.2 Mechanism for the effect of procurement policy on innovation 
 
In order to design a procurement policy that may promote an innovation activity 
effectively, we need to understand the mechanism in which procurement policies have an 
effect on innovation activities
3
. Cave and Frinking (2003) divided the effects of 
procurement policies on innovation efforts into the direct demand–pull impacts and 
indirect demand–pull impacts. The direct demand–pull impacts are elated to the efforts of 
procurement policies based on the intention to directly purchase the innovative products 
and services. 
When an enterprise can capture the sales market at the initial stage and take the 
advantageous position first, the risk of innovation may be reduced (Dalpé, 1994). And 
public purchases of innovative products will deliver a positive signal to the market. The 
public procurement publicizes the function of relevant product widely in the private 
                                            
3 The influences on innovation may be understood by dividing them into the direction of technology change 
and the rate of technology change (Geroski, 1990; Dalpé, 1994; Edquist & Hommen, 2000; Hommen & 
Rolfstam, 2009). However, the concept has not been divided in this study. 
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market, raising the initial recognition of the product in the market. Such effects on the 
private market may be more important than the initial public procurement (Rothwell, 
1984; Porter, 1993). In this manner, the procurement has a direct impact on innovation 
activities by purchasing innovative goods and services. 
The indirect demand–pull impacts mean that innovation is a by-product of government 
procurement. According to Cave and Frinking (2003), the public procurement 
disseminates the R&D results, and reduce the cost and risk factors in innovation activities, 
or may have an indirect impact on innovation activities by supplementing the existing 
R&D results. Meanwhile, Cabral et al. (2006) identified three types of indirect effect of 
public procurement on innovation; by enlarging the market for new goods; by facilitating 
the adoption of new standards; and by changing the market structure. 
In fact, many existing studies have analyzed the effects of government procurement 
from a static viewpoint. But it is required to understand the public procurement with 
dynamic views. As Cabral et al. (2006) mentioned, the effect of public procurement on a 
market structure may be a typical example of dynamic views. Especially, the dynamic 
effect of procurement can be derived from the studies which have been focused on the 
fact that the users have impact on innovation activities at the time when they demand 
products.  
Since the beginning of studies carried out by Von Hippel (1976), a lot of studied 
focused on innovation policies have put emphasis on the interaction between users and 
manufacturers, along with the roles of users in the innovation process (Lundvall, 1993).  
For example, Von Hippel (1976, 1978) argued that in the case of a spreading network, it 
was more important to ensure the accessibility to the information and knowledge obtained 
from customers and suppliers in the relevant industry, where the products are 
manufactured on the basis of technical capacity, because new innovation results were 
created by using the existing technological knowledge through the internal mechanism or 
various spreading mechanisms. 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) pointed out that the concepts of user needs and demand 
were not separated clearly from each other in the existing studies, which had analyzed the 
demand-pull impacts. They separated the effects of need-pull caused by users from the 
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demand–pull effects mediated by the market. They thought that even though there were 
innumerable types of user needs, only a part of the needs could form a potential market of 
the products, yet only a small subset of these potential demands are fulfilled. Such 
recognition can be understood as an emphasis on the importance of lead users who 
convert the abstract needs to the demand for specific products. 
Gardiner and Rothwell (1985) argued that the users who had clear requirements for 
design would play a role in making suppliers innovate or improve products. Von Hippel 
(1986) discovered the creation of user-led innovation in the science instrument industry. 
According to his study results, the strong and specific needs of lead users were realized in 
the later market. 
Porter (1993) recognized that the role of users was important in the initial stage where 
development of products and industrialization was carried out, because the client needs 
for new equipment could change the form of existing products. And also, he argued that 
the initial users could predict the market demand of innovative product, and the 
enterprises could improve the product and the competitiveness continuously through 
prediction of demands. 
Bresnahan and Greenstein (2001) observed the joint development process between the 
users and manufacturers in the IT industry, and they paid attention to the fact that 
general-purpose technologies were being adjusted in accordance with the specific 
problems and the various needs of users, who were participating in the joint development. 
Malerba et al. (2007) put emphasis on the importance of the experimental users in the 
Internet, automobile and the aircraft industry. The term 'experimental users' connotes that 
users accept the fact that there is a risk involved in a new product or at the prototype stage 
of development, and the price and quality may not meet the requirements. New 
enterprises begin to sell their products to the experimental users, and continuously 
improve the products through their feedbacks. 
Meanwhile, the studies on innovative policies have found out that the technical 
capacity of users was acting as an important factor in innovative activities, besides the 
user needs. Especially, in the case of capital goods, the customers may present specific 
requirements and provide technical support for innovation. And the role of users becomes 
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more important as they can affect even the stage of prototype development (Dalpé, 1994). 
For example, Grandstand and Sigurdson (1985) found out that the government equipped 
with technical capacity was playing an important role in the strategic stage of technical 
specification and product development, when they analyzed the process of development 
in the Nordic countries. Through their studies, it was proved that the specialized 
knowledge of the government as a user in procurement had an indirect and dynamic 
impact on the innovation activities of producers. 
When we consider the fact that specific needs and requirements of users, including 
their technical capacity, can have a significant impact on innovative activities in this way, 
we can make a guess on the effects of the government as a user on innovative activities in 
the industry. In a word, a public institution may be willing to become the first user of 
innovative products as a lead user and induce the improvement of such products, and 
create the demand of other users. And then, the suppliers, who participate in the public 
market through transactions with public clients equipped with high-level technical 
capacity, can be entitled to benefits such as the technology transfer (Dalpé, 1994). 
 
2.2.2.3 Requirements for successful procurement policies 
 
Though procurements are considered to have an effect on innovative activities in the 
industry to some extent regardless of the purpose, the policy makers shall review the 
relevant requirements in order to make such procurement policies be the more effective 
investment-inducing means. 
Dalpé (1994) argued that the users from public sectors should clearly express the user 
needs regarding performance rather than presenting the requirements for standards or 
trademarks in order to create effective procurement policies. In this context, Dalpé (1994) 
argued that the innovation of enterprises or industries could be promoted when the direct 
requirements were established clearly by the institution using the products, rather than a 
central procurement agency which was not directly connected to the requirements of 
users. 
Geroski (1990), who had observed the major results of innovation caused by public 
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procurements in the computer, civil aircrafts and semiconductor industry, suggested the 
specific condition that could create innovation through procurement policies. According 
to him, the principal agent of procurement (namely, the institution using the products) 
shall apply the high standards for products and technologies in order to heighten the 
intensity of effect and obtain good results through procurements. And secondly, the 
public institutions shall define the definite needs at which innovation efforts are aimed. In 
addition, it is required to boost the relevant enterprises and industry by creating 
sustainable demand for the innovative products and services at the initial stage, and by 
providing common markets for those products and services. On the other hand, public 
institutions shall encourage competition among suppliers. And also, Geroski (1990) 
pointed out that the procurement policy could lead innovation in a wrong direction, 
particularly in relation to poor targeting, backward-looking protectionism and the support 
of national champions. 
On the other hand, Edler and Georghiou (2007) put emphasis on the need for co-
ordination across government. And also, they highlighted the combination of public 
demand with private demand through procurement policies, and the critical role of 
linkages between supply and demand in the process of innovation. The total demand may 
be increased by encouraging civilian needs at a new dimension, and a good environment 
for innovative activities may be created when suppliers have much contact with the lead 
users in the private sector, who have high technologies. 
The requirements for a successful procurement policy include a significant scale of 
procurement. The purchaser's capability, which meets the requirements suggested by 
public institutions, may differ according to the market power. Dalpé (1994) argued that 
the government influence on suppliers increased when government purchases took up a 
considerable part of products in an industry. The enterprises will participate in a 
procurement of new complex goods, which consists of new and complicated technologies, 
only when the amount of order reaches the threshold and the revenue offsets the R&D 
costs, or when they judge that future contracts can be guaranteed. When the size of 
government procurement is bigger than a certain level, enterprises judge that it is 
profitable to meet the requirements of users in terms of profits by developing new 
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products. 
The content like this can be identified in the study of OFT (2004). According to OFT 
(2004), if a size of public demand reaches the considerable level, where the size of public 
procurement can exercise the purchasing power by integrating demand, the government 
can provide an actual opportunity for a product market in the public sector, and the 
private sector can get the critical mass that ensures profitability through R&D 
investments. This is in the same vein as the necessity of cooperation made by government 
agencies, which was mentioned by Edler and Georghiou (2007), and they also suggested 
that public procurements should be carried out through cooperation in the similar policy 
direction and range of purpose rather than individual purchases. Uyarra and Flanagan 
(2010) argued that the government could expand the market of specific goods through 
purchasing power of the public sector and the expanding market could act as incentives 
for innovation. 
On the other hand, Porter (1993) argued that the scale of procurement played an 
especially important role in the high-tech industry, the industry characterized by 
substantial economies of scale in production, and the industry with high level of uncertainty. 
 
2.2.2.4 Possibility of inefficient procurement policy 
 
Because procurement policies in the public sector are set up after considering the 
political, institutional and economic factors in a complex manner, it is not guaranteed that 
such procurement policies will act as an effective means at all times. For example, if it is 
required to consider the regional distribution of orders, which affects elections, and the 
national security, the decision on procurement could be made in an economically 
inefficient manner (Dalpé, 1994). 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1981) pointed out that, despite the fact that procurement 
policies can be effectively used to protect and boost the new-technology based enterprises, 
the several restrictions below could interfere with the use of such opportunities. Firstly, 
the absence of common recognition of the application strategy for procurement policies in 
public agencies may cause frequent shift in policy with enterprises left in uncertainty. As 
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a result, it breaks the self-confidence of enterprises to succeed in the market. Secondly, if 
a procurement policy cannot be combined with various means supporting the innovation 
activities due to lack of market power of government in the total market, the procurement 
may not have an effect on the R&D investment. Thirdly, due to the lack of competition 
among suppliers in the public sector market, there are not many cases of market entry of 
newly established businesses into the public sector market. Fourthly, the government may 
lack the capability to deal with the area of technology, and it may be occasionally affected 
by interest groups, so that the government cannot make rational decisions at all times. 
Williams and Smellie (1985) pointed out the purchasing tendency of government, 
which tried to maintain technical systems. They argued that the suppliers, who had 
provided the initial products, could easily participate in the follow-up maintenance and 
parts supply, and they were more likely to receive a further order, concluding that the 
government was apt to maintain the trade with the same supplier. This is because the 
government, as a purchaser, is also aware of the risks in the case where the government is 
purchasing products and services in which complicated technologies are embedded. In the 
cases of military supplies, which are subject to security and confidentiality requirements, 
it is difficult to replace the supplies with other goods, so that the government is more 
likely to maintain the same technical system. As a result, public agencies may form a 
close relationship with specific enterprises. In such a case, the enterprise will make effort 
to maintain the business relationship with public agencies by using political leverage 
rather than make effort to improve technology due to the awareness of the market that has 
been already formed. And also, such suppliers are apt to maintain the same technology in 
order to avoid the innovation risk and adjustment cost. And if there is no other option 
than to sell the product to public agencies, they will not carry out energetic innovation 
activities because the innovation results obtained from R&D activities cannot be applied 
to other fields (Dalpé, 1994). 
In this manner, when the decision on procurement is made on the basis of 
consideration of other things rather than the quality and technical factors, the tendency to 
produce innovative products may be reduced and the influence of procurement policies 
on innovative activities may be reduced as well. 
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2.3 Literature review 
2.3.1 Empirical evaluation of subsidy policy 
 
In general, economists have reached a consensus that the effects of subsidy on R&D 
investment of enterprises have both positive and negative results. Howe and McFetridge 
(1976) carried out a econometric analysis on the determinants for the R&D investment 
carried out by 81 Canadian enterprises in the electric, chemical, and machinery industry 
during the period between 1967 and 1971. According to the analysis results, it was 
confirmed that the reception of subsidy had not caused a change in the total R&D 
expenditure of the enterprises in the chemical and machinery industries, however, the 
reception of subsidy had caused a small increase in the total R&D expenditure of the 
enterprises in the electric industry. On the basis of the results, they concluded that the 
subsidization could not replace the private R&D investment. And they also argued that 
the subsidy policy had increased the total R&D expenditure of the society as much as the 
amount of subsidy (not more than the amount). 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) analyzed the direct impact of R&D subsidy granted 
by the German government on the promotion of private R&D investment and the indirect 
impact of R&D subsidy on the technical performance (or innovation achievement, 
measured by the number of patents). They collected the annual data from 3,779 enterprise 
in the manufacturing industry during the period between 1992 and 2000, and then the 
Propensity Scoring Method (PSM) was applied to data analysis, so that they could 
conclude that the hypothesis that government subsidy accelerated the private R&D 
investment could not be rejected. After all, they argued, the enterprises that had received 
the subsidy used it in R&D activities, and the scale of R&D investment increased by 
30.4%. Lerner (2000) pointed out that the subsidy granted by the US SBIR program could 
function as a quality certificate for small and medium businesses, so that it could help 
them qualify for a loan from banks. On the basis of such interpretation, Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger (2004) assumed that German businesses could increase the R&D investment 
through such effects. 
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997) analyzed the effects of the subsidy 
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on private R&D investment by using a total of 216 observations, which were collected 
from 17 OECD countries during the period between 1981 and 1996. They assumed that 
the elasticity of private R&D with respect to direct subsidies was 0.06 in the short run, 
but it was 0.22 in the long run, so that they could confirm that the state subsidy had a 
positive effect on the promotion of private R&D investment. However, they found out 
that the effect of subsidy on the promotion of private R&D investment rose in proportion 
to the subsidization rate, but it began to decrease after reaching the threshold (inverted U-
curve in accordance with subsidization rate). In a word, they argued that the government 
subsidy had the greatest promotional effect when the subsidization rate was 15%, and 
then it began to reduce, showing rather negative effects when the rate exceeded 30%. 
Accordingly, what they suggest is that the country which granted a moderate amount of 
subsidy achieved better results than the country which subsidized too much or too little. 
Klette et al. (2000) carried out a survey study on the five micro-econometric researches 
(Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Lerner, 1998; Branstetter & Sakakibara, 1998; Griliches & 
Regev, 1998; Klette & Møen, 1999), in which the effects of government-granted R&D 
subsidy on commercial R&D were analyzed. It was identified that the subsidy had a 
positive effect on the promotion of private R&D on the basis of the results of the four out 
of five studies. However, they pointed out that if enterprises which did not receive 
government subsidy were selected as a control group in such studies, it was based on the 
tacit premise of random sampling. In other words, they pointed out that though the 
difference-in-difference (DID) or the methodology of Heckman et al. (1998) were applied 
to the existing studies they reviewed, the effects of subsidy might have been 
overestimated as the selection bias was not dealt with correctly. 
The study result in which the selection bias was considered is as follows. Firstly, 
Busom (2000) analyzed the effects of subsidy by applying the Heckman–type selection 
model on the basis of the cross-section data of the 145 Spanish enterprises, which had 
received a subsidy from the Center for Industrial Technological Development (CDTI). On 
the whole, the complementarity effect appeared to be dominant in her study. However, 30% 
of the enterprises appeared to have a substitution effect. Lach (2002) applied the 
difference-in-difference method to a study focused on the analysis of panel data of the 
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enterprises that had carried out R&D in Israel during the period between 1990 and 1995. 
In this research, it was identified that the complementary effect existed between the 
subsidy and R&D investment only in the cases of small-sized companies, but the subsidy 
appeared to have no significant effect on large firms in the results of analysis. Wallsten 
(2000) analyzed the effects of SBIR, which was a program designed to support small and 
mid-sized technology-intensive enterprise in the USA, by using the 3SLS estimator. 
According to the result, Wallsten found out that the complete substitution effect was 
occurring between the government subsidy and R&D investment of enterprise. 
David et al. (2000) carried out a survey research regarding the 33 studies reported in 
the period between 1966, when Hamberg's study was published, and 2000. On condition 
that the existence or non-existence of significance of estimated coefficients is ignored, 11 
papers (33.3%) out of the 33 papers reported the net substitution relationship between the 
government subsidy and private investment, while the rest of 22 papers (66.6%) reported 
the net complementary relationship. Classifying the results according to the level of 
subjects of analysis, they found out that almost the half of studies (9/19) on business and 
firm unit showed the substitution relationship, while the 2 out 14 studies on industrial and 
national level showed the substitution relationship. It implied that the substitution effect 
reduced as the integration level of the subjects of analysis rose due to the spillover effect 
of R&D occurring among the industries. According to the examination of differences 
among countries, the 5 studies out of 6 studies, which targeted the countries other than 
the USA, appeared to have complementary relationship, while the 12 studies out of 21 
studies, which targeted the the USA, appeared to have a relatively mild complementary 
relationship. Especially, according to the study results focused on the units lower than an 
enterprises, the 7 studies out of 12 studies on the USA appeared to have a substitution 
relationship, but only 2 studies out of 7 studies on the countries other than USA appeared 
to have a substitution relationship, so that the existence of regional contrast was identified. 
David et al. (2000) have not suggested a general conclusion regarding the effect of 
subsidy due to the difference in the methodologies in the literature and the purposes of 
government subsidies, including the detailed level of materials used in the research. 
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2.3.2 Empirical evaluation of tax incentive 
 
Since the enforcement of the R&D tax credit system in the USA in 1981, a lot of 
studies analyzed the effects of this system. Using the time-series analysis, Baily and 
Lawrence (1985) compared the actual investment level and the investment level that may 
be predicted on the basis of historical R&D investment. They proved the effects of the 
R&D tax credit by confirming that the actual investment level of the 12 R&D-intensive 
manufacturing industries had risen an average of 7.3% from the existing investment level 
during the period between 1982 and 1983. 
And also, Brown (1985) confirmed that the amount of R&D investment during the 
period between 1981 and 1984, after the enforcement of R&D tax credit system, was 
much more than the predictive value based on the time-series model. According to his 
study, the actual R&D investment increased by 25% in 1984 due to the tax credit system, 
which was introduced in 1981. 
By applying the similar method, Cordes (1989) concluded that the R&D tax credit 
introduced in 1981 had promoted the investment in the USA. His study proved that the 
enforcement of R&D tax credit helped the actual amount of R&D investment increase by 
8.7% in 1981, 17.4% in 1982, 25.5% in 1983, and 26.8% in 1984. 
Eisner et al. (1984) found out that there was no difference in increase of R&D 
expenditure between the enterprises to which the tax credit system for R&D investment 
was applied and other enterprise to which the system was not applied after the 
enforcement of tax credit system. They argued that the effects of tax credit system was 
offset in the long run because the enterprises increased the expenditure through which 
they could qualify for the benefit of tax deduction, while they reduced the R&D 
expenditure through they could not become a beneficiary of tax credit. 
Tillinger (1991) confirmed that in the case of an enterprise of which the Tobin's Q 
value was close to '1', the R&D tax credit was effective, however, if the Tobin's Q value 
was bigger or smaller than '1', the effect of tax credit on R&D expenditure was very small. 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) analyzed the determinant of labor, physical capital 
investment and R&D investment, including the interaction among them. They collected 
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the data of enterprises recoded during the period between 1959 and 1966, and analyzed 
the data after dividing them into four types of industry. According to the analysis result, 
the R&D investment demand decreased by 0.5% when the rental price of the R&D capital 
increased by 1% in each of the four industries. 
Falk (2006) found out that the tax incentive system measured by B-index had a 
significant effect on the demand of private R&D investment after applying the dynamic 
panel analysis to the OECD country level data built up during the period between 1980 
and 2002. According to his study, the short-run elasticity of R&D investment with respect 
to the price of R&D was about –0.22, and the long-run elasticity of R&D investment was 
0.84. In short, the amount of short-term R&D investment appeared to have increased by 
0.22% when the B-index decreased by 1%. Such results accord closely with the existing 
study results. In their reports confirming that the price elasticity of R&D expenditure was 
about 1.0 at the industrial level, Bloom et al. (2002) argued that R&D investments were 
sensitive to capital costs. And the European Commission (2003) and Guellec and Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) reported that the price elasticity of R&D expenditure 
was -0.81 and 0.31 respectively. 
Kim (2007) analyzed the effects of tax incentive by using the enterprises panel data 
collected during the period between 2002 and 2004. He argued that when the user cost of 
capital after taxation decreased by 1% through the expansion of the tax incentive system, 
the R&D investment based on the internal financial resources of small and medium 
businesses and the major companies would increase by 1.4% and 0.8% respectively. 
 
2.3.3 Comparison between the effects of direct and indirect 
means 
 
When deciding which means is more effective, the direct or indirect means, we may 
directly refer to studies which are focused on the comparisons between direct and indirect 
means. And also, we may indirectly refer to the studies in which the two types of policy 
variables have been included in the analysis model in order to analyze the effects of each 
policy variable. 
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The studies carried out to compare the effects of direct and indirect means are as 
follows. Kwack (1984) compared the results of indirect tax support and export subsidy, 
which had been granted to the enterprises of overall industries, with the results of R&D 
tax credit provided to specific industry. According to the results, the effects of investment 
tax credit appeared to be excellent in terms of production activities, while the effects of 
indirect tax and export subsidy appeared to be excellent in terms of social welfare. 
Kwon and Paik (1995) analyzed the effects of capital market distortions on capital 
formation in the economy by using the CGE model. Their model assumes that the 
producers decided the level of fixed capital investment on the basis of the expected sales 
during the given period, factor prices and the current inflation rate. According to their 
study, which was aimed at manufacturing businesses after establishing the year 1978 as 
the base year, the tax incentive and financial support appeared to have an effect on the 
increase in fixed capital investment. Especially, the tax incentive appeared to be more 
effective in the investment promotion as the financial support caused the increase in fixed 
capital investment by 6.8%, while the tax incentive caused the increase in investment by 
11.6%. 
Zhu et al. (2006) argued that the state subsidy was more effective than tax incentive in 
promoting the R&D investment, according to their study carried out by using the 
industry-level panel data regarding the Shanghai area. The data was limited to the period 
between 1993 and 2002. Especially, they suggested that the state subsidy promoted the 
private R&D investment, while the tax support had effect on reduction of R&D 
investment in the private sector. 
Kim et al. (2011) compared the effects of policy means by applying the Ordered Probit 
Model which was based on the Technology Innovation Survey (2005). According to the 
result of analysis on overall enterprises, it was found out that the benefit regarding tax 
expenditure appeared to raise the probability in attempt to innovate by 15.6%, while the 
benefit regarding government subsidy appeared to raise the probability in attempt to 
innovate by 18.3%, so it was concluded that the effect of subsidy system was better. 
However, when the subjects of analysis was limited to small and medium businesses, the 
probability of innovation attempt affected by the benefit regarding tax cut increased by 
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22.0%, while the probability of innovation attempt affected by the benefit regarding 
government subsidies increased by 16.6%, so it was concluded that the effect of tax 
support was better than that of subsidy. 
Avellar (2011) compared the effects of direct and indirect means by using the PSM 
methodology on the basis of firm-level data collected during the period between 2006 and 
2008. According to him, the difference in the average scale of investment between the 
enterprises, which received a tax incentive, and the enterprises, which did not receive tax 
credits, appeared to be two times as big as the cases in which the government subsidy was 
given to such enterprises. As a result, he concluded that the tax incentive is more effective 
than the government subsidy. 
On the other hand, the effects of direct and indirect means can be indirectly compared 
on the basis of the following studies. The study of Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (1997) suggested that both the direct subsidy and tax incentive had a short-term 
effect of private R&D investment promotion. According to their study, the short-run 
elasticity of private R&D investment with respect to the government subsidy was 0.06, 
and  its elasticity with respect to tax incentive (when the B-index was a proxy variable) 
was -0.18. However, the long-run elasticity of private R&D investment with respect to 
government subsidy was 0.22, so that they could conclude that the direct subsidy was 
more effective than the tax incentive in the long term, deriving the elasticity of the value 
of '0' regarding the tax incentive. Regarding such differences, they concluded that it was 
because the subsidy encouraged the enterprises to begin a new investment project, but the 
tax incentive mainly induced them to gradually increase investments in the project in 
progress. 
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) made an indirect comparison between the subsidy and tax 
incentive from the view point of benefit-cost ratio. The benefit implies the amount of 
R&D induced by the tax credit. And the cost means the amount of tax revenue lost due to 
the presence of the credit. The ratio of these two quantities is the benefit-cost ratio; when 
the size of investment-inducing effect is bigger than the cost, the tax incentive is more 
effective in terms of comparison between costs and effects than the subsidy; if the size of 
investment-inducing effect is smaller than the size of tax support, the subsidy is more 
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effective in terms of comparison between costs and effects than the tax incentive. Their 
survey on the existing studies on effects of the tax incentives confirmed that when the 
enterprises received one dollar's worth of tax support, the enterprises created a dollar's 
worth of additional investment in average. In a word, they concluded that both the tax 
incentive and subsidy had an equal level of effect. 
Wu et al. (2007) carried out a regression analysis by using the panel data from nine 
countries, which was collected during the period between 1985 and 1995. According to 
them, the elasticity of private R&D investment with respect to the user cost of R&D 
appeared to be about 0.6, while its elasticity with respect to government subsidy ranged 
from 0.24 to 0.41. In short, they suggested that the R&D investment at the national level 
reacted to the user cost of R&D more sensitively than the subsidy did. On the basis of the 
result, we may judge that the indirect means of tax incentive is more effective than the 
subsidy. 
Kim (2007) found out that when the user cost was reduced by 1% due to the expansion 
of tax incentive, the increase of R&D investments of the private sector ranged from 0.5% 
to 1.1%, however, the firm’s own R&D investment decreased by 0.06%-0.07% when the 
direct government subsidy increased by 1%. In particular, on the premise that the R&D of 
small and medium businesses reacted sensitively to the user cost, and the government 
subsidy crowded out the firm’s own R&D, they argued that the tax incentive was more 
effective than the subsidy policy when the policy goal was aimed at increasing the firm’s 
own R&D investment. 
 
2.3.4 Empirical evaluation of procurement policies 
 
The results of many empirical studies have confirmed that demand-pull policies act as 
major variables in innovation activities. Since Schmookler (1966) put emphasis on the 
importance of market scale regarding motivation for changes in technology, a lot of 
economists have paid attention to the innovation-inducing effects of demand. Eisner 
(1978) emphasized the relative importance of the demands or sales, liquid assets, and 
capital costs, which could play a role as a determinant in making a decision on investment 
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of an enterprise. According to the result of his study, the demands and sales were the 
major determinant of business investments, and the liquid assets occasionally acted as an 
important factor. When considering his opinion, we may conclude that Eisner (1978) 
supported the acceleration theory of investment
4
. 
On the basis of his own case studies, Utterback (1974) argued that 60-80% of major 
innovations were caused by the reaction between market demands and recognized needs. 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1981) carried out a comparative analysis on the innovation-
inducing effects of the R&D subsidy and the procurement contract of the government. 
They argued that the long-term procurement policy of government was more effective in 
generating innovation than R&D subsidies in various fields. 
Geroski (1990) analyzed the quantitative and qualitative significance of the 
government's demand for innovations. He argued that the government's demand could 
reduce the risk and uncertainty that enterprises would face in the future market 
environment. Especially, he suggested that the influence of government procurement in 
rapid innovation activities could become important, particularly when considering the 
contents of the study of Rothwell and Zegveld (1981), which argued that the more rapid 
the innovation was, the more important role the predictability played. And also, Geroski 
argued that procurement policies were more effective in inducing innovations than R&D 
subsidies, which had been used frequently as a means of innovation policies. On the other 
hand, Geroski and Walters (1995) confirmed the casualty, in which demands induced 
innovation activities, by carrying out a time-series analysis where the innovation and 
patent data in the UK were used. 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) regarded the demand, firm size and characteristics of 
industry as the major variables that could have a significant impact on innovation 
activities. During the period between 1988 and 1992, they carried out regression analyses 
on the 441 enterprises selected from the manufacturing and service industry in Netherland. 
According to the results of their study, the scale of enterprise had no effect on innovation 
activities. On the other hand, they identified that the increase in demand was a significant 
                                            
4
 The acceleration effects refers to the fact that the investment demand is closely connected to the 
importance of growth rate of sales, and this theory came to the fore as the study of Clark (1917) 
was published. 
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variable in innovation, so that the demand-pull effect suggested by Schmookler could be 
proved. And also, on the basis of such results, they concluded that the Keynesian theory 
could play an important role in explaining the determinants of investments. 
Sung (2001) analyzed the determinants of investments of the private sector by using 
the panel data (1990-1997) collected from the enterprises in the Korean manufacturing 
industry He argued that the sales growth rate and cash flow had a positive effect on 
investments, presenting the result of his own research, in which the long-run elasticity of 
firm’s investment with respect to sales and cash flow were 0.03 and 0.01 respectively. 
In a survey of more than 1,000 enterprises and 125 economic federations, BDL (2003) 
argued that more than 50% of respondents recognized the new requests and demands as 
the major source of innovation activities. On the other hand, BDL (2003) argued that the 
market factor played the more important role than that of technology-push, presenting the 
results in which only 12% of total enterprises promoted R&D activities on the basis of 
new technology development inside the enterprise. 
Palmberg (2004) and Saarinen (2005) carried out an analysis on the data regarding the 
innovation, which had been commercialized during the period between 1984 and 1988, so 
that they could confirm that 48% of the projects that had created the results of successful 
innovation were caused by the government procurement or regulations. Besides, the 
arguments that the market demand and procurement policies acted as an important factor 
for innovation activities were supported empirically by the studies carried out by Fazzari 
(1993), Chirinko et al. (1999). 
 
2.3.5 Limitation of the existing studies 
 
As shown in the previous clause, most of the studies cannot provide any clues to 
identify which policy means is relatively more effective, the direct or indirect means, by 
analyzing the effect of policy means limited to either the tax incentive or subsidy. It is 
possible to compare the effects of policy means indirectly by using the results of studies 
on each policy means carried out individually. However, such indirect comparisons may 
cause considerable distortion when interpreting the policy effect as the individual studies 
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were carried out on the basis of different analytical frame, data system and targets. 
Meanwhile, the subjects of most studies were the enterprises that belong to a specific 
industry, or specific industries. And in some studies, the data at the industrial level has 
been presented by pooling, or the results of effect analysis on policy means have been 
presented at the national level. In a word, such studies have failed to suggest any results 
regarding the difference in effects of the same policy means on individual industries. A 
policy means which had a positive effect on an industry cannot be a panacea for other 
industries. Even though a policy means is effective in a specific industry (country), we 
cannot expect that such results will occur in the other industry (country) with equal effect. 
Complicated circumstances such as operational, technological and environmental factors, 
have impacts on innovation, so that we need to understand the characteristics of each 
industry in order to carry out innovative policies effectively (Anex, 2000). 
The methods used to measure the effects of R&D policies in the existing studies can be 
divided into two types. The first one is focused on the analyzing the degree to which 
support policies promote the private R&D investments, and the other is focused on the 
comparison between the cost of policy support and the results of investment promotion. 
However, the results of analysis in this way only show the partial effect, and the full 
effect of policies has not been considered (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). For example, Hall 
and Van Reenen (2000) argued that the full effect of policies could be identified through 
the analysis, in which the changes in output were included, because the reduction of 
capital costs, which was caused by tax incentive policy, led to an increase in output, and 
the increase in output could result in an increase in investment. In addition, such aspects 
may be highlighted more when considering the spillover effects of knowledge. 
The existing studies have failed to provide implications regarding the ultimate effects 
(economic growth) of technology policies. Though the goal of R&D policy means is to 
increase the private R&D investment, the ultimate goal of technology policies embracing 
the innovation-inducing policy means is to promote the economic growth through 
technological changes. Accordingly, the analysis on the effect of implementation of R&D 
policy on private R&D investments, and the analysis on economic results can provide 
useful implications to the policy maker of the relevant policy. 
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2.4 Presentation of problems 
 
In 2012, R&D spending by business enterprises occupied 78% of Korea’s total R&D 
expenditure. It implies that the main agent of R&D investment in Korea is not the 
government, but the private sector, and the enterprises act as the group that determines 
the national technology competitiveness. In this context, the government makes efforts to 
prevent reduction of industrial R&D investment in order to overcome stagnation aspects, 
which appear repeatedly in the global society, and improve the national technology 
competitiveness. The South Korean government is implementing various investment-
inducing policies in order to encourage the industries to increase their own investments. 
The R&D policies implemented by the government include the subsidy, tax incentive, 
financial support, human resource support, public procurement, legal and institutional 
infrastructure, technology transfer, technology guidance and consultation. 
From the viewpoint of supply-push, the tax incentive and state subsidy scheme are the 
most focused policy instruments. The scale of government subsidy and tax incentive has 
been on an increasing trend over the last 10 years. However, as we may assume on the 
basis of the results of empirical studies, it is expected that the effects of each policy 
means will appear differently due to the institutional characteristics of each policy means 
and the investment climate in each industry. 
The policy makers shall choose adequate policy instruments, on the premise that the 
intervention of government in innovation activities is reasonable. However, as discussed 
above, the comparison between the government subsidy and tax incentive on the basis of 
existing literature is limited. This implies that the current subsidy and tax incentive are 
being implemented individually without comparison of the effects of each policy means, 
which is based on the quantified result of institutions. 
In this context, this study is aimed at analyzing the individual effects of government 
subsidy and tax incentive system, which are the typical policy means implemented from 
the viewpoint of supply-push. And also, it is designed to seek the answer regarding how a 
correct intervention can be chosen by comparing and evaluating the effect of government 
subsidy with the characteristics of direct means and the tax incentive with the 
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characteristics of indirect means. 
Meanwhile, the importance of demand-pull policies has been recognized through the 
debates which were proceeding through the 1960s and 1970s. On the whole, most 
governments have implemented the supply-push policies despite the fact that the 
importance of demand-pull innovation was recognized in reality (Edler & Georghiou, 
2007). 
However, when the economists were looking into the reason of slowdown of 
innovation activity and economic growth, they have recognized the limitation of the 
policies focused only on supply-push, which could not induce innovation activities 
sufficiently. Entering the 2000s, the EU and member countries began to be interested in 
demand-pull policies on innovation in these circumstances. A lot of reports put emphasis 
on the importance of public procurement and leading market for innovation activities, and 
the EU recommended its member countries to promote the demand-pull policies 
(European Commission, 2005, 2007; Aho et al., 2006). As a result, the EU and member 
countries adopted the demand-pull policies aggressively. The Government of South 
Korea has also recognized the importance of demand-pull policies, so that the 
government has been supplementing the institutional strategy in order to carry out such 
policies (National Science and Technology Council, 2011). 
In this context, this study aims to analyze the effects of public procurement on 
innovation activities from the viewpoint of demand-pull policy. In fact, besides the 
procurement, various demand-pull policies, such as the regulations, standardization and 
the policies to promote leading markets, can play an important role in implementation of 
innovation policies (Blind et al., 2004; Georghiou, 2007). However, considering the fact 
that the scale of public procurement is much bigger than the scale of other support of 
policy means, and the effect of procurement policy can be realized relatively faster than 
others, I have chosen the public procurement among the policy means focused on 
demand-pull as the subject of analysis. 
Especially, this study is aimed at evaluating the effects of national defence 
procurement among various types of public procurement. There are two reasons why the 
effects of national defence procurement are analyzed in this study. Firstly, it was 
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considered that the national defense expenditure exceeded 30% of the government budget 
until the end of 1980s, and even in the 1990s and 2000s, the national defense expenditure 
formed a greater part of the government budget. Secondly, the government has protected 
and fostered the defence industry strategically since the initial stage of industrialization of 
this country. Especially, the government allowed the defence industry market to form a 
monopolistic structure, restricting the market entry of other competitors, and maintained 
the market size through procurement of defense products, so that the policy could bring 
the relevant industry to the reasonable maturity. Accordingly, the defence procurement 
has had a huge impact on the defence industry. 
In this manner, this study is designed to analyze the effects of subsidy and tax incentive 
from the viewpoint of supply-push, and then the comparative evaluation of the effects of 
each policy means will be carried out as well. Apart from the evaluation, the effects of 
procurement which is the typical means of demand-pull policy will be analyzed. The 
reason why the study was carried out after separating the analysis on R&D policies 
(subsidy and tax incentive) and the analysis on procurement policy from each other are as 
follows. Firstly, the purpose of procurement is to purchase goods that will be used for the 
maintenance of public function, and it has an indirect influence on innovation activities, 
so it is inappropriate to compare the effects of procurement with the effects of subsidy 
and tax incentive directly. Secondly, in the case of defence industry, which is considered 
in a model when analyzing the effects of defence procurement, the prices of goods are 
determined by the cost-plus contracts on the basis of negotiation, so that it is 
characterized by the fact it is rarely affected by the R&D policies.  
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Chapter 3. Construction of knowledge-based 
SAM 
 
3.1 R&D capitalization process 
 
In this study, the knowledge-based SAM has been constructed in order to analyze the 
economic effects of knowledge capital that has been accumulated from R&D investments. 
The knowledge-based SAM can be defined as a social accounting matrix in which the 
economic flow that includes the knowledge capital is described by reflecting the 
knowledge capital as an independent factor of production through the capitalization 
process of R&D. The capitalization of R&D refers to the dealing with the R&D costs, 
which used to be dealt with as an intermediate consumption as intangible fixed assets 
(Intellectual Property Products). 
The System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA 1993) recommended enterprises to deal 
with the R&D investment-related expenditure as an intermediate consumption (current 
expenditure), which was not a capital expenditure and consumed in a production process. 
That was because it was difficult to establish a clear standard for identification, 
evaluation and depreciation of such assets in practice, despite the fact that the R&D 
investment was close to the fixed investment as it was implemented to get income in the 
future (Son, 2005). 
However, the System of National Accounts 2008 stipulates that the R&D expenditure 
shall be dealt with as a formation of fixed capital, expanding the range of fixed capital 
assets. In this system, the previous account name of intangible fixed assets was changed 
into the intellectual property products, as the range was expanded, and the R&D was 
incorporated into the intellectual property products, along with mineral exploration and 
evaluation, computer software and databases, entertainment, literary and artistic originals, 
and other IPPs. 
The studies on CGE model, which constructed the SAM including knowledge capital, 
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include the studies of Zürn et al. (2007), Sue Wing (2003), Garau and Lecca (2013). The 
knowledge-based SAM suggested in the existing studies were constructed by setting up a 
hypothesis discretionally. Zürn et al. (2007) estimated the R&D transactions among 
industries by applying the transaction share among industries as a weighted value, 
according to the method suggested by Terlecky (1974). Garau and Lecca (2013) 
identified the R&D transactions among industries by applying the weighted value based 
on the Yale Technology Matrix (YTM). Meanwhile, Sue Wing (2003) set up a hypothesis 
that the specific R&D-intensive industry was an industry where the R&D service was 
produced, and then Sue Wing interpreted that the transaction between the R&D service-
producing industry and other industries represented the transaction of R&D. However, in 
those existing studies, the R&D transaction was estimated on the basis of the discretional 
hypothesis set up by the researcher, so that there might be much room for improvement as 
it may distort the actual details of knowledge transactions. 
 
3.2 Method for construction of SAM 
 
When considering the limitation of existing studies and the fact that the System of 
National Accounts and input-output (I-O) tables differ from country to country, it is 
inappropriate to apply the method for construction of SAM suggested by the existing 
studies, as it is. 
Accordingly, this study aims to construct the knowledge-based SAM with 2009 as the 
base year, by applying the knowledge-based SAM suggested by Yang et al. (2012), which 
is focused on the economic structure in Korea. They constructed the basic SAM in which 
the labor and physical capital, and then they expanded it into the SAM that included the 
knowledge capital, so that they could construct the knowledge-based SAM. At this time, 
the reflection of knowledge capital in the SAM means the capitalization of R&D, and the 
capitalization of R&D was carried out according to the System of National Accounts 
2008 and recommendation of OECD (2010). 
The outline of construction procedure for the knowledge-based SAM is as follows. 
Above all, the structure of knowledge-based SAM is formed by adding the following two 
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accounts into the basic SAM in which the labor and physical capital are included as 
factors of production. Firstly, the 'knowledge account' is added in conventional value 
added accounts. After capitalizing the R&D, the knowledge, which is regarded as a 
product, is reflected in the SAM as an independent account in consideration of a 
production system where the knowledge is an input factor of production separated from 
labor and capital. The value of 'knowledge' added into the accounts of value-added means 
the value-added generated from the knowledge capital. Secondly, the 'knowledge capital 
formation' which is distinguished from the fixed capital formation is added into the 
‘investment account’. 
 
      Table 2.  Structure of the knowledge-based SAM 
 
 
And now, we need to reflect a proper value in the newly added accounts, and adjust the 
existing value of other accounts due to the newly added account. To achieve this, it is 
required to confirm how the R&D expenditure has been dealt with in the I-O table, which 
is the basic data system for preparation of SAM. If the R&D expenditure has not been 
reflected in the I-O table, the breakdown of R&D expenditure by industry and the 
breakdown of expense spent for R&D implementation shall be estimated separately, and 
then the R&D expenditure shall be reflected in the SAM on the basis of the estimation. 
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By the way, in Korea, the R&D including the R&D in self-account is regarded as a 
separate production activity, not an ancillary activity, when estimating the I-O table. And 
also, the current expenditure on R&D is dealt with as an intermediate consumption, and 
the capital expenditure on R&D is reflected in the formation of fixed capital. Therefore, 
the key point in preparation of knowledge-based SAM is to identify the details of R&D 
expenditure, which has been reflected in the current I-O table as an intermediate 
consumption and fixed capital formation, and capitalize the value and prevent the 
accounts from overlapping with the other reflected in advance. 
By the way, there is the 'research institute' industry producing 'R&D goods' in the 
industry classification of the I-O table. And it is separated from other industries. 
Accordingly, the details related to R&D expenditures by industry can be identified 
through the transactions between each industry and the 'research institute' industry. 
Therefore, the transactions among industries can be identified without using the 




3.2.1 Creation of value-added knowledge 
 
The first stage is to capitalize the current expenditure on R&D activities. The ordinary 
expenditure is reflected in the details of intermediate consumption in the I-O table. 
According to the small-sized industry classification of the I-O table, the 'research 
institutes (148)' industry and the 'research and experiment in enterprise (149)' industry 
belong to the industry which manufacture R&D products. Accordingly, the details of 
R&D expenditure in each industry can be identified through checking the transactions 
between those two industries and other industries. 
Because the details of R&D expenditure (intermediate consumption) in each industry 
have been identified, the value-added created by knowledge can be estimated. As the 
R&D expenditure, which used be dealt with as an intermediate consumption, has been 
capitalized, the R&D expenditure is not an intermediate consumption any more. 
                                            
5
 The Bank of Korea (2011) specified that the R&D expenditure in the I-O table was reflected on the basis of 
the Frascati Manual. 
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Therefore, the breakdown of R&D expenditure is eliminated from the SAM, and all or 
some of the value will be reflected as the value-added created by the knowledge capital. 
 
Table 3.  Generation of value-added knowledge 
 
            (Before adjustment)                  (After adjustment) 
 
3.2.2 Dealing with current expenditure as knowledge capital 
formation 
 
The knowledge capital formation account in the vertical axis of Table 2 shows the 
breakdown of expenditure in which the R&D expenditure provided by households or the 
government is spent for R&D activities among each of industry. By the way, the 'research 
institutes (148)' industry and the 'research and experiment in enterprise (149)' industry are 
the industries that carry out R&D, so that the breakdown of those industry may be 
regarded as the spending for R&D activities. Accordingly, the values of these accounts 
shall be eliminated from the breakdown of intermediate transactions, and they are 
reflected in the knowledge capital formation account. 
By the way, the System of National Accounts 2008 and the OECD (2010) recommend 
that all the expenditures (including R&D expenditure) of manufacturers, which are aimed 
at sales and profit, be dealt with as intermediate consumption. Therefore, not all the 
expenditure of 'research institutes (148)' industry and the 'research and experiment in 
enterprise (149)' industry have to be capitalized. And the R&D expenditure of market 
producers shall remain as the intermediate consumption. It is required to refer to the I-O 
table which has been subdivided into 403 basic sectors. According to the classification of 
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403 basic sectors, the 'research institutes (148)' industry can be subdivided into the 
'research institutes(public) (357)', 'research institutes(private, non-profit) (358), and 
'research institutes(commercial) (359)' industry, and the 'research and experiment in 
enterprise (149)' industry in the small-sized industry classification may be reclassified 
into the 'research and experiment in enterprise (360)' on the basis of 403 basic sectors. 
Among the four basic sectors, the 'research institutes(commercial) industrial, 359th 
industry, belongs to an industry that carries out R&D for profit, so that all the breakdown 
of R&D expenditure of this industry shall remain as the intermediate consumption just 
the way it is. 
Accordingly, after eliminating the 'industrial research institute (359)', the expenditure 
column of the rest of three industries is moved to the knowledge capital formation 
account. At this time, the breakdown of 'research institutes(public)', 'research 
institutes(private, non-profit) sector is recorded in the 'public R&D' account, and the 
breakdown of 'research and experiment in enterprise' will be recorded in the 'private 
R&D' account. 
 
Table 4.  Dealing with current expenditure on R&D 
 
               (Before adjustment)              (After adjustment) 
 
3.2.3 Dealing with capital expenditure as knowledge capital 
formation 
 
The capital expenditure on R&D is subdivided into machinery, land and building, and 
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computer software, and the capital expenditure occupied 9.5% of the total R&D 
expenditures in 2009. In the I-O table, the R&D expenditures regarding machinery, land 
and building, are reflected in the tangible fixed assets, and the computer software is 
reflected in the intangible fixed assets. Therefore, in order to avoid double counting the 
capital expenditure, the amount equivalent to the capital expenditure on R&D shall be 
deducted from the fixed capital formation, and then the same amount shall be reflected in 
the knowledge capital formation. 
It is not clear in what the item of expenditure of 'machinery' among the capital 
expenditure has been paid. Accordingly, it is assumed that the R&D investment activities 
regarding machinery have been carried out in the five industries such as general 
machinery and equipment, electronic and electrical equipment, precision instruments, 
transport equipment, and furniture and other manufactured products on the basis of the 
large-sized industry classification in the I-O table. And the expenditure regarding land 
and buildings is related to the 'construction' industry, which belongs to the large-sized 
industry classification in the I-O table, so that the amount which falls into the item of 
'land and building' shall be deducted from the value of fixed capital formation of the 
construction industry, and the same amount shall be reflected in the account of knowledge 
capital formation. Finally, the expenditure related to the computer software among the 
capital expenditures is connected to the 'real estate and business service' industry, which 
includes the computer software industry. Accordingly, the relevant amount shall be 
deducted from the account of 'real estate and business service' industry among the fixed 





Chapter 4. Analysis on the effect of 
government R&D policies 
 
4.1 Background and purpose of study 
 
The R&D is the source of technological innovation and the determinants of economic 
growth. In recognition of such things, the government has been making great effort to 
jump up to the knowledge-based economy. Over the last 10 years, the R&D investment of 
government has increased by an average of 13.6% every year, and the degree of R&D 
intensity has reached 4.03% of GDP. However, the scale of R&D investment is still lower 
in comparison with the advanced countries. 
Along with the government R&D investment which has been increasing steadily, the 
direct subsidy from the government has been increasing year by year, and the scale and 
ranges of tax incentive for R&D has been expanding as well. For example, the tax credit 
related to human resources and R&D expenditure, which has occupied 75%-84% of tax 
expenditure regarding R&D for the last 5 years, has been changed from a temporary item 
to a permanent deduction item since 2009. It may be assumed that the recent upward 
trend of R&D investment in the industry is associated with the aggressive investment-
inducing policies of the government. 
The subsidy has originated from the system in which the government directly provides 
financial support to specific R&D activities, so it may be characterized by the high degree 
of intervention by the government. The tax expenditure is a means to reduce the burden 
of corporate tax regarding the fiscal payment caused by R&D activities of enterprises 
through the tax privilege. We may expect that the tax expenditure will ensure the 
efficiency in respect that it does not distort the functioning of market, the benefit is 
applied to enterprises indiscriminately, and above all, the decision on investment is left to 
the market. Due to the merits of policy means, both of them are used simultaneously. 
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Table 5.  Present condition of R&D-related tax expenditure and tax credit 




Tax credit for research and human 
resources development costs 
Percentage of tax credit 
in tax expenditure (%) 
2000 9,792 6,890 70.4 
2001 9,111 6,426 70.5 
2002 9,527 6,867 72.1 
2003 13,950 11,597 83.1 
2004 12,564 12,398 98.7 
2005 13,224 9,782 74.0 
2006 13,120 9,478 72.2 
2007 16,429 14,080 85.7 
2008 18,620 15,331 82.3 
2009 20,244 15,535 76.7 
2010 23,452 18,571 79.2 
2011 27,643 23,341 84.4 
2012 30,606(p) 24,977(p) 81.6 
 
Source: The Ministry of Strategy and Economy, Budget for Tax Expenditure (each year) 
 
Table 6.  Present condition of national R&D project investment 














2002 46,984 4,572 19,450 10,609 7,589 - 4,764 
2003 49,036 4,281 21,135 11,141 8,145 - 4,334 
2004 59,847 4,059 26,001 13,233 10,035 - 6,518 
2005 77,904 4,408 34,081 18,273 12,199 - 8,944 
2006 87,639 5,649 39,094 19,014 15,053 2,520 6,309 
2007 95,745 5,452 40,628 21,978 16,071 4,608 7,008 
2008 109,936 6,225 45,526 26,555 21,414 2,603 7,613 
2009 124,145 6,683 49,718 30,120 28,185 1,007 8,433 
2010 136,827 7,090 55,113 33,956 28,683 3,024 8,960 
2011 148,528 7,319 57,099 37,672 32,330 3,744 10,363 
 
Source: Science and Technology Council, National R&D project survey and analysis (each year) 
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By the way, we need to pay attention to the fact that the growth rate of subsidy is twice 
as high as the growth rate of tax expenditure as the subsidy amount has increased by an 
average of 17.7% every year in comparison with the tax expenditure which has increased 
by an average of 9.1% every year, which was boosted by the expansion of R&D policies. 
 
                                          (unit: hundred million won) 
 
Figure 3.  Trend of government support for R&D over the last 10 years 
 
According to the Figure 3, we may infer that the Korean government is likely to prefer 
the subsidy system as a policy means to promote R&D. It seems that the government has 
been attracted by the fact that the subsidy system has immediacy, easiness of execution 
and high degree of government intervention, while the tax expenditure system cannot be 
implemented promptly because of the approval process based on the tax law, and the 
system has an institutional nature regarding the low level of government control. And the 
phenomenon of preference for the direct support policy means like a subsidy seems to be 
in line with the recent situation in which the government-led science and technology 
policies are promoted aggressively. However, it is doubtful that the preferences for such 
policy means are based on the strict policy impact analysis. 
When the government decides to intervene in the private R&D activities, the issues the 
government has to consider are how to choose effective policy means in order to promote 
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the private R&D investment. Furthermore, in the recent situation where the demand for 
welfare is increasing, the government R&D investment is not expected to continuously 
increase as before. Accordingly, the scale of subsidy is expected to have no upward trend 
as before. And also, the government policies regarding tax expenditure need to be 
efficient in respect that it is based on the budget expenditure of the government, though it 
is carried out in an indirect form. In this context, the National Assembly of Korea has 
prepared a legal basis on which the management of achievement can be carried out by the 
enactment of the Special Tax Treatment Control Law (Clause 4 of Article 142) which was 
revised and put into effect in 2013. 
Therefore, this study is aimed at analyzing the individual effects of government 
subsidy as a direct means and the tax incentive as an indirect means among the major 
policy means, which have been implemented to promote the private R&D investment by 
the government, and carrying out a comparative evaluation of the results of analyses by 
using the CGE model. Along with this, this study aims to analyze the effects of each 
investment-inducing policy on economic growth in consideration of the fact that the 
technology policy is to induce economic growth through technological changes in the 
long run. 
 
4.2 Analytical framework 
4.2.1 Inter-industry technology flows 
4.2.1.1 Recognition of spillover effect 
 
Enterprises improve their productivity through technological changes which are 
obtained from their own R&D activities. However, the technology, a fruit of R&D 
activities, has a unique characteristic regarding the fact that the technology cannot be 
monopolized by the enterprise (Arrow, 1962). Due to the characteristics of technical 
knowledge as public goods, even enterprises that have not engaged in R&D can improve 
their productivity freely via the results of R&D achieved by other enterprises. Moreover, 
there are many results of studies which show that the productivity has improved largely 
due to the spillover effects rather than their own R&D activities (Griliches, 1998a). 
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Griliches (1979) divided such spillover effects into two types, the rent spillover and 
knowledge spillover effect. The rent spillover is related to the transactions (purchase flow) 
of goods (capital goods or intermediate goods), in which a technology developed by other 
enterprise is embodied. In the background of this concept is the fact that the aspects of 
qualitative improvement is not reflected in the price of goods, of which the quality has 
been improved through innovation activities, due to a new competition pressure and price 
elasticity of demand. Accordingly, other enterprises, which apply such goods to their own 
production process as input factors of production without paying additional costs, will 
enjoy a part of product innovation as a spillover effect (Griliches, 1979, 1992; Verspagen, 
1997). Griliches (1979) took the computer industry as an example of rent spillover. The 
computer industry has brought about technological innovation through cutting-edge R&D. 
The productivity of computer industry cannot be measured by using a standardized 
method, and the benefit of productivity improvement cannot be completely monopolized. 
Other industries will receive differential benefits according to the amount of purchase of 
goods from the computer industry. 
On the other hand, the pure knowledge spillover is not directly connected with 
transactions of goods, because it is based on the fact that knowledge has the 
characteristics of public goods. This works through various channels such as the mobility 
of researchers, patent information, reverse engineering, scientific journals, and 
information exchange at seminars (Los, 1997; Verspagen, 1997; Maurseth & Verpagen, 
2002). Griliches (1979) paid attention to the relationship between the photographic 
equipment industry and scientific instrument industry, taking it as an example of pure 
knowledge spillover. Though there are not many transactions between the two industries, 
they benefit from each other's R&D as the fields of technology they belong to are similar 
to each other. 
 
4.2.1.2 Tracking the technology flows 
 
As mentioned above, most economists have acknowledged that the knowledge of 
technology, which has been obtained through R&D activities, has a unique characteristic 
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regarding the spillover effect, and it has impacts on the productivity of other industries 
(Verspagen). In this context, the empirical studies on the effects and direction of spillover 
effects have been carried out vigorously. In order to estimate the spillover effect, the first 
work to be done is to measure the size of external knowledge stock, which causes the 
spillover effect in an industry. 
The amount of benefit obtained by an industry through the spillover effect is associated 
with the size of external knowledge stock, and it can be commonly expressed as the sum 
of weighted values of the knowledge stock of other industries as follows (Griliches, 1979; 
Los, 1979). 
 
  j ij i
i
IRE RE i j  
 
In this equation, 'i' is the industry producing the spillover, 'j' is the industry which is the 
beneficiary of the spillover effect. iRE  is the knowledge stock of external industries, 
and the weighted valued ij  is the degree of effect of the knowledge stock of industry 'i' 
on the productivity of industry 'j'. Accordingly, 
jIRE  is the sum of the weighted values 
of the external knowledge stocks that has effect on industry 'j' . 
The weighted value refers to the degree of benefit of external R&D capital, which is 
granted to each enterprise or industry, and it also means the economic and technological 
distance among enterprises. If an industry gets further away from external knowledge, the 
spillover effect will decrease. So, a question is raised on how to measure the weighted 
values representing the technological distance among enterprises or industries (Antony & 
Grebel, 2008). 
Griliches (1979) argued that there was not sufficient theoretical or factual knowledge 
regarding the work in which the correct weight values of external R&D stocks could be 
obtained. And he argued that such a problem should be solved in an empirical manner, 
though it was very difficult. Accordingly, it is required to establish the method in advance, 
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in which the producer and beneficiary exchange such effects in order to identify the 
spillover effects of R&D and deal with the problems to be measured (Griliches, 1998a). 
According to the survey research carried out by Mohnen (1996), the factors such as 
product domain between the two industries, type of R&D, patent classification, input-
output flow, mobility of research manpower, qualification of research manpower, and 
research cooperation agreement shall be considered in order to measure the weighted 
values. The factors mentioned above can be divided into two views on the basis of the 
spillover type. The first one is the view that the technology is spreading out after it is 
embodied in the goods (embodied knowledge spillovers), and the other is the view that 
the technology is spreading out through various channels other than the goods 
(disembodied knowledge spillovers). 
 
4.2.1.3 Flow of technology based on embodied knowledge 
 
Some researchers thought that the technology was spread outside through the inter-
industry transactions of products in which the innovation was embodied. In this 
viewpoint of methodology, the background is inherent in the idea that enterprises are 
dealing with the knowledge accumulated inside as intermediate goods. From this 
viewpoint the industry will benefit from the external knowledge in proportion to the 
goods they purchase (Los, 2000). Measuring the flow of technology based on the 
embodied knowledge among industries by using the I-O table is related to the rent 
spillovers (Griliches, 1992; Los, 1997). In the pioneering works carried out by Brown and 
Conrad (1967), and Terleckyj (1974), the I-O table was used to consider the transactions 




Though the earlier studies considered the transactions of intermediate goods as the 
transactions of goods among industries, some follow-up studies measured the weighted 
                                            
6 The studies dealing with transactions among industries on the basis of I-O table include the studies carried 
out by Terleckyj (1980), Griliches (1979, 1984), Sveikauskas (1981), Odagiri (1985), Goto and Suzuki (1989), 
Wolff and Nadiri (1993), Wolff (1997), and Keller (2002), and we may refer to the survey researches carried 
out by Nadiri (1993), Griliches (1995), and Mohnen (1996) as well. 
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values, focusing on transaction flow of capital goods rather than the intermediate goods, 
in consideration of the fact that the capital goods was playing a role in delivery of the 
spillover effects (Wolff & Nadiri, 1993). 
Especially, the measurement methodology for knowledge spillover through goods 
transactions have been applied to the studies which were aimed at analyzing the effects of 
foreign trade on economic productivity of a country (Antony & Grebel, 2008). Coe and 
Helpman (1995) put emphasis on the rent spillovers among countries, shedding light on 
the relationship between the knowledge of technology embodied in the goods, which 
were traded between countries, and the total factor productivity. Keller (1999) used the 
methodology of Coe and Helpman (1995) in order to analyze the productivity of various 
sectors in the G7 countries. And also, Keller (2001) carried out survey researches on the 
literature in which the relationships between the goods transactions through foreign trade 
and the total factor productivity were dealt with. 
 
4.2.1.4 Flow of technology based on disembodied knowledge 
 
Disembodied knowledge may be spread out through migration of researchers, patent 
information, science and technology journal, and seminars, so that it is difficult to 
identify the source of the flow of technology based on disembodied knowledge accurately 
(Maurseth & Verspagen, 2002). A lot of authors of literature used the patent citation data 
in order to measure the spillover of the knowledge created through innovation (Antony & 
Grebel, 2008). The studies, in which this methodology was applied, acknowledged that 
such patent citations data were a measure of knowledge spillovers (Maurseth & 
Verspagen, 2002). However, in reality, the pure knowledge spillover has a broader range 
than the flow of technology which is captured from patent citation, so that the patent-
based information accounts for a part of pure knowledge spillover (Maurseth & 
Verspagen, 2002). 
Despite such limits, the merit of patent data is that it helps figure out the flow of 
technology between the producers of knowledge and the beneficiary as patent documents 
also contain citations to previous patents. On the other hand, patents have been 
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recognized as useful indexes with which a lot of studied related economics may identify 
R&D activities and technological changes (Griliches, 1990). The studies in which patent-
based information was used in order to measure the knowledge spillover include Jaffe et 
al. (1993), Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996, 1998), Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Jaffe et al. 
(1993), Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996, 1998), Verspagen and De Loo (2000). 
Despite the usability of patent-based information, patent data could not be used 
frequently as it could not provide the data at industrial level, which was needed by 
economics studies focused on R&D and productivity (Kortum & Putnam, 1997). 
However, the difficulty in matching the codified technological knowledge to specific 
industrial sectors was overcome by the Yale technology concordance (YTC) scheme 
suggested by Evenson et al. (1991) (Antony & Grebel, 2008). 
The Yale technology concordance provided the spillover matrix by connecting the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) with the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC). Since then, the spillover effect could be estimated by using the 
matrix of flow of technology in many studies carried out by Fikkert (1997), Evenson 
(1997), Verspagen (1997), Los and Verspagen (1999), Keller (2002). Evenson and 
Johnson (1997), Kortum and Putnam (1997) confirmed the usability of Yale technology 
concordance in their studies. 
 
4.2.1.5 Selection of the estimation method for technology flows 
 
In fact, both the rent spillovers and pure knowledge spillovers are acting as an 
important factor in the endogenous growth theory (Verspagen, 1997). And when 
analyzing the spillover effects on the whole economy, it is impossible to divide the 
spillover effects occurring between producers and beneficiaries into rent spillovers and 
pure knowledge spillovers (Meijl, 1995). Nevertheless, the studies focused on spillovers 
shall select one between rent spillovers and pure knowledge spillovers to reflect it a 
model. The result of study may differ according the selection approach, so that the 
selection of estimation method for flow of technology is one of the important works. 
Due to the growing interest in patent citation and the development of computer 
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software that help find out the specific patent with ease, the patent data has been used as 
indexes, with which we may measure the size and direction of spillovers (Griliches, 
1998a). 
However, the studies focused on estimation of the flow of technology on the basis of 
such patent data have several problems and limits (Griliches, 1990; Verspagen & De Loo, 
2000). Among the problems, this study aimed at reflection of spillover effect at the 
industrial level has to pay attention to the two. Firstly, the propensity to patent differs 
from industry to industry (Scherer, 1983). According to Scherer, the concentrated 
industries aiming to increase market share and profits and the firms, which have been 
diversified across industries and countries have higher patenting propensities. On the 
other hand, the industries, of which the principal user of innovation is the government, 
are likely to have a lower propensity to acquire new patents. That is because the 
government pays more attention the systems-based innovations rather than the innovation 
of specific products, and it is more difficult to acquire a patent in the fields of systems-
based innovations. And in most cases, the ownership of outcomes from innovation, which 
has been carried out by public contracts, belongs to the government. Accordingly, there is 
no substantial motive to innovate and no need for patent. On the contrary, it is essential to 
protect the patent related to the technology for pharmaceutical industry, because it can be 
copyed in the development process. Typically, the share of innovations which are 
patented is higher in such industries (Verspagen & De Loo, 2000). 
Secondly, the measurement of flow of technology by using patent-based information is 
on the assumption that the spillover has been delivered from the cited patent to the citing 
patent. By the way, the judgment regarding the technological connection between patents 
is not made by the inventor, but the patent office. Therefore, it is not clear whether the 
knowledge of cited patent has been delivered to the citing patent (Verspagen & De Loo, 
2000). In their study, in which some US patents were used as materials, Jaffe et al. (1998) 
argued that the patent information was useful to measure the spillover effect of 
technology, but it could cause errors. 
On the other hand, Keller (1997) compared the results of regression analysis on the 
relationship between total factor productivity and R&D on the basis of YTC matrix with 
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the results of regression analysis on the data regarding the flow of technology on the basis 
of I-O table. According to Keller, there was not a clear difference between the results of 
regression analysis based on the YTC and the results of regression analysis based on the 
I-O table. Therefore, he concluded that it was impossible to determine whether the 
technology flow table of YTC could capture the technology flows among industries more 
effectively than that of the I-O table. Meanwhile, Keller (2002) analyzed the effects of 
own R&D and external R&D on the total factor productivity by using the technology 
flow table based on the I-O table and YTC matrix. Keller (2002) argued that the 
technology flows based on the I-O table appeared to have a better statistic result than the 
technology flows based on the YTC matrix. 
As a result, it is more reasonable to estimate the technology flows by using the I-O 
table in this study in which the spillover effect of knowledge among industries is reflected. 
Accordingly, the technology flow table was prepared on the basis of the transaction flow 
of the I-O table of the base year. And then, the external R&D stock that had impact on 
industrial productivity was estimated by using the technology flow table. 
 
4.2.2 Investment model 
 
The typical investment theories, in which the policy variables of tax support may be 
reflected, include the investment theory of Jorgenson (1963, 1967), Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967), who introduced the concept of user cost of capital, and the Tobin's (1969) Q 
theory. Both models are based on the idea that investments occur when a producer 
decides to raise the current capital stock level to the optimal capital stock level in order to 
maximize the profit. This basic principle of investment model refers to the decision-
making on investment in consideration of the marginal condition, which was suggested 
by Fisher (1930), and it is positioned on the extension of decision-making model in which 
the investment is decided by comparing the marginal cost with the marginal profit that 
can be obtained from 1 unit of marginal investment. 
First of all, in the investment model of Jorgenson (1963, 1967), an enterprise that is 
able to predict the future completely will seek profit-maximization
 




. According to Jorgenson's model, the changes in user cost of capital, 
in which the variables of investment-inducing policy have been considered, will cause a 
change in the level of capital stock from the current level to the desired level of capital 
stock. Actual investments occur in order to adjust the gap between the current level of 
capital stock and the level of desired capital stock that has been changed. 
In a circumstance without a variable of tax, the process where the level of desired 
capital stock is determined is as follows. When an enterprise borrow assets from another 
firms in order to obtain capital services, the rental rate of capital inputs can be calculated 
in the following equation. 
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q t e c s e ds
e c s ds                                   Eq. (1)
 
 
 where, q : price of capital goods 
r : discount rate 
c : cost of capital services 
 : rate of replacement 
t : time when the capital goods are acquired 
s : time when the capital service are supplied 
 
If the equation is differentiated against the time when the capital goods were obtained, 
we may derive Equation (2) below. 
 
( )c q r q

  
                                             Eq. (2) 
 
Here, /q dq dt

 , so that it refers to the inflation, or appreciation or gain in capital. 
                                            
7 The investment model of Jorgenson explained in this clause was cited from Jorgenson (1963, 1967), Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967). 
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And then, if it is supposed that there is no gain in capital, Equation (3) can be derived. 
 
 ( ) c q r                                                 Eq. (3) 
 
Left side of Equation (3) is the rental price of capital from the standpoint of the owner 
of capital, and it also means the user cost of capital from the viewpoint of lessee . Now in 
order to analyze the effects of tax incentive on investment, the tax variables such as the 
corporate tax rate, tax credit rate, depreciation rate are applied, so that Equation (3) can 
be expanded to Equation (4). 
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Eq. (4) 
 
 where,  : corporate tax rate 
k : investment tax credit rate 
( )D s : depreciation (the proposition of the original cost of an asset of age s that 
may be deducted from income for tax purpose) 
 
Now if 'z' is defined as the present value of the depreciation deduction on one dollar’s 
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Eq. (5) 
 
 Accordingly, Equation (3) can be expanded to Equation (6) which represents the user 













c q r                                      Eq. (6) 
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Meanwhile, Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967) assumed the Cobb-Douglas 





( , ) , 1       Y L K a L K where                         Eq. (7) 
 
Accordingly, when the exogenous output (Y), the price of output (PY) and the user cost 
of capital (C) are given, the desired level of capital stock below can be derived, under the 









                                              Eq. (8)
 
 
In this regard, K   is the desired level of capital stock to meet the profit-
maximization condition. By using Equation (8), the relationship between the desired level 
of capital stock and tax variables can be identified. In short, when the corporate tax rate 
or tax credit rate are lowered, the user cost of capital will be lowered, so that the desired 
level of capital stock will be raised. 
The capital stock in Equation (8) is the theoretically desired level of capital stock that 
may maximize the profit, so that there may exist a gap between the theoretically desired 
level of capital stock and the current level of capital stock. The producers try to narrow 
the gap through actual investment expenditures. It is required to formulize the process, in 
which the changes in the desired level of capital stock in a model lead to an actual 
investment, in an investment model. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) judged that the demand 
for investment could not immediately result in actual investments due to the additional 
costs to adjust the level of capital stock. The assumed that the actual investments, which 
were affected by the changes in the desired level of capital stock, were carried out for 
                                            
8
 The more genralized type of function is the CES function as follows. 
1/( , ) [ ] , 1        Y L K a L K where
 
Jorgenson (1963) introduced the Cobb-Douglas function on the assumption that the value of substitution 
elasticity among input factors was 1. And Jorgenson and Stephenson (1969) argued that the unit elasticity 
of substitution was in accordance with the actual data. 
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multiple time periods, instead of introducing the adjustment cost of capital. The actual 
investment behavior can be described through the distributed lag function in which the 
time-phased weighted values are applied. And Hall and Jorgenson assumed that the 
replacement investment was in proportion to the level of capital stock under their 
assumption of a constant rate of replacement. In this regard, the total demand for 
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  
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s : proportion of change in desired capital in period t-s that results in 
 investment expenditures in period t. 
 
Therefore, the net investment can be expressed as the weighted average of the change 
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And now, the course of performance, in which the investment demand is materialized 
into actual investments, can be expressed completely by estimating the coefficient of 
distributed lag function. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) assumed that the changes in the 
desired level of capital stock during the first two periods had a considerable effect on 
investments, and the effects of the changes that happened during the previous period was 
reduced geometrically. Under such assumption, Equation (10) can be expressed as 
Equation (11) again. 
 
 1 1 1 1
(1 )             t t t t t t t tNID K K NID                  Eq. (11) 
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If, in that expression, I replace 
K
 
in Equation (11) with 
K
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             Eq. (12) 
 
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) specified the coefficients in Equation (9) by estimating the 
coefficient of Equation (12), so that they could explain the capital investment in the USA 
during the period between 1931 and 1963. They argued that the fitted investment 
functions could describe the actual investment expenditures successfully despite the 
considerable variability in levels of gross investment during the relevant period. 
Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of 
its assets. If the value of Q is bigger than 1, the net investment will increase, but if it is 
smaller than 1, the net investment will decrease. 
Summers (1981) derive the tax adjusted Q, in which tax variables were considered, in 
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Eq. (13) 
 
 where,  : corporate tax rate 
c : capital income tax rate 
 : dividend tax rate 
k : investment tax credit 
 : change in a firm’s value resulting from a unit increment to the  
capital stock 
z : present value of the tax savings from the depreciation deductions arising 
                                            
9 As for the contents regarding tax adjusted Q, the study of Summers (1981) was mainly referred to. 
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 on a new investment of one dollar 
 : rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock 
 : debt ratio (= debt / capital stcok) 
p : price of goods (overall price level) 
 
Along with this, the following relationship between Q and the investment (I) has been 
derived by introducing the quadratic adjusted cost function ( ), in order to reflect the 
process, in which the investment is realized after the decision on investment is made by a 
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           Eq. (14) 
  
The right side of the equation above represents the value of Q. Through Equation (14), 
we may know that the Q model for tax adjustment considers the capital cost as a variable 
explaining the investments. However, the shadow price,  , which represents the change 
in a firm’s value resulting from a unit increment to the capital stock, cannot be observed. 
Accordingly, Hayashi (1982) solved the empirical problem by replacing the shadow 



























                             Eq. (16) 
 
 where, V : market value of a firm’s equity 
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B : present value of the tax savings due to depreciation deductions 
   on existing capital 
pK : nominal value of capital stock 
 
Both Jorgenson's investment model, in which the user cost of capital is used, and the 
investment model based on the Q theory, which has been suggested by Tobin (1969), 
Summers (1981), Hayashi (1982), are regarded as a neoclassical approach based on a 
firm's optimizing behavior, and they are considered to have provide solid theoretical 
foundations for the investment models (Kwack, 2005). 
In this study, the investment model suggested by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), in which 
the user cost of capital is considered, has been selected between the two investment 
models in which the variables of tax incentive can be reflected. The reason is as follows. 
Firstly, there are many obstacles to measure the value of Q accurately in reality. The value 
of enterprise in the stock market has high volatility, and there is high probability of errors 
when measuring the replacement cost of the firm’s assets. So, the estimated Q values may 
be distorted, and such a problem may cause biased results in predicting investment plans 
(Griliches & Hausman, 1986; Cummins et al., 1994). In order to solve the problems 
regarding estimation of the distorted Q value, various estimation methods have been 
developed, including other studies focused on introduction of proxy variables for Q value 
(Caballero et al., 1995; Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995). 
Secondly, the desired capital stock in the investment model suggested by Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967) is affected by the outputs, along with the user cost of capital. In fact, 
this is the main reason why their investment model has been criticized. There have been 
arguments that the major variable that affected the decision-making on investment in the 
empirical studies, where the investment model of Hall and Jorgenson (1967) was applied, 
was not the user cost of capital, but the changes in outputs. In short, it is argued that the 
investment model of Hall and Jorgenson (1967), which is aimed at explaining that the 
significant variable regarding decision-making on investment is the user cost of capital, is 
rather playing a role in reconfirming an ‘accelerator effect’, which argues that 
investments of enterprises are related to the changes in outputs (Eisner, 1969, 1970; 
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Eisner & Nadri, 1968; Chirinko & Eisner, 1983). 
However, it is judged that the reflection of outputs (value-added) in this study, in which 
the methodology of CGE is applied, is rather appropriate. In partial equilibrium, it may be 
expected that the investment will increase when the user cost of capital decreases. 
However, from the viewpoint of general equilibrium, we may not see that reduction of 
user cost of capital leads to increase in investment. In general equilibrium, the tax credit 
system will have different degree of impact on each industry, and it will lead to a 
difference in production capability and growth rate in individual industries. Furthermore, 
when considering the indirect path on which the spillover effects have impacts on the 
growth of other industries, we may see relatively fast growth in some industries or 
slowdown or decrease of growth in other industries from a dynamic point of view
10
. 
Therefore, it has been judged that the application of the investment model suggested by 
Hall and Jorgenson (1967), in which the industrial growth may be reflected, is more 
appropriate than the application of Q-theory, when analyzing the effects of R&D policies 
on investments from the viewpoint of general equilibrium, where all the transactions 
among economic units and industries are considered. 
 
4.2.3 Structure of the CGE model 
4.2.3.1 Model Outline 
 
The models include households, government and 27 industries representing the main 
agents of production and consumption. And each industry produces one product. The 
production sectors make decisions in order to maximize their own profit in the 
environment of perfectly competitive market, and the households make decisions for 
utility maximization. The physical capitals and knowledge capitals are accumulated by 
the each investment determined endogenously, and the financial resources required for 
the investment are through the savings of the government and households. 
The primary input factors of production that will be put into production consist of labor, 
                                            
10 We may know that the value-added has an immediate and positive effect on demand for R&D investment 
through the studies by Bernstein and Nadiri (1988), Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003). 
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physical capital and knowledge capital. Especially, the knowledge capital has been 
divided into the private knowledge capital and public knowledge capital, so that the effect 
of innovation activities of each main agent can be distinguished from each other and 
evaluated individually in the aspect of R&D. The private knowledge capital means the 
knowledge stock in which the results of R&D carried out by the private sector have been 
accumulated, and the R&D activities have been carried out with its own money or 
government subsidy. On the other hand the public knowledge capital is the knowledge 
stock in which the results of R&D carried out by the government have been accumulated, 
and the R&D activities have been carried out with the financial resources from the 
government itself and the private sector. 
The major source of household income is the factor income, and household may obtain 
transfer income from the government. The government imposes taxes such as the labor 
income tax, corporate income tax, indirect tax and tariff on households and industries, 
and the tax revenues are used for savings and consumption, and transfer to household, 
and so on. As for the international trade with the rest of the world, I assume a small open 
economy, so that it does not have a significant impact on the foreign sector. 
In order to describe and analyze the long-term effect of investment, the recursive 
dynamic models have been applied. In general, the dynamic mechanisms applied to the 
CGE model are divided into the inter-temporal dynamics and recursive dynamics. 
Considering the fact that the industrial R&D investment, which has been paid attention to 
in this study, responds sensitively to the changes in economic situation, which are caused 
by uncertain changes in future economic environment, it was judged that the recursive 
dynamic model was more appropriate than the inter-temporal dynamic model. Figure 4 










Figure 4.  Structure of the Knowledge-based CGE model 
 
The variable and parameters used in this model are presented in Table 7. For your 




Table 7.  Symbols of parameters and variables 
Sets and indicies 
i  Sectors and goods     { 1, 2,,, 27}i S S S  
rdt Type of R&D         { , }rdt rdc rdg  
Activity variables 
iZ  
Gross domestic output of the i-th good 
iVA  
Value-added composite of the sector i 
iQ  
Armington composite goods of sector i 
iD  
Domestic goods of sector i 
iEX  
Exports of the i-th good 
iM  
Imports of the i-th good 
iL  
Labor used in sector i 
iK  
Physical capital used in sector i 
TINVK  Total physical capital good 
iIVNRD  
Knowledge capital good of sector i 
iSUPIVNRD  










Efficiency of sector i 
Price variables 
iPZ  Price of the i-th gross domestic output 
iPVA  Price of value-added composite of sector i 
iPQ  
Price of Armington composite goods of sector i 
PL  Wage 
PK  Rental price of physical capital 
iPH  
Rental price of knowledge capital 
PINVK  Price of physical capital goods 
PRDZ  Price of knowledge capital goods 
iPM  Price of the i-th imported good in domestic currency 
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m
iPW  Price of the i-th imported good in foreign currency 
iPE  Price of the i-th exported good in domestic currency 
e
iPW  Price of the i-th exported good in foreign currency 
ER  Exchange rate 
Tax and income variables 
LABTAX  Labor income tax 
CORTAXK  Capital income tax (physical capital) 
CORTAXH
 




TAXCRE  Amount of tax credits 
HI  Household income 
GR  government income 
BG  Government debt 





,j iax  
Input requirement coefficient of the j-th intermediate input for a unit 
output of the i-th good 
iava  
Input requirement coefficient of the i-th value-added composite for a unit 
output of the i-th good 
,i rdtaxrd  
Input requirement coefficient of the i-th intermediate input for a unit R&D 
capital good (by type of R&D) 
rdtavard  
Input requirement coefficient of the value-added composite for a unit 
R&D capital good (by type of R&D) 
tgl  
Population growth rate in period t 
 
4.2.3.2 Production activities 
 
Creation of value-added composite 
 
The value-added composite is produced using labor, physical capital and knowledge 
capital. In this model, the Constant Elasticity Substitution (CES) function is applied as a 
production function, so that it allows the knowledge capital to be replaced with the labor 
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and physical capital, which are the traditional and primary input factors of production. 
Meanwhile, the knowledge capital which is put into the value-added production activities 
as a direct factor of production is regarded as a private knowledge capital, not a public 
knowledge capital, and the knowledge capital used in each industry is regarded as a 
industry-specific asset. When considering the fact that it is difficult to use the knowledge 
capital required in the agricultural sector in the IT industry, this can be understood as a 
rational assumption. Accordingly, we may conclude the knowledge capital cannot be 
mobile among industries. 
The impossibility of movement of knowledge capital among industries forms a contrast 
to the fact that labor and physical capital can be mobile among industries. Accordingly, 
the producers seeking to maximize profits decide the input demands for labor and 
physical capital, and the level of value-added composite by adjusting quantities of labor 
and physical capital, depending on the relative prices, while all the current knowledge 
capitals, which are accumulated during the previous periods, are used for production of 
value-added composite. The optimal quantities of value-added composite and input 
factors in an industry that seeks to maximize profits can be represented by solving the 
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where for i
                  Eq. (17)
 
 
In this formulation, 
iEFF  
is the variable that represents the productivity affected by 
the spillover of knowledge capital, and the full explanation will be given later. In the 
value-added production function in the CES type mentioned above, the value of elasticity 
of substitution for labor, physical capital and knowledge capital in each industry is 
supposed to be '1'. Accordingly, the production function of value-added composite can be 
contracted to the Cobb-Douglas function. In this type of production functions the profit-
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maximizing producers will decide the quantities of value-added composite and the input 







   
l k h
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i i i i i
l k h
i i i
VA EFF L K H
where for i
                            Eq. (18)
 
 
      i i i i i i i iPVA VA PL L PK K PH H                         Eq. (19)
 
 
( ) /[(1 ) ]    l li i i i iL PVA VA t PL                              Eq. (20)
 
 
( ) /[(1 ) ]    k ki i i i iK PVA VA t PK                            Eq. (21)
 
 
( ) /[(1 ) ]    h hi i i i i iPH PVA VA t H                           Eq. (22)
 
 
Production of gross domestic output 
 
The gross domestic output of each industry is produced using value-added composites 
and intermediate goods. The Leontief type production function has been applied to 
production of gross domestic output just like it is used in the CGE model. The Leontief 
production function does not allow the substitution between value-added composites and 
intermediate goods. So, the producer seeking to maximize a profit will face the 
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i
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X X X VA
s t Z for i
ax ax ax ava
               Eq. (23) 
 
The producer who is facing the problem of profit maximization will determine the 





,  j i j i iX ax Z for i j                                    Eq. (24) 
 




min( , ,..., , ) 
i i n i i
i
i i n i i
X X X VA
Z for i
ax ax ax ava
                   Eq. (26) 
 
On the other hand, the Leontief production function in Equation (26) does not facilitate 
differentiation, so that there may be a difficulty in numerical computations. So, it is better 





i i i i i j j i
j
PZ Z PVA VA PQ X for i        
      
       Eq. (27) 
 
And the following unit cost function can be derived if ,j iX  and iVA  in Equation (27) 
are replaced by using Equation (24) and (25). 
 
 
,    i i i j i j
j
PZ ava PVA ax PQ for i                       Eq. (28) 
 
Consequently, the produce will determine the quantities of gross output, value-added 
composite, and intermediate goods that satisfy Equation (24), (25), and (28). 
 
Spillover effects of knowledge 
 
A sector-specific knowledge capital is used as an input factor to produce value-added 
composites, so it has a direct impact on the relevant sector. But the economic importance 
of knowledge capital is that it generates the spillover effect. In short, a knowledge capital 
accumulated in a specific sector can have impact on the productivity of other sector after 
it is adopted by the relevant sector without charge. In this model, the spillover effect of 
knowledge capital has been reflected in the following method. 
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Above all, in the case of private knowledge capital, an industry 'i' selected randomly 
will benefit from the knowledge capital accumulated by industry 'j' (j≠i). As mentioned in 
Clause 4.2.1., it has been supposed that the scale of knowledge stock of other industries 
(namely, external knowledge stock, s
iH ) that affects an industry 'i' would be in 





  si i j j
j i




jH : knowledge stock of the industry 'j' 
 ,
i j : rate of goods sold to the industry 'i' over goods 'j' (as intermediate goods) 
 
On the other hand, the economic effect of external knowledge stock (
s
iH ) on the 
industry 'i' has been estimated through the elasticity of total factor productivity (TFP) or 
gross domestic production (GDP). In this study, the elasticity of GDP with respect to the 
external knowledge stock has been reflected on the basis of the study carried out by Jo 
(2004). Accordingly, an efficiency variable of an industry can be expressed as a 




 , si i iEFF f H ela                                          Eq. (30) 
 where, 
iela : elasticity of GDP with respect to external knowledge stocks 
              for the industry 'i' 
 
As shown in Equation (30), the degrees of increase in value-added (i.e. the degree of 
productivity improvement) caused by an external industry differ from industry to industry. 
We can understand that it is caused by the capacity to absorb the external knowledge 
capital and the technological proximity among industries. 
67 
On the other hand, the public knowledge capital has the non-rival and non-exclusive 
nature of public goods that can be used by all industries simultaneously. Accordingly, all 
the private sectors can improve their productivity by using the public knowledge capital. 
In this model, the effect of public knowledge capital on productivity has been calculated 
by reflecting the elasticity of GDP with respect to the public knowledge capital on the 
basis of the study carried out by Park et al. (2003). Accordingly, the industrial efficiency 
variable in Equation (30) can be expressed again as the function like Equation (31). 
 
 
 , , , si i i iEFF f H ela HG elahg                               Eq. (31) 
 
 where, HG: public knowledge stock 
       
ie l a h g: elasticity of GDP with respect to public knowledge stock 
              for the industry 'i' 
 
In a word, the private knowledge capital can be fully formed by private R&D activities, 
and the capital has direct impact on its own production as it is used as a factor of 
production. And also, the knowledge capital of each industry, along with the government 
and public knowledge capital, creates spillover effects, so that it may have an effect on 




The financial resources needed for R&D investments are provided through the savings 
of private sector and government. Korea has a very small scale of R&D investment from 
overseas, so in this study the foreign savings for R&D have not been considered. In 
principle, the financial resources for industrial R&D investment are based on the R&D-





 rdc i iPRDZ IDH PSAVRD                      
            Eq. (32) 
 
 where, 
rdcPRDZ : price of private R&D capital goods 
 i
IDH : demand for investment goods 
 i
PSAVRD : financial resources held by industries (savings) 
 
In short, as shown in Equation (32), when the investment demand of the industry is 
determined endogenously, the financial resources for R&D investment is supplied 
through household savings (
iPSAVRD ) in principle. However, if the government grants 
subsidies in order to improve the competitiveness of enterprises, the private firm will 
decide the firm’s own R&D expenditures (savings) in consideration of the government 
subsidy. In this process, the government subsidy appears to promote or crowd out private 
investments. In this study, the mechanism, in which the private firms make a decision on 
the scale of firms’ own investment when receiving government subsidy, has been realized 
by using the CES function. In short, when the government is engaged in subsidization, 
the financial resources needed for investments will be supplied through the government 
subsidy and in-house financing as shown in Equation (33). 
 
     
1/
(1 ) )
         rdc i i iPRDZ IDH a PSAVRD RDSUBSIDY  




iRDSUBSIDY : government subsidy 
 
On the left side of Equation (33) is the financial resource ( rdc iPRDZ IDH ) needed for 
investment of the industry 'i', and the right side represents the process in which the 
financial resource is supplied by combining the in-house financing and the government 
subsidy. In principle, the government-led R&D is supplied from the government budget, 
and some part of the financial resources is provided by the private sector. For the sake of 
simplicity of the model, the scale of government-led R&D investment has been fixed in 
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comparison with the GDP. 
 
     GRD rgrd GDP rprd GDP                  
            Eq. (34) 
 
 where, rgrd : proportion of government-led R&D investment over GDP 
       r p r d: proportion of private R&D investment aimed at the government 
over GDP 
 
Meanwhile, the financial resources needed for physical capital is supplied through the 
savings of households and government, including the capital from overseas. Above all, 
the scale of financial resources based on the savings of households and government, 
which is aimed at physical capital, is determined by propensity to save among economic 
agents. And the propensity to save refers to the proportion of savings of each economic 
agent in the physical capital investment in the base year. On the other hand, the influx of 




( ) ( )       i i
i i
TSAVK rp PINVK IDK rg PINVK IDK SF    Eq. (35) 
 
 where, TSAVK : total savings used for physical capital investment 
 ,rp rg : propensity to save regarding the physical capital investment of 
              households and government respectively 
 
SF : balance of trade 
 
In this manner, the financial resources needed for R&D and physical capital investment 
are supplied from the savings of households and government, and the total savings of 
each economic agent are as follows. 
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       Total savings of household 
 
( )      i i
i i
SP PSAVRD rprd GDP rp PINVK IDK          Eq. (36) 
 
 
Total savings of government
 
 
( )      i i
i i
SG RDSUBSIDY rgrd GDP rg PINVK IDK      Eq. (37) 
 
In this model, the size of investment of physical capital and R&D capital is determined 
endogenously, so that the financial resources needed for this investment differ according 
to the size of investment determined endogenously. In a word, this model is an 
investment-driven model, of which the size of total savings is determined by investments. 
So, as the investment demand increases, the savings of households increase proportionally, 
however, the consumption of households decreases. 
 
4.2.3.4 Physical capital and production of capital goods 
 
The funds supplied through savings are used to purchase physical and R&D capital 
goods. The physical capital goods are the composite goods produced by inputting 
domestic goods and imported goods. In other words, when the demand for physical 
capital goods is determined through an investment function, the quantities of composite 
goods needed for supply of the physical capital goods can be derived as well. 
 
 /TINVK INVRES PINVK                                   Eq. (38) 
 
 i iXV TINVK                                            Eq. (39) 
 
The scale of R&D capital goods is determined in the following equation on the basis of 
scale of savings for R&D investment and the price of capital goods. 
 
 




/i i rdcSUPINVRD RDSUBSIDY PRDZ             
            Eq. (41)
 
 
( ) rdc i i
i
RDZ INVRD SUPINVRD                          Eq. (42) 
 
( ) /   rdg rdgRDZ rprd GDP rgrd GDP PRDZ                  Eq. (43) 
 
The R&D capital goods are produced using composite goods and value-added 
composites. When it is supposed that the production function of R&D capital goods is the 
Leontief production function of Armington composite goods and value-added, the 
Armington composite goods and value-added needed for production of R&D capital 




 i rdt i rdt rdtRXV axrd RDZ                                    Eq. (44) 
 
 rdt rdt rdtRVA avard RDZ                                     Eq. (45) 
 
,   rdt rdt rdt i rdt i
i
PRDZ avard PRVA axrd PQ                  Eq. (46) 
 
And now, in order to satisfy the demand for the value-added derived from Equation 
(45), labor and capital is input to produce value-added composites. At this time the Cobb-





   rdt caprdt labrdt rdt rdt rdtRVA a RLS RKS                            Eq. (47) 
 ,
( ) /  rdt rdt lab rdt rdtRLS PRVA RVA PL                          Eq. (48) 
 ,
( ) /  rdt rdt cap rdt rdtRKS PRVA RVA PK                         Eq. (49) 
 
4.2.3.5 International trade 
 
It is supposed that a small open economy has been applied to this model. The small 
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open economy implies that an economic scale of a country is so small that the economic 
activities of the country have no effect on the rest of the world. This assumption is 
realized as the export and import prices in terms of foreign currency are exogenously 
given for this economy (Hosoe et al, 2010). Accordingly, the export and import prices in 
foreign currency are not variables, but parameters of which the values are given 
exogenously, while the export and import prices of goods in domestic currency are 
endogenous variables. The two types of price are related to each other through the 
exchange rate variable. 
 
 
(1 )m mi i iPM ER t PW                                        Eq. (50) 
e
i iPE ER PW   
 
 where, 




iPW : import and export price of goods in foreign currency 
 
As shown in Equation (50), this model reflects fact that tariffs are imposed in foreign 
trade, and the domestic price of exported and imported goods is expressed by multiplying 
the foreign price including the tariff by the exchange rate. On the other hand, the 
imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods has been reflected in the 
model through Armington’s assumption. The imperfect substitutability between domestic 
and imported goods implies that the goods produced domestically and the goods imported 
from a foreign country are separated from each other, though the kinds of the goods are 
identical. The model represents the imperfect substitution between domestic and imported 
goods by using the CES function. The Armington composite goods are provided to 
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                Eq. (51)
 
 
Through the optimization issue mentioned above, a derived demand for the domestic 
and imported goods can be deducted (Equation 52), and Equation (53) is induced by 


















                                 Eq. (52) 
 
    i i i i i iPQ Q PM M PD D                                 Eq. (53) 
 
On the other hand, the goods produced domestically are consumed by home consumers, 
or exported to other countries. Enterprises seeking to maximize profits make a decision 
on whether their products will be sold in the domestic market or a foreign market, 
according to the domestic price and export price. In this model, the Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) function in Equation (54) has been introduced along with the 
existing CGE model. As a result, producers shall consider the restriction from the 
equations (Equation 54 and 55) and the normal profit condition (Equation 56), on which 
they determine the quantities of goods to be sold in the domestic market, and other goods 




















                                      
Eq. (55) 
 
    i i i i i iPZ Z PE E PD D                                   Eq. (56) 
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The government imposes tax on the labor income of households, and also the 
government imposes the corporate tax and indirect tax on the production activities of 
firms. And the government imposes tariffs on imports of goods. The rules of ad valorem 
duty have been applied to all the taxes, and the each rate of taxation reflected in this 
model was determined on the basis of the data presented in the national tax statistics 
yearbook and the I-O table. On the other hand, the tax revenues collected by the 
government are consumed by the government first. The consumption scale of each 
product, regarding the government expenditure, was defined as the increased amount 
based on the rate of growth of GDP from the initial value in the base year. And the 
government saves funds to supply financial resources needed for physical capital and 
R&D investments. After allocating the tax revenues to consumption and savings, the 
residue is transferred to households. 
 
 Iidirect tax 
 
   Zi i i
i
INDTAX t PZ Z                                    Eq. (57)
 
 
       Labor income tax 
 
   li i
i
LABTAX t PL L                                      Eq. (58)
 
 
 Capital income tax (physical capital) 
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Capital income tax (knowledge capital)
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TARIFF t PW M                                     Eq. (61) 
 
 Government income 
      GR INDTAX CORTAXK CORTAXH LABTAX TARIFF BG    
Eq. (62) 
 
 Government consumption 
 0
 i iXG rgdp XG                                           Eq. (63) 
 
 Government savings 
 
( )      i i
i i
SG RDSUBSIDY rgrd GDP rg PINVK IDK      Eq. (64) 
 








Households get the government transfer, and they also get factor income by providing 
the production sectors with factors of production such as labor, physical and knowledge 
capital. Households shall allocate a part of income to tax that is to be paid according to 
the tax rate determined by the government, and then save a part of income needed for 
investments. As explained in the items of investment above, the amount of savings from 
76 
household income has been determined in consideration of the demand of firm’s own 
R&D investments and the proportion to be covered by households in dealing with 
investment demand of the government and the total physical capital investment. 
 
       Labor income 
 
  i i
i
LINC PL L                                           Eq. (66) 
 
 Physical Capital income 
 
  i i
i
KINC PK K                                          Eq. (67) 
 
 Knowledge capital income 
 
  i i
i
HINC PH H                                         Eq. (68)
 
 
 Total household income 
    HI LINC KINC HINC TR                              Eq. (69) 
 
 Household savings 
 
( )      i i
i i
SP PSAVRD rprd GDP rp PINVK IDK
         
Eq. (70) 
 
The rest of income, after allocating the income to tax payment and savings, will be 
used for household consumption. The utility in households is achieved by consuming 
goods, and households determine the amount of consumption of each product in order to 
achieve the utility maximization within the available budget. In this model, the utility 
function of households is supposed to be the Cobb-Douglas function. Accordingly, the 


















s t PQ XP HI SP
                               Eq. (71)
 
 
After solving the utility maximization problem, the amount of consumption of each 
product is determined as follows. 
 
 




Because this model is based on the perfect competitive market system, the goods and 
factor market shall satisfy the market-clearing conditions. The market clearing of a goods 
market implies that the supply and demand are well balanced. So, the following 
constraint shall be satisfied. 
 
 Market-clearing condition (goods) 
 
,     i i j i i i rdt
j rdt
Q X XP XG XV RXV                      Eq. (73) 
 
On the other hand, even in the factor market focused on labor, physical capital, and 
knowledge capital, the constraint regarding the balance between demand and supply shall 
be satisfied (Equation 74, 75, 76). 
 




L L LS                                            Eq. (74) 
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K K KS                                           Eq. (75) 
 
 Market-clearing condition (knowledge capital) 
 i i




In the case of R&D investments, the amount of investment and savings are equal to 
each other as the financial resources are supplied from the savings of households and 
government. However, in the case of physical capital they are not equal to each other.  
This is because the investment regarding physical capital is determined endogenously by 
an investment function, while the savings for physical capital are determined by the 
household and government's propensity to save, which is determined exogenously. 
Accordingly, this model has been designed to make the investments and savings for 
physical capital be equal to each other by using the debt of government. 
 
 Savings for physical capital investment 
 
( ) ( )       i i
i i
TSAVK rp PINVK INVK rg PINVK INVK SF  Eq. (77) 
 
 Government debt 
 BG TSAVK INVRES                                      Eq. (78) 
 
4.2.3.7 Dynamic process 
 
Labor is an exogenous factor that increases or decreases according to the rate of 
population growth predicted in advance, while capital investments accumulate as a capital 
stock on the basis of the endogenous decision made by economic agents. Adopting the 
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general principle of perpetual inventory method, in which physical capital is accumulated, 
the method has been applied to the knowledge capital in this study according to the 
recommendation of OECD (2010), so that the knowledge created by R&D may be 
accumulated and used in the future production activities. As shown in Equation (81), the 
private knowledge capital is accumulated through the firm’s own R&D investment and 
the investments based on the government subsidy. 
On the other hand, the knowledge capital is subject to obsolescence at a constant rate 
like physical capitals. That is because the economic value that can be obtained through 
the knowledge capital decreases as the time pass by, though the knowledge capital is an 
intangible asset and not subject to depreciation in terms of material. 
 
 Demographic growth 
 1
(1 )t lt tL g L                                               Eq. (79) 
 
 Accumulation of physical capital stock 
 1
(1 )   t k t tK K TINVK                                    Eq. (80) 
 
 Accumulation of private knowledge capital stock 
 , 1 , , , ,




 Accumulation of public knowledge capital stock 
 1 , ,
(1 )   t g h t rdg tHG HG RDZ                               Eq. (82) 
 
4.3 Simulation analysis 
4.3.1 Simulation scenario 
 
The base year of this model is 2009, and the period of simulation is a total of 22 years 
from 2009 to 2030. In order to confirm the sustainability of each policy means after the 
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policy shocks, the investment-inducing measure has been inputted during the 5-year 
period between 2014 and 2018
11
. The 12 periods is long enough to identify the 
sustainability of effects of policy means after the implementation of the policy is 
completed. 
The analytical purpose of this study is aimed at analyzing the effect of each policy 
means, and comparing them with each other. Accordingly, it is required to make the 
government provide support with the same scale, so that all the industries are provided 
with the same tax credit benefit. And then, the same amount of subsidy as the tax credit 
amount occurring in every period is supplied to the industries. Other taxes are not raised 
in order to make up for the reduction of tax revenues, which is caused by the tax credit, or 
prepare the budget for subsidies. Instead, the amount of transfer to household is reduced, 
which is equivalent to the amount of tax expenditure or subsidy. 
 




Tax credit Subsidy Subjects 
Baseline scenario - - - - 
Scenario A T=6 – T=10 7%  
All the 
industries 
Scenario B T=6 – T=10 - 
Same scale as 





4.3.2 Simulation results 
4.3.2.1 Promotion of R&D investments 
 
It has been found out that the provision of tax credit benefit is more effective to 
achieve the primary goal, which is to promote private R&D investment at its own 
expense, than the subsidy support. The reason why the tax benefit is more effective is that 
                                            
11 The base year of simulation is year 2009 (T=1). So, the period between 2014 and 2018, when the 
investment-inducing polity is in effect is called T=6~T=10, and the last year of simulation is called T=22. 
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the desired level of capital stock is raised by the reduction of user cost of capital. For this 
reason, a manufacturer increases investments, which is followed by the increases in 
knowledge stock, so that the production capacity will be relatively expanded. This will 
lead to the increase in output and value-added, so that a virtuous cycle occurs, which 
induces investment demand. 
 
Table 9.  Effect on private R&D expenditure       (unit: ten billion won) 








* ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
 
However, what is interesting is that the investment has not increases boundlessly 
during the period when the tax credit benefit was granted. The desired level of stock and 
the rate of increase in investment has increased sharply, which is due to the user cost of 
capital that was lowered during the period between T=6 and T=7 when the tax credit was 
put into practice, however, the user cost of capital has been changed a little during the 
period between T=8 and T=10 in comparison with the previous periods. And due to the 
gradual increase in value-added, there is no big change in desired level of stock. 
Accordingly, the level of investment is getting higher than that of baseline scenario from 
the period 8, however, there is no sharp increase like the period between T=6 and T=7. 
On the other hand, during the period between T=11 and T=12, when the tax credit benefit 
is not provided any more, the user cost of capital increases again, so that the rate of 
increase in investment begins to decrease in comparison with the previous period. 
However, it may be identified that the investment level remains high in comparison with 
the baseline scenario due to the expanded production capacity (knowledge stock) and the 




Private R&D expenditure 
Total R&D investment carried out 
by the private sector 
 
Figure 5.  Dynamic change in private R&D investment 
 
Meanwhile, we may confirm that the discontinuous investing activities occur with a 
big range of fluctuation in the rate of increase when a policy shock is given, through 
Figure 5 that shows percentage changes of private R&D expenditures from the baseline 
scenario. This result has been caused by an investment behavior, with which the industry 
is responding to the exogeneous policy shocks, and such an investment behavior is 
realized by an investment model implemented. Though the rapid changes in investment 
level in this model has been relieved a little due to the time lag when the investment 
demand leads to an actual investment, the rate of change in investment in comparison 
with the baseline scenario appears to be discontinuous as the policy shock has a 
substantial impact on the industrial investment level from the time when the policy shock 
is applied. 
The case, in which the big fluctuation in increase of investment is caused by a tax 
credit in this manner, can be identified in some empirical studies, in which the effects of 
R&D-related tax credit that was introduced in the USA in 1981 on the private R&D 
investments were estimated. For example, Baily et al. (1985), who carried out an analysis 
on the R&D activities of 12 R&D-intensive manufactures during the period between 1982 
and 1985, found out that the private R&D investments had increased at an average annual 
rate of 7.3% in comparison with the predicted value based on the historical data. 
Mansfield (1985), who carried out an analysis on the R&D activities of 6 R&D-intensive 
manufactures, argued that the expenditure on R&D in the private sector increased at an 
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average annual rate of 10% and 23% in 1981 and 1982 respectively, in comparison with 
the existing trend. Brown (1985) argued that the R&D investment had increased by 25% 
during the period between 1981 and 1984, due to the introduction of the tax credit system 
in 1981. Cordes (1989) argued that the actual R&D investments in 1981 1982, 1983, and 
1984 were higher than the predicted values by 8.7%, 17.4%, 25.5%, and 26.8%, 
respectively. 
The government subsidy appeared to have no effect on the user cost of capital and the 
desired level of stock in the period when it was paid, however, the payment of subsidy 
crowded out a part of private R&D investment, which led to a reduction of total private 
R&D investment with internal funds. However, what we need to pay attention to is that 
the gap between the baseline scenario and the investment level is narrowing during the 
period between T=6 and T=10, when the subsidy is paid, despite the increase in the scale 
of subsidy. Furthermore, from the period T=10, the level of private R&D expenditure is 
getting higher than the case where the subsidy is not paid, though the size is small, and 
then the investment is maintained at the higher level than the baseline scenario 
continuously. On the other hand, the subsidy has not fully crowded out the private R&D 
investment, so that the total scale of sectoral R&D investments, including the subsidy 
provided by government in each period, increases higher than the baseline scenario. 
Accordingly, when the subsidy is granted, the level of industrial knowledge stock 
remains higher than that of the baseline scenario, and also the level of desired capital 
stock, which has been relatively expanded due to the value-added, remains higher than 
that of the baseline scenario. As a result, the investment gap between the baseline 
scenario and Scenario B decreases gradually despite the crowding-out effect of the 
subsidy. After all, during the simulation period and afterwards, including the period T=10 
when the subsidy is granted, the investment activity is stronger than that of the baseline 
scenario. 
 
4.3.2.2  Accumulation of knowledge capital stock 
 
In both the case of tax credit benefit and the case of subsidy, the level of knowledge 
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capital stock was higher than that of baseline scenario. When the tax credit benefit is 
provided, the difference of private knowledge stock between the baseline scenario and 
scenario A (tax credit) increases sharply due to the sharp increase in investment. Even 
after the provision of tax benefit, the investment level rises relatively, so that the 
difference with the baseline scenario is maintained continuously as shown in Figure 6. As 
a result, the stock level appears to have increased by 22.2% from the baseline scenario in 
the last period. 
Though a part of private R&D expenditure is crowded out, when the subsidy is granted, 
the knowledge capital stock appears to have increased higher than the baseline scenario 
because of the increases in total R&D investment. Even after the provision of subsidy is 
terminated, the gap is maintained at a fixed level, so that it has increased by 7.2% in 
comparison with the baseline scenario. 
 
Table 10.  Effect on private knowledge stock 








* ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
 
 






4.3.2.3  GDP at factor cost 
 
The GDP is used as a major index to represent the effect of a policy means on 
economic results. During the first two periods when the tax credit is provided the GDP 
decreases a little bit, but since then it increases sharply. The reason why the GDP 
decreases during the first stage of the tax credit is that the value-added created by the 
labor and physical capital falls down due to the price reduction of labor and physical 
capital despite the rise in income on the basis of the knowledge capital. However, value-
added created by the factors of production such as labor and physical capital can remain 
at a higher level than the baseline scenario due to the increase of wage and rental price of 
physical capital through the next periods, while value-added created by the knowledge 
capital still remains at a higher level than the baseline scenario. According to the analysis 
on the difference in each factor income, the knowledge capital accounts for 40%~60% of 
the causes of the gap in the GDP. 
On the other hand, when implementing a subsidy policy, the level of GDP is equal to 
the baseline scenario or higher than that, which has been consistent since the beginning of 
the implementation of investment-inducing policy. During the first two periods when the 
subsidy is provided, the price of physical capital drops relatively, however, the wage 
increases, so that the value-added created by labor and physical capital remains at the 
higher level than that of the baseline scenario. On the other hand the value-added created 
by knowledge capital remains at the higher level than that of the baseline scenario. After 
all, the provision of subsidy has raised the GDP growth rate by 0.82% in comparison with 
the baseline scenario on the basis of the final period. As the knowledge-based income 
accounts for 10%~30% of factors that cause such a gap, so that we may know the 
knowledge capital plays a less role than that in the tax credit system. 
 
Table 11.  Effect on GDP                   (unit: trillion won) 












Figure 7.  Dynamic change in GDP and gross output 
 
4.3.2.4  Gross output and output by industry 
 
The increase in R&D investments, which has been caused by the tax credit, results in 
the expansion of production capacity. As a result, the gross output has increased in 
comparison with the baseline scenario and Scenario B. In Scenario B, in which the 
government subsidy is provided, the gross output remains at the higher level than the 
baseline scenario, though the level is lower than the case of tax credit. There might be a 
difference, but the gap between the baseline scenario and both cases appear to be on the 
rise as the time pass by. The reason why the gross output has increased in this manner is 
that the level of knowledge capital increases relatively, though the level of physical 
capital is a little lower than the baseline scenario, and the production capacity of each 
industry has expanded in comparison with the baseline scenario, and the knowledge 
capital accumulated in the economy has improved the productivity through the spillover 
effect. 
 
Table 12.  Effect on gross output             (unit: trillion won) 
Division Baseline Tax credit Subsidy 





         * ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
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The economy has been expanded in terms of gross output due to the provision of tax 
incentive. However, from the viewpoint of output of each industry, we may see that some 
industries can benefit from the tax support intensively, but the others cannot, which 
results in the polarization among the industries. 
In the introduction of the tax incentive, the gross output has increased by 8.4% in 
comparison with the baseline scenario in the final period, and the percentage may be 
converted to 446.97 trillion won (Table 13). However, as shown in Figure 8, this final 
figure is based on the calculation in which 328.28 trillion won has decreased in some 
industries including the ‘education, health and social work’ industry, and the 775.25 
trillion won has increased in the specific industries including the ‘electronic and electrical 
equipment’ industry. To put in concretely, 46.5% out of 775.25 trillion won is connected 
to the increase amount of the output in the ‘electronic and electrical equipment’ industry. 
And the transportation equipment industry accounts for 23.0% of the total increase 
amount. And the basic metal products industry accounts for 14.8% of the increase amount. 
In short, as shown in Figure 8, the increase in gross output is based on the result in which 
some industries including ‘electronic and electrical equipment’ industry have soared in 
comparison with others. On the other hand, the industries, of which the output has 
reduced in comparison with the baseline scenario, include the ‘food, beverages and 
tobacco products’, ‘real estate and business services’, and the ‘education, health and 
social work’ industry. Among them, the decrement of output in the ‘food, beverages and 
tobacco products’ industry occupied 14.5% of the total decrement, which is the highest 
percentage. 
 
Table 13.  Change in gross output by scenario        (unit: trillion won) 
Division 
Sum of increased 
gross output (A) 
Sum of decreased 
gross output (B) 
Increase in 
gross output 
(C = A + B) 
Tax incentive 775.25 -328.28 446.97 
Subsidy 137.41 -51.60 85.81 
* Final period 
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There are several explanations about why the output of some industries has increased, 
but the output of other industries has decreased, when the R&D investments increases all 
across the country. Above all, the industries of which the output has increased are the 
industries that increased considerable amount of investment through tax incentive, which 
resulted in a higher level of growth. In fact, the effective corporate tax rates of such 
industries have appeared to decrease much more than other industries. This implies that 
the industries with a bigger distribution coefficient of knowledge and large scale value-
added can benefit more from the tax incentive, even though the same tax credit rate has 
been applied. The second reason of increase in output is that the relevant industry has 
benefit relatively more from the spillover effect from other industry. Especially, the 
‘transportation equipment’, ‘precision instruments’ and ‘general machinery and 
equipment’ industry have benefited relatively more from the spillover effects of external 
knowledge stock. The spillover effects derived from external knowledge other than its 
own knowledge capital acted as a factor that increased the gap among industries. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Percentage of increase in output of each industry in the introduction of tax 
incentive 
 
On the contrary, there are many industries of which the growth rate slows down 
relatively in comparison with the baseline scenario despite the tax incentive. The 
industries of which the output has decreased include the ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’, 
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‘food, beverages and tobacco products’, ‘textile and apparel’, ‘printing and reproduction 
of recorded media’, and ‘petroleum and coal products’ industry. The characteristic of 
such industries is that the rate of increase in R&D investment is low, which results in the 
slowdown in accumulation of knowledge stock, and they benefit less from indirect 
spillover effects of knowledge stock of other industries. The effective corporate tax rate 
declines slightly in comparison with others, so that they benefit less from the tax credit in 
reality. On the other hand, when implementing the tax credit, the wage and rental price of 
physical capital rise relatively, so that the price of goods produced by the industries, such 
as food and grocery and agricultural and fishery industry where the proportion of labor 
and physical capital is high, will rise as well. As a result, the competitiveness of such 




Figure 9.  Percentage of decrease in output of each industry in the introduction of tax 
incentive 
 
In this way, the tax incentive has caused a phenomenon in which the gap in growth 
among industries is deepened. This implies that the tax credit seems nominally to provide 
equal benefit to all the industries, but the benefit is concentrated on the knowledge 
capital-intensive industries. 
As shown in Table 12 and 13, the gross output has increased by 1.6% from the baseline 
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scenario when the subsidy is provided. However, like the tax incentive, this final figure is 
based on the result in which the output of some industries has increased, but the output of 
other industries has decreased. The sum of increased output of 11 industries, including 
‘electronic and electrical equipment’ industry, reached 137.41 trillion won, and the sum 
of decreased output of 16 industries, including ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’ industry, 
reached 51.60 trillion won. And because the gap is relatively small, we may conclude that 
the subsidy plays a positive role in mitigating the phenomenon, in which industrial 
growth is concentrated in specific industries, better than the tax credit. 
 
4.3.2.5 Factor price 
 
When the tax credit was provided, the wage decreased slightly during the three periods 
from T=6 to T=8, and since then, it appeared to increase slightly. This is because the 
rental price of knowledge capital has dropped, which resulted in the drops in relative 
prices of other factors. However, the wage rose higher than the baseline scenario from the 
period T=9. This is because the demand for labor has increased due to the increase in 
output despite the drops in relative prices. On the contrary, in the case of subsidy support, 
the wage is at the level similar to the baseline scenario or increases slightly. 
The rental price of physical capital has appeared to increase in both policy means. This 
is due to the increase in demand for physical capital according to the increase in output 
and expansion of value-added. 
 
Table 14.  Effect on wage and rental price of physical capital 

















4.3.2.6 Tax revenue 
 
When implementing the tax credit, it was expected that the tax revenue would increase 
because the gross output and value-added increased. However, against to researcher's 
expectation, the level of government revenue was lower than that of baseline scenario 
when implementing the tax credit. The major reason of decrease in government revenue 
is related to the decrease in indirect tax. Though the gross output has increased in 
comparison of the baseline scenario, the outputs of some industries have decreased 
(Figure 9). Especially, the government revenue decreased in the industries to which high 
indirect tax rate was applied as the output of such industries decreased a lot in comparison 
with other industries. 
In the case of subsidization, it was expected that the tax revenue would increase due to 
increase in gross output, however, the tax revenue in the last period decreased slightly. 
Like the tax credit, the main reason is that the growth of the industry, to which high 
indirect tax rate is applied, is lower than that of the baseline scenario. However, when 
considering the fact that the differences in growth rate among industries, when 
introducing government's subsidy, is smaller than the gap in growth rate when 
implementing the tax credit, we may confirm that the tax revenue is at the level similar to 
that of the baseline scenario or decreases slightly. 
 
Table 15.  Effect on tax revenue                   (unit: trillion won) 
Division Baseline Tax credit Subsidy 





* ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
 
4.3.2.7  Physical capital investment 
 
In the case of tax credit, the physical capital investment decreased by 3.8% in 
comparison with the baseline scenario in the final period. When providing the tax benefit, 
the value-added of each industry expanded, so that it was expected that the physical 
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capital would increase. But the rental price of physical capital increased according to the 
increase in economic scale. After all, the negative effect of rise in rental price of physical 
capital on shrinkage of investment was bigger than the positive effect of increase in 
value-added on expansion of investment. Therefore, the investment in physical capital 
decreased. The provision of subsidy has caused a slight decrease in investment for the 
same reason, however, the rate of decrease was smaller than that of tax credit. 
In this way, when implementing the R&D policies, the decrease in physical capital 
investment can be understood as the transition to a knowledge-based economy by 
replacing physical capital with knowledge capital. But there is no doubt about the 
importance of physical capital. Therefore, the policy makers have to introduce additional 
policies that supplement the physical capital investment policy when setting up a 
investment-inducing policy for promotion of R&D investment. 
 
Table 16.  Effect on physical capital investment       (unit: trillion won) 








* ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
 
4.3.2.8  Discussion on results 
 
The simulation presented above is aimed to compare the effects of the two policy 
instruments, so that the results have been derived by establishing the amount of tax 
credits, which occur when the government provides tax support benefit, as the subsidy for 
each industry. However, if a comparison between the policy instruments is not considered, 
the various methods of subsidization, so that the effects of subsidy may differ. In this 
context, in this study, an additional study has been carried out in order to look into the 
effects according to the methods of subsidization. In short, the beneficiaries of subsidy 
are divided into the non-manufacturing industrial group and the manufacturing industrial 
group, which is different from the existing method of subsidization. Accordingly, all the 
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government subsidies have been applied to the non-manufacturing industrial group in the 
first simulation, and the government subsidy has been granted only to the manufacturing 
industrial group in the second simulation. At this time, the government subsidy is 
provided only during the period between T=6 and T=10 as mentioned above, and the 
scale of subsidy granted at each period is the same amount as the amount of tax credits, 
which occurs when the tax incentive is introduced in Scenario A. 
 




13 industries including ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’, ‘mining and 
quarrying’, ‘electricity, gas, steam and water supply’, ‘construction’, 
‘wholesale and retail trade’, ‘accommodation and food services’, 
‘transportation’, ‘communications and broadcasting’, ‘real estate and 
business services’, ‘public administration and defense’, ‘education, health 
and social work’, and ‘other services’ industry 
Manufacturing 
industrial group 
14 industries including ‘food, beverages and tobacco products’, ‘textile 
and apparel’, ‘wood and paper products’, ‘printing and reproduction of 
recorded media’, ‘petroleum and coal products’, ‘chemicals, drugs and 
medicines’, ‘non-metallic mineral products’, ‘basic metal products’, 
‘fabricated metal products except machinery and furniture’, ‘general 
machinery and equipment’, ‘electronic and electrical equipment’, 
‘precision instruments’, ‘transportation equipment’, ‘furniture and other 
manufactured products’ industry 
 
The results of analysis suggest that the application of subsidy to non-manufacturing 
industrial groups, which are characterized by non-R&D-intensive sector, is more effective 
than granting a subsidy to the manufacturing industrial groups that are classified into a 
R&D-intensive industrial group, in terms of private investment promotion and economic 
growth. This is because the non-manufacturing industrial groups, in which their own self-
financed R&D investment has not been activated, can increase the investment through 
subsidies, and the accumulation of knowledge capital formed by the increase in 
investment through the subsidies leads to additional R&D activities with their own money. 
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On the contrary, the knowledge-based manufacturing industry carry out relatively 
active investments with their own resources even though they do not receive government 
subsidies. However, though different methods of subsidization are applied, the fact that 
the effect of tax incentive is bigger than the effect of subsidy has not been changed. 
 
Table 18.  Comparison of the results regarding the methods of subsidization 
                                                      (unit: ten billion won) 








































       
* ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
 
On the other hand, in this study, the individual effects of each policy means have been 
analyzed by applying the subsidy and tax incentive policy separately, and it has been 
concluded that the effect of tax incentive is better than effect of subsidy on the basis of 
the analysis. However, it is considered that searching for an optimal policy mix is a 
meaningful attempt because various policy means are used simultaneously in reality. In 
consideration of such necessities, an additional analysis in which the subsidy and tax 
incentive are applied simultaneously has been carried out. The purpose of the analysis is 
to find out the optimal ratio of subsidy and tax incentive in order to maximize the effect 
of policy within the available budget. 
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To achieve this, a simulation test has been carried out by adjusting the ratio of subsidy 





Figure 10.  Effect of policy according to the changes in ratio of subsidy 
 
According to the result, we may see that the degree of effects in terms of private R&D 
promotion and GDP decreases when reducing the scale of tax credit and increasing the 
rate of subsidy at the same time. On the basis of the result, it is desirable to provide the 
tax incentive first within the limit of the budget that is available. However, the attempts to 
determine appropriate ratio of such policy means had limited success in adjusting the 
substitutional or complementary effect that may occur between the two policies. Some 
studies carried out by the researchers such as Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2003), and Mohnen and Röller (2005) have dealt with the theme. Because the 
analyses in this study are carried out on the level of industry, relevant studies at the 
subordinate level shall take precedence. Accordingly, the result presented above are 
considered to be limited results of studies, which have been derived in the state where the 
two policies are regarded as disconnected with and independent from each other. 
Finally, in this study, a total of 22 years from 2009 to 2030 has been selected as a 
simulation period, and the 5-year period between 2014 and 2018 has been selected in 
order to apply the subsidy or tax incentive. The selection of simulation period is focused 
on the confirmation of sustainability of policy means, so that persistence of effect can be 
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identified after completion of the policy means. Due to the study setting like this, it was 
not possible to clarify the implications regarding the period of the support or time. In 
order to supplement the shortfall, the period of government support was varied so that the 
effect could be analyzed. 
However, though the period of government support is established as 7 or 10 years, 
which may result in a variation of the effects of policy means (promotion of private R&D 
investment, or GDP) due to the changes in period and scale of government support, we 
may know that there would be no change in the fact that the effect of tax incentive is 
bigger than that of subsidy as shown in Table 19. 
 
Table 19.  Effect of policy according to the period of government support 
               (unit: ten billion won)                                                               
Division Baseline Tax credit Subsidy 
Policy 







































      * ( ): percentage change from the baseline scenario (final period) 
 
As shown in the result of analysis, this study has confirmed that as the period of 
government support increases, the effect of policy gets bigger. But this study cannot 
present any implication regarding the optimal time (or period). Such limitation of this 
study is caused by applying the recursive dynamics to the CGE model. 
In the recursive dynamic model, all the decisions, including investments, are made 
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through an myopic way, so that the environmental changes that occurred in the past, or 
will happen in the future, cannot have an effect on the decision making in the present 
period. In short, only the changes in exogenous environment in the present affect the 
decision making in the current period. 
Although this study cannot present any implication regarding the optimal period (or 
time) for policy implementation, this is a very important factor when designing a policy. 
So, it is required to expand this model by referring to the relevant studies which have 
dealt with such a theme. For example, there are studies in which the evaluation and 
comparison of temporary tax incentive and permanent tax incentive have been carried out. 
Abel (1982) argued the application of the temporary tax incentive for a limited time in an 
economic recession because the temporary tax incentive was more effective than the 
permanent tax incentive. On the contrary, Park and Kim (2006) derived an opposite result, 
and argued that continuous tax support was effective. Meanwhile, regarding a dynamic 
effect of subsidy, we may refer to the study carried out by Klette et al. (2010). As for the 
capital accumulation method, they argued that if an accumulation method, in which a 
learning effect had been reflected, was applied instead of the perpetual inventory method, 
the fact that government would subsidize could change the firm’s own R&D investment 
before and after subsidization. On the other hand, we may refer to the studies carried out 
by Hall (1992), Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997, 2003), when referring 
to the analysis on the effects of the stability of government policies on industrial 
investments. 
    
4.4 Sub-conclusion 
4.4.1 Summary and policy implications 
 
Both the direct support method represented by the subsidy and the indirect method 
represented by the tax incentive have achieved the primary goal of policy to promote the 
private R&D investment. However, the indirect support method of tax credit is more 
effective than the direct support method of subsidy to promote private R&D activities. 
The same result has been identified in the analysis in which the ratio of subsidy and tax 
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incentive was adjusted. Accordingly, this study supports the results of existing studies 
carried out by Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Avellar (2011), Guellec and Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) and Wu et al. (2007), who argue that the indirect 
means were more effective than the direct means. 
The difference between the two types of policy, regarding the effect of private 
investment promotion, is caused by the institutional characteristics. In short, the effect of 
tax credit benefit is based on the mechanism in which the desired level of capital stock 
changed by the decrease in user cost of capital promotes the investment demand. The 
subsidy, in which the financial resources for the private R&D investment is provided by 
the government, has a kind of income redistribution effect, however, it does not have a 
direct effect on the changes in the desired level of capital stock in each industry. Besides, 
the government subsidy crowds out a part of sector’s own self-financed R&D activities, 
so that it is likely to reduce the investments with in-house financial resources in 
comparison with the situation where the subsidy is not granted. 
This result implies that though it is necessary for the government to intervene into the 
market, it has to choose an indirect support method. That is because it is more effective to 
allow the private sector to decide the level of voluntary investment in consideration of 
overall environment regarding production activities. In the case of subsidy, the 
government grants the subsidy to the industry without considering the investment 
environment in the industry. So, the effect is relatively small, even though the primary 
goal to promote the investment in the private sector may be achieved. 
The policies of tax credit and subsidy have shown the positive effect in terms of 
investment promotion and overall economic growth. However, both policy means 
promote the growth of knowledge capital-intensive industry, while they bring about the 
slowdown in growth of the industries that are not R&D-intensive. Especially, the tax 
credit benefit has the possibility to bring about a polarization in terms of industrial growth. 
This is because the substantial benefit is concentrated on some industries even though the 
nominal benefit is equal to each other all across the industries. On the other hand, the 
direct subsidy from the government mitigates the unbalanced industrial growth by 
slowing down the concentration of knowledge capital in comparison with the tax credit. 
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In a word, it is effective to allow the private sector to decide the investment level 
according to their voluntary decision-making through the indirect support method. 
However, if the government policy is completely dependent on the voluntary decision-
making of private sector, some industries that show lack of enthusiasm may decrease the 
use of industries’ own R&D resources, so that the effective support from the government 
may not be carried out when the industrial growth is slowing down. Therefore, it is 
required to make efforts to provide supplementary effects to the part of industry through a 
direct intervention, though the indirect support method is applied first. 
On the other hand, in this study, the investment level is endogenously on the basis of 
investment function without establishing an exogeneous relationship between the two 
types of investment. When implementing the policy of R&D investment promotion by 
using this model, there has been a trend in which the physical capital investment 
decreases. Accordingly, the policy makers shall identify various factors that may cause 
reduction of physical capital investment during the process in which the R&D policies are 
implemented, considering introduction of policies that are able to make up for the 
reduction. However, there is a logical risk if we judge on the basis of this result that the 
R&D investment has effect on the physical capital investment. That is because there is a 
possibility that the relationship between the two types of investment may change 
according to the specific value of elasticity of substitution between the physical and 
knowledge capital in the value-added production function introduced in this model. The 
studies on this shall be expanded from now on. 
 
4.4.2 Significance of study and future research 
 
Many existing studies have been focused on the effects of each policy means on the 
private R&D investments. They provide the justification of government R&D policies by 
confirming the positive effects of each policy means. When the government intervenes 
into the market on the basis of the justification, what the policy maker shall consider is 
how to choose the most effective policy means among various policy means. By the way, 
the existing studies have failed to provide many implications regarding the issue how to 
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choose a proper policy means. 
The significance of this study is that the effects of direct and indirect support methods 
have been compared in one analysis framework, meeting such a demand for studies. 
Furthermore, this study is aimed at the analysis of effects of R&D policies on economic 
growth, as well as the private investments, by reflecting the spillover effects of R&D 
investments and knowledge capital in the CGE model which embraces the economic 
activities of industry, households and government. 
However, this study has some limitations as follows. Firstly, in this study, the 
individual effects have been derived by applying the subsidy and tax incentive separately. 
However, the government is implementing various policy means such as the subsidy and 
tax incentive simultaneously. Accordingly, in order to maximize the effects of policies, 
we have to look for a direction to the optimal policy mix in which the direct and indirect 
policy means are combined with each other. In order to carry out such studies, a profound 
examination regarding the substitutional and complementary relationship among each 
policy shall take precedence. Secondly, this study has not dealt with the themes about the 
time and period of government support despite the importance of such discussions. To 
achieve this, it is required to apply an inter-temporal dynamic model, and carry out 
studies on dynamic investment-inducing effects according to the various methods for 
capital accumulation and the stability of government support. Thirdly, this study is 
focused on the fact that the investment level appeared to be lower than the optimal level 
due to the market failure. However, the market failure takes place in terms of the 
composition of R&D (Tassey, 1996). Accordingly, a discussion on R&D policies focused 
on correcting the market failure regarding the composition of R&D such as the basic, 




Chapter 5. Analysis on the effect of defence 
procurement 
 
5.1 Background and purpose of study 
 
Unlike the concept of 'supply-push', which is related to the policy means of 
government affecting the provision of new technologies, the concept of 'demand-pull' is 
related to the policy means of government affecting the scale of market regarding the new 
technologies. 
The advanced industrial countries, including Korea, have been concentrated on the use 
of supply-push policy means. However, the governments that recognized the limitation of 
supply-push policy in promoting innovation activities gradually began to pay attention to 
the demand-pull policies, and the importance of public procurement as a typical policy 
means has come to the fore. 
The public procurement has been applied as a part of industrial policy instruments 
(Dalpé, 1994). The public procurement as an industrial policy allows the public agencies 
to promote the innovation activities of industries by using the purchasing power in the 
market, so that it can develop the industries. Especially, the public agencies can protect 
the newly established industries, in order to help them get on the track by providing them 
with opportunities to sell the products. And also, the firms that have carried out a public 
procurement can grow to be matured firms as they obtain the opportunities to enlarge the 
common market for the product (Premus et al, 1985). The economists also have been 
interested in public procurement as a means of industrial policy, and the representative 
studies have been carried out by Rothwell and Zegveld (1981), Rothwell (1984), and 
Geroski (1990). Edler and Georghiou (2007) suggested the importance of local demand, 
market and system failures, and the improvement of public policy and services as the 
rationale in which the procurement policy is used as an industrial policy. 
This study is focused on the analysis of the effects of defence procurement, which is a 
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part of public procurement, on the private innovation activities. The Korean government 
has implemented a variety of policies aimed at protecting and fostering the defence 
industry strategically. Due to the characteristics of defence industry, the demand of the 
government has more effect on the structure and innovation activities than any other 
policy means. In the case of USA, the procurement policies regarding the national 
defense and aerospace field have played an important role in protecting and fostering the 
newly established enterprises and industries (Bollinger et al., 1983). 
Accordingly, this study is designed to examine the effects and limitations of defence 
procurement policies by focusing on the effects of defense expenditures, which form the 
greater part of the government expenditures, on the innovation activities. In this study, the 
effects of defence procurement are divided into two types to be analyzed. Firstly, all the 
expenditures related to national defense are regarded as the defence procurement, so that 
the effects of defence procurement on innovation activities are analyzed. The defense 
expenditures include the purchase of ordinary goods and services, as well as the weapon 
systems, in order to maintain the national defense function. Accordingly, the defence 
procurement represents the transactions with other industries, as well as the defence 
industry
12
. And then, the effects of the procurement limited to high-tech weapon systems 
on the investment of the defence industry will be analyzed. 
The defence industry is one of the typical capital-intensive industries, so that the scale 
of defence procurement may cause a big change in the investment level. Especially, our 
defence industry absolutely depends on the domestic demand, so that there is a strong 







                                            
12 The defence industry may be defined as 'the industry engaged in research and development of material that 
are needed for military purpose to defend the country' (National defense white papers, 2006). 
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5.2 Theoretical backgrounds and empirical studies 
5.2.1 Demand-pull policies and national defence procurement 
 
In this clause, the difference between the public procurement and defence procurement, 
which is a special case of public procurement, will be discussed, focusing on the 
characteristics of defence procurement. It is expected that the effects will increase when 
designing and implementing the defence procurement policies in consideration of such 
characteristics. 
The reason why the defence procurement has a significant effect on innovation 
activities carried out by the industry participating in the procurement market is that the 
national defense section requires the completeness of cutting-edge technologies. In most 
cases of defence procurement, it is required to develop the products or services (Edquist 
et al. (2000) called this kind of procurement the developmental procurement) that do not 
exist at the time of placement of order. Accordingly, we may frequently observe the cases 
in which the costs and period of time for product development are changed in order to 
satisfy the product performance requested by the military (Dalpé, 1994; Hartley, 2007). 
While the defence procurement puts emphasis on developmental procurement, the 
public procurement consists mostly of adaptive procurements, in which the existing 
goods or services are required (Edquist et al., 2000). The adaptive procurements put a 
bigger emphasis on the application of existing goods or services in specific (local) 
environment than development of new technologies. This characteristic of public 
procurement can found in the study carried out by Lember et al. (2011). After carrying 
out the studies on the characteristics of procurement in the Baltic nations they confirmed 
that the public procurement in those countries did not present requirements regarding 
R&D efforts and the innovations induced by procurement had nothing to do with the 
development of new technologies. Yaslan (2009), who had carried out 30 case studies on 
public procurement of information technology in Turkey, found out that the procurement 
was not closely related to the radical innovations. He argued that the procurement policy 
had effect on the gradual innovations for commercial application and inducement for 
organizational and process innovation rather than a radical innovation. 
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On the other hand, the theoretical foundation of hypothesis that the defence 
procurement is more effective than the public procurement can be derived by focusing on 
the specific conditions to secure the successful procurement policy, which was suggested 
by Geroski (1990) as mentioned above in Clause 2.2.2. According to Geroski, the 
requirements for a successful procurement policy include the application of high-level 
product and technology standard provided by the main agency for procurement, clear 
needs which the efforts of innovation is aimed at, provision of market for new products 
and services, and boosting competition among providers. 
By the way, the defence procurement is very closely connected to the requirement for 
success, which has been mentioned by Geroski (1990). The military provides the market 
with clear information regarding the necessary weapon systems in order to maintain and 
improve military strength, and asks the market to develop such systems. The 
manufacturers, who are interested in the purchase intent of the military, put resources in 
the product development, which satisfies the requirements presented by the military. 
Especially, the technological demand for the weapon systems requested by the military is 
specified in the Required Operational Capability (ROC), and it is used as a standard when 
the military makes a final decision on whether the weapon system developed by the 
producer is a success or failure. And the national defense section allows specific 
enterprises to have a monopolistic and oligopolistic status in the fields of weapon system 
development in consideration of economic, strategic and technological factors. 
Furthermore, the government controls the entry to the defence industry by prohibiting 
enterprises other than the enterprises designated by the state in advance to develop, 
produce and distribute defense-related products. As a result, the enterprises participating 
in the defence procurement market can capture a market of certain size. Along with this, 
when the defense section selects a company as a provider of weapon systems, it will 
purchase the entire quantity from the relevant company, so that the enterprise selected as 
a provider may expect considerable amount of economic profit. Accordingly, the 
technological competition will take place vigorously in the monopoly and oligopoly 
system occupied by a few enterprises. Under such an institution, the concentration of 
demand and mass purchase created by the national defense section as a monopoly buyer 
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plays a major role in developing the technology of industry (Dalpé, 1994). 
And also, there are many research institutes established by the military authority in 
order to develop weapon systems, and the Armies, Navies and Air forces have studied the 
'demand' itself regarding the weapon systems equipped with cutting-edge technology in 
order to maintain the dominant position in terms of military strength against the explicit 
or potential enemy. Therefore, the national defense section can play a better role as a user 
than any other institutions carrying out public procurement. Considering the 
characteristics of defence procurement, it may be assumed that the defence procurement 
can be more effective in inducing innovations than any other public procurement. 
However, some characteristics mentioned above may be regarded as the reason by 
which the defence procurement works inefficiently. For example, the defense section puts 
technological performance ahead of everything, however, the over-specialized technology 
cannot be used commercially in the private market. These factors reduce the effect of 
inducement of private R&D activities (Lichtenberg, 1989). And also, in the monopolistic 
and oligopolistic status of the defence industry, a small number of producers allow them 
to avoid mutual competition, so that they may reduce development activities and costs. 
And they may be reluctant to invest resources for R&D due to the lack of attraction to 
improve the productivity. 
 
5.2.2 Economic characteristics of defence industry 
 
Understanding the unique characteristics of defence industry is essential to design a 
government policy and evaluate the effect of the policy. In this clause, we will examine 
the characteristics of the defence industry, especially the economic characteristics. The 
defence industry, which is directly connected to the national security, is a strategic 
industry, so that the characteristics may include the monopolistic and oligopolistic status 
of both the consumer and provider, uncertainty, and the importance of technological 





5.2.2.1 Bilateral monopoly and oligopoly market 
 
The defence industry is operated in an imperfectly competitive market, where both the 
supply and demand side have the bilaterally monopolistic and oligopolistic market 
structure (Hartley, 2007). Firstly, on the supply side, a small number of enterprises 
centered around conglomerates form the monopolistic and oligopolistic market structure. 
In order to foster the defence industry strategically and improve the defense capacity, the 
Korean government has designated specific enterprises which may produce military 
supplies. Though an enterprise has technologies that can be applied to the weapon system 
development usefully, the enterprise cannot enter the market without an approval from 
the government. Accordingly, the provider's monopolistic and oligopolistic status is very 
clear in Korea. 
On the other hand, on the demand side, the government is the only consumer. There is 
no commercial demand for weapon system because it is system for construction of 
defense capacity required for national security. In addition, the government has put strict 
restrictions on sales of weapon system, as well as production. Accordingly, the 
government has the only position as a buyer of the products from the defence industry, 
and it has also a great influence on the structure of defence industry. And unlike the 
practice in general industries, the development of weapon system commences only after 
the demand for the weapon system has been specified by the buyer, namely the 
government. Therefore, the defence industries are aimed at development and production 
of the products that satisfy the specific government demand. So, the technology needed 
for production of weapon system is considerably specialized. 
It is very difficult to reach a general conclusion on whether such a monopolistic and 
oligopolistic structure of defence industry invites a market inefficiency. In general, the 
principle aimed at achievement of the economy of scale in the defence industry is 
regarded as an efficient policy for defence industry (Hartley, 2006). Rogerson (1995) 
argued that it was uneconomical that a number of enterprises produced an identical 
weapon system, and it was desirable to buy products in quantity from specific businesses 
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and reduce financial expense, when considering that relatively few kinds of weapon 
systems were purchased. Therefore, Rogerson (1995) concluded that it was common that 
almost all major weapon systems were produced by a supplier. And he argued that the 
existence of substitutional relationship between weapon systems to some extent may 
create positive competition in certain circumstances, however, a complete substitution 
regarding major weapon system could not exist and the effect of competition was limited. 
In the case of Korea, inducing competition into the defence industry market may be 
regarded as uneconomical in the circumstance where the export of weapon systems and 
the government demand for weapon systems is limited. When considering the fact that 
the rate of operation in the enterprises that belonged to the manufacturing industry was 
77.2% in 2008, while the rate of operation in the defence industry was 60.3% in the same 
year
13
, it is judged that such a logic is rational to some extent. 
On the contrary, some countries intentionally maintain the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic structure in the domestic market defence industry even in the circumstance 
where the procurement through competition or cooperative production is considered to be 
economical. Hartely (1995) pointed out that European NATO allies were maintaining 
their domestic defence industry market as a monopolistic and oligopolistic structure in 
order to foster the domestic defence industry, even though it was more economical and 




The uncertainty inherent in defence industry is prevalent throughout the full process 
including technology development, prototype fabrication, end product development and 
mass production, sales and demand (Rogerson, 1995). Peck and Scherer (1962), and 
Scherer (1964) divided the uncertainty in procurement process into the internal 
uncertainty and external uncertainty. The internal uncertainty is caused by technological 
unknowns. Most of weapon system development demands a technological capacity that is 
                                            
13  Defense Acquisition Program Administration (2010), Defense Acquisition Program, Administration 
Statistics Annual Report. 
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superior than the existing technology level. In short, the relevant public agency demands 
a new technology the agency regards as necessary in order to build strong defense 
capacity in the future, though it does not exist at present. Accordingly, there may be a 
considerably high uncertainty, and it takes a long time to design a new weapon system. 
During the period of designing, the military may change their request regarding a 
technology development for a new field, which they want to apply to the weapon system. 
So, such uncertainty exists throughout the production process, including the prototype 
fabrication and production of end goods. 
Hartley (2007) clearly shows the uncertainty which is inherent in the defence industry 
by presenting the cases in which the development expense increases much higher than the 
initial plan and the development is retarded in a process of weapon system development. 
 








A400M airlifter 4.8 4.6 15 
Astute nuclear-powered 
submarine 
4.5 6.1 43 
Nimrod MR4 destroyer 4.9 6.7 89 
Type 45 destroyer 9.6 10.3 18 
Eurofighter Typhoon 29.2 33.3 54 
US sample of 26 
weapons projects: 
R&D costs 
120.4 164.9 26 
US Joint Strike Fighter 189.8 206.3 18 
US Expeditionary 
Fighter Vehicle 
8.1 11.1 Na 
 
Source: Reedited by Hartley (2007) on the basis of NAO (2005), GAO (2006) 
 
According to Table 20, the expense for the Nimrod program in the UK increased by 
36.7%, from initial budget of 4.9 billion dollars to 6.7 billion dollars, and the completion 
of development was delayed for 89 months. And in the case of Expeditionary Fighting 
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Vehicle in the USA, the expense increased by 37.0%. The R&D expense of the 26 
weapon system development project in the USA increased by 40.0%, from 120.4 billion 
dollars to 164.9 billion dollars, and the completion was delayed 26 months in average. 
The external uncertainty refers to the uncertainty of demand for weapon system. The 
government may change the policy from the procurement of weapon systems through 
development of domestic enterprises to the procurement through import due to political 
or economic reasons. And due to budget restrictions or increase in development expense, 
the number of products, which was in the initial plan, may be reduced, or the plans for 
development or procurement can cancelled altogether or put off. Such cases can be found 
out easily in the process of weapon system procurement. And in case of technical faults in 
the weapon system at the initial stage of the long-term procurement process, the 
additional mass production and procurement plan are postponed, and the initial products 
are subject to technical supplement. In this way, most cases of weapon system 
procurement have high uncertainty in comparison with other products equipped with 
cutting-edge technology. 
An example of decrease in demand for weapon system due to the increase in 
development expense, namely the rise in unit price for purchase, is the case of F-22A 
Raptor. The US Department of Defense initially planned to produce 750 F-22A Raptors 
at the average price of 69 million dollars, however, the price rose by 122%, as the 
procurement price reached 153 million dollars, which was estimated figure in 2004. 
Accordingly, the mass production plan was changed as the quantity was reduced from 
750 to 183 (GAO, 2004, 2006; Hartley, 2006). 
As mentioned above, the weapon system development programs have relatively high 
possibility to fail, and the internal uncertainty such as development cost overrun and 
delay in delivery is high. And at the same time, the external uncertainty such as changes 
in demand itself exists at all times. 
 
5.2.2.3 Importance of technological capacity and R&D 
 
In general, the armed forces have to consider the performance of weapon system as the 
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first priority when making a decision on weapon system procurement. In most cases, the 
weapon system development is carried out after the technological demand, which is 
judged by the armed forces, is determined in the concrete, which is so-called 'First 
confirm, then develop'. Especially, the technological demand is described in the Required 
Operational Capability (ROC) in details. The criterion of success or failure is based on 
whether the technology development satisfies the ROC or not, so the top priority of 
defence industry is to develop the technology that meets the ROC. Accordingly, in the 
process of weapon system acquisition, the performance and reliability of technical aspect, 
rather than the economic aspect including the expense, is regarded as the top priority 
(Kim et al., 2012). Such characteristics present a contrast to the general industries which 
consider the 'price vs. performance' and 'cost vs. quality'. 
According to Kirkpatrick (1995), the actual cost per unit of combat plane had risen by 
10% every year in the USA and UK. Pugh (1993, 2007) argued that the weapon system 
expense other than combat planes had risen by 10% every year, and there had been no 
change in the trend of rise in unit cost even after the cessation of the cold war. The reason 
why the unit production costs for weapon system rose was not because of the inefficiency 
procurement process, but because of technological arms race (Hartley, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 11.  Trend of unit production cost for combat planes 
Source: Hartley (2007) 
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In this way, the importance of R&D in the defence industry increases continuously 
because each country seeks for the excellent next generation weapon system, which is 
better than the current weapon system. Rogerson (1995) concluded that the innovative 
technology in the defence industry is as important as tangible products, emphasizing the 
importance of R&D. 
 
5.2.3 Empirical studies 
 
The empirical studies on the effects of defence procurement on innovation activities 
are as follows. Sherwin and Isenson (1966), and Greenberg (1966) emphasized the 
influence of defence procurement on innovation activities on the basis of the evaluation 
of ‘HINDSIGHT’ project. They argued that the Department of Defense had shown the 
importance of 'need' in the 710 major defense innovation projects, such as aircrafts, 
satellite, and the missile system. And Sherwin and Isenson (1967) argued that 95% of 
technology development was boosted by the demand of defense, which had been 
recognized, and only 0.3% technologies were boosted by the development of science and 
technology, which were not intended for. 
  Utterback and Murray (1977), who carried out a study on electronic industry, argued 
that the defence procurement created the innovative environment and encouraged the 
enterprises to accept high-level technological standards. And they also argued that the 
Department of Defense, which was the initial user of innovative products, played an 
important role in innovation activities by placing initial orders with relatively new 
enterprises. 
Lichtenberg (1988) argued that the contract of defence procurement increased the R&D 
investment in enterprises. According to Lichtenberg (1988), when the government 
procurement increased by 1 dollar, the private R&D investment increased by 9.3 cents. 
On the other hand, when the sales that were not related to the government increased by 1 
dollar, the private R&D investment increased by 1.7 cents, so that he suggested that the 
effect of defence procurement appeared to be bigger than that of other procurement. On 
the basis of these studies, he estimated that the half of the private R&D investment (about 
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52.8%) was caused by the increase in government procurement during the period between 
1979 and 1984. 
Saal (2001) estimated the effect of defence procurement on the total factor productivity 
of the manufacturing industry in the USA. He proved that the defence procurement 
indirectly promoted the R&D investment by presenting the fact that the defence 
procurement had a positive effect on the total factor productivity. According to Saal 
(2001), when the defence procurement increased by 1% in the industry which was 
directly related to the defence procurement, the total factor productivity increased by an 
annual average of 0.9%, and when the defence procurement increased by 1% in the 
remaining 169 industries, the total factor productivity increased by an annual average of 
0.03%. 
Draca (2013) carried out a regression analysis at the enterprise level on the basis of 
major procurement contracts of the US Department of Defense, which were concluded 
during the period between 1966 and 2003. After estimating that the elasticity of private 
R&D with respect to defence procurement was 0.065, Draca concluded that the defence 
procurement had a significant effect on innovation activities of enterprises. And he 
applied the 'commercial demand' variable, along with the defence procurement to an 
analysis, so that he estimated that elasticity of private R&D with respect to defence 
procurement was 0.045, and its elasticity with respect to commercial demand was 0.038. 
On the basis of result, he suggested that the defence procurement had a more effect on 
innovation activities than the commercial demand. 
 
5.3 Dataset and model construction 
5.3.1 Construction of social accounting matrix 
 
As mentioned above, this study aims to analyze the effect of two types of defence 
procurement such as the total defense budget and the procurement limited to weapon 
system on innovation activities. To achieve this, the SAM in which the total defense 
expenditure is reflected and the SAM in which the defense expenditure limited 
procurement of weapon system is reflected have been prepared. 
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Firstly, the SAM in which the total defense expenditure is reflected has been 
constructed as follows. The government, which is one of the main institutions of 
economy, is divided into the administration government and the Ministry of Defense, so 
that the Ministry of Defense is defined as a main agent of economy. 
And then the specific values regarding the income and expenditure of the 'Ministry of 
Defense' account are allocated. Firstly, the administration government allocates the budge 
to the Ministry of Defense, and then deducts the same amount from the goods 
consumption of the existing 'public administration and defense' industry. In this regard, as 
for the size of budgets allocated to the Ministry of Defense, the budge allocated to the 
goods consumption after excluding the personnel expenses, transfer payment, repayment, 
and disbursements from the total defense expenditure in 2009 (MB in Figure 11). 
On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense consumes the goods by using the allocated 
budget in order to maintain the defense function (K8 in Figure 12). In this regard, the 
consumption structure of the Ministry of Defense in each industry is reflected as the 
results in which the details of defense expenditure are classified into each industry on the 
basis of the full statement of budget expenditure prepared by the Ministry of Defense and 
the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). Finally, the output of relevant 
industry shall be reduced because the goods of 'public administration and defense' led by 
the government has been deducted. If this is interpreted in a different way, the details of 
expenditure in the 'Ministry of Defense' account has been deducted from the exiting 
expenditure column of 'public administration and defense' industry because the 
expenditure column of the 'Ministry of Defense' account represents the part of exiting 




Figure 12.  SAM with the account of Ministry of Defense 
 
Secondly, the SAM is prepared, which is aimed at analyzing the effect of the 
expenditure related to weapon system acquisition on R&D investment of the defence 
industry. For this reason, it is required to establish a new account by separating the 
defence industry from the existing SAM. In order to carry out such a work, we need to 
consider how properly define the defence industry. The problem regarding how to define 
the defence industry leads to the problem on how to determine the range where the goods 
produced by enterprises are regarded as related to the defence industry. 
As pointed out by Hartley (2007), when defining the defence industry, we need to 
include the activities such as repair and maintenance, service support, and R&D, as well 
as the production of military supplies. 
According to 2011 statistics annual report of the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration, there were 91 registered defense-related enterprises in Korea. The 91 
enterprises were producing the military supplies. However, according to Ann et al. (2011), 
there were 1,100 domestic enterprises engaged in defence industry if the primary and 
secondary subcontractors other than the 91 enterprises designated as the defence industry 
by the state were included. In order to carry out accurate analysis, the subcontractors shall 
be included along with the enterprises designated as the defence industry. However, there 
is another difficulty to define the defense-related enterprise in this manner. Above all, in 
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Korea, there is no accurate data regarding the subcontractors which are connected to the 
designated enterprises. Secondly, it is difficult to judge how deeply the sales, assets and 
human resources of subcontractors are connected to the defence industry, even though 
there exists the data regarding the subcontractors. The subcontractors themselves may not 
be able to make such a judgment, as well as the examiner, and they may not know 
whether the relevant subcontractor is related to the defence industry or not. And in the 
case of enterprises engaged in dual-use production for both civilians and the military, it is 
not clear how to deal with (Hartley & Hooper, 1995). In addition, the problem will be 
more complicated when considering the direct and indirect services, such as maintenance 
and repair, disposal, service support, which are provided by the private factor in order to 
maintain the defense function. In consideration of practical problems like this, in this 
study, the defence industry is defined as the defense-related enterprises designated by the 
state. 
And now, we will apply the series of transactional information regarding the 
production of goods and supplying the goods to the market to the SAM. To achieve this, 
it is required to identify the transactional information of defence industry, which has been 
reflected already in the existing industrial classification system of the I-O table, and then 
reflect it in the separate defence industry account. By the way, the details of product and 
sales scale, along with the total amount of sales in the defence industry are included in the 
'Financial Statement Analysis of Defence Industry' published by the Korea Defence 
Industry Association (KDIA). On the basis of the data, it is possible to determine to 
which industry each enterprise belongs in the existing industrial classification system of 
the I-O table, and identify the proportion of the sales of defense-related enterprise in the 
total sales in the defence industry. According to the analysis, the defence industries are 
scattered across 8 industries such as the ‘chemicals, drugs and medicines’, ‘basic metal 
products’, ‘fabricated metal products except machinery and furniture’, ‘general 
machinery and equipment’, ‘electronic and electrical equipment’, ‘precision instruments’, 
‘transportation equipment’ and ‘furniture and other manufactured products’ industry. 
On the other hand, the Financial Statement Analysis of Defence Industry has divided 
the sales of each designated defence industry, input of intermediate goods, new physical 
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and R&D investment scale, human resources, asset scale, corporate tax payment record 
into defense and non-defense sector in order to provide the data. On the basis of the data, 
it is possible to identify the proportion of intermediate goods, and the proportion of value-
added such as wage and operating surplus in comparison with the total sales. According 
to the analysis, the intermediate goods accounted for 71.4 % of the total sales, which 
reached 8.7692 trillion won in 2009, and the value-added accounted for 28.6%. 
Accordingly, on the basis of total sales, it is possible to allocate a specific value to the 
newly added 'defence industry' account by applying the proportion of defence industry in 
each industry, and the proportion of intermediate goods, value-added, and tax in the sales. 
For example, the account of defence industry, which is engaged in the ‘chemicals, drugs 
and medicines’ industry (S8), can be derived as follows. 
 
 
          (Before adjustment)                     (After adjustment) 
Figure 13.  Procedure for reflecting the account of defence industry 
   
 MILOUT = Sales in the defence industry (base year) 
 Di = Proportion of sales made by industry 'i' related to the defense supplies 
              in the total sales made by whole defence industry 
              where, i ∈ {8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16} 
         INT = Proportion of intermediate goods in the total sales made by 
                whole defence industry 
 DV = Proportion of value-added (before tax) in the total sales made by 
               whole defence industry (vector) 
 DT = Proportion of tax in the total sales made by whole defence industry (vector) 
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In short, after applying the proportion of sales made by chemical product industry 
among the total sales made by the whole defence industry to the input of intermediate 
goods, value-added and tax, the value of each item is deducted from the account of 
chemical product industry, and then it is reflected in the account of defence industry. If 
this method is applied to every industry that belongs to the defence industry, a new 
account of defence industry can be reflected (K2 in Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14.  SAM with the account of defence industry 
  
All the goods produced by the defence industry are supplied to the final demand such 
as government demand and export, so it cannot be used as an intermediate demand. 
Especially, the proportion of the government demand is critical as it occupied 96% of the 
total sale made by the defence industry in 2010. And the rest of 4% was exported (Ann et 
al., 2011). Accordingly, the fact that 96% of defence industry products was purchased by 
the government (DP in Figure 14) and the rest of 4% was exported (DEX in Fig. 14) in 
2009 has been reflected in the SAM created in this study. Meanwhile, the government 
118 
purchased 1.9862 trillion won worth of weapon systems from abroad in 2009
14
, and it has 
been reflected in the SAM (FP in Figure 14). 
There exist the data needed for the computing process of model other than the data that 
shall be reflected in the SAM directly. For example, the stock level of physical capital 
and knowledge capital is required for the production function of the defence industry. In 
this regard, the scale of physical capital is announced in the Financial Statement Analysis 
of Defence Industry, however, the knowledge capital accumulated through R&D is not 
specified in the relevant data. Therefore, in order to obtain the knowledge capital stock in 









                                          Eq. (83) 
 where, 0BS : knowledge stock in the base year 
 0BI : R&D investment in the base year 
 
5.3.2 Model structure 
 
In order to analyze the defense section, the model presented in Chapter 4 was used as a 
basis, however, it was partly modified to build a model in order to analyze the 
investment-inducing effect of defence procurement. 
Above all, the Ministry of Defense or defence industry, which was newly added to the 
existing social accounting matrix, has been reflected as an activity variable. The Ministry 
of Defense consumes goods according to the expenditure structure that has been 
established in order to carry out defense function after receiving the budget from the 
administration government. In a word, the Ministry of Defense functions as a main agent 
of economy within the model like the administration government. On the other hand, the 
defence industry carries out production and investment activities, and the accumulated 
                                            
14 Source: Defense Acquisition Program Administration (2010), Statistics annual Report. 
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knowledge capital stock through the activities may affect the economic growth through 
various channels, so that we need to consider it carefully. 
The defence industry creates other industry's demand by using the goods from other 
industry as intermediate goods in the production process. However, basically the defence 
industry in Korea is small in terms of scale, so that it is expected that the effect of 
demand creation will be relatively limited. Above all, what we expect through the growth 
of defence industry is focused on the effect of knowledge capital stock on economic 
growth, namely the economic effect of 'spin-off'. The 'spin-off' means the technology 
diffusion in a special type which is related to the technology transfer from the defense 
section to private section (Weston & Gummett, 1987). 
In order to evaluate the economic effect caused by changes in defense technology, it is 
required to understand the mechanism and process with which the defense R&D stocks 
affect the economy (Weston & Gummett, 1987; Hartley, 2006). However, the studies 
carried out so far do not help us to completely understand what defense R&D project 
creates the spin-off. Though the spin-off occurs, we do not have enough understanding of 
the sweep and degree of the spillover effect. 
One of the major causes of the difficulty in empirical study is that there exists the lag 
effect in the process in which the R&D expenditure affects the technological changes and 
the economic growth. Because the result of study may be affected according to the 
method to reflect the time lag, the time lag of knowledge stock shall be paid attention to. 
However, the issue of time lag is one of the sources of debate that can be solved in a 
relevant study, and there is no common sense of the estimated value of lag period 
(Chakrabarti & Anyanwu, 1993). Therefore, Hartley (2006) argued that the lag period 
should be estimated by an empirical method rather than a theoretical approach. 
Despite the difficulty, the spin-off effect of defense R&D investment or knowledge 
stock on the economy of a country was analyzed by some econometricians. There are 
typical domestic literatures written by Park et al. (2003), Lee et al. (2006), Lee et al. 




Table 21.  Spin-off effects of defense knowledge stock 
Division Major contents 
Park et al. 
(2003) 
· Elasticity of GDP with respect to defense R&D stock: 0.043 
· Elasticity of TFP with respect to defense R&D stock: 0.02 
 - Defense R&D time lag: 2 years, obsolescence rate: 10% 
Lee et al. 
(2006) 
· Elasticity of TFP with respect to defense R&D investment (flow)  
 - Time lag; 0, 8, 9, 10 years => 0.07% 
· Elasticity of TFP with respect to defense R&D investment (stock) 
 - Time lag 8 years => 0.09% 
Lee et al. 
(2007) 
· Measurement of value-added creation effect through defense R&D 
 - Transfer technology to the enterprise producing prototypes and carrying on 
transactions with ADD 
Jo et al. 
(2010) 
· Elasticity of GDP with respect to ADD R&D stock: 0.392 
· Elasticity of GDP with respect to defense R&D stock: 0.383 




· Effects of the defense-intensive industries’ R&D stock on TFP 
 - Aviation and Electronic industry: negative 
 - Shipbuilding and Chemical industry: negative 
 
In this study, both the knowledge stock of public section and the defence industry has 
been regarded as public goods, so that the knowledge stock of defence industry is 
considered to have an effect on the productivity of overall economy. Accordingly, the 
total factor productivity of the industry 'i' is represented by a knowledge stock function of 
defence industry along with other industries public section knowledge stock. In this study, 
as for the effects of knowledge stock of defence industry, the result of study carried out 
by Park et al. (2003) has been reflected. 
 
( , , ) si iEFF f H HG HD                                      Eq. (84) 
 where, 
s
iH : external knowledge stock 
       HG : public knowledge stock 





5.4 Simulation analysis 
5.4.1 Simulation scenarios 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of defence procurement, the defense expenditure 
excluding personnel expenses was increased by an annual average of 3% in Scenario A, 
and in Scenario B, the defense expenditure was increased by an annual average of 5%, so 
that the effect of changes in the size of defence procurement on private R&D investment 
could be analyzed. 
On the other hand, in order to analyze the effect of weapon system procurement 
(spending beneficial expense for defense capacity) on the R&D investment of defence 
industry, the size of weapon system in the baseline scenario C was increased by an annual 
average of 7%, while the size of weapon system in the comparison scenario D was 
increased by an annual average of 9%, so that the effect of changes in the size of weapon 
system procurement on R&D investment of defence industry could be analyzed. 
 
Table 22.  Scenarios for analysis of defence procurement effect 
Division Period 
Annual increase 
rate of defence 
procurement 
Annual increase rate 






























5.4.2 Simulation results 
 
It was found out that the increase in defence procurement promoted the R&D 
investment in the industry. Table 23 shows the changes in the level of R&D investment, 
which happened during the simulation period. When the annual average increase rate of 
defence procurement rose from 3% to 5%, the total accumulated R&D investment 
increased by 9.96 trillion won during the simulation period. This is 1% higher than the 
baseline scenario A. 
 
Table 23.  Effect on private sector’s total R&D investment         (unit: trillion won) 
Baseline scenario A Comparison scenario B Difference 










448.8 991.6 565.9 1,001.6 9.97 (1.0%) 
* Aggregate during the whole simulation period 
 
The sensitivity in which the R&D investment responds to the changes in defence 
procurement at the national level has been expressed as a elasticity index. According to 
the result, the elasticity of total R&D investment with respect to defence procurement was 
0.039, and when the defence procurement increased by 1 won, the demand for R&D 
capital goods increased by 0.0851 unit. The innovation activity-inducing effect of defence 
procurement, which has been confirmed in this study, may be regarded as rational, when 
considering the fact the elasticity of investment with respect to sales for the 
manufacturing industry by Sung (2001) was 0.03, and the result of Lichtenberg (1988), 
who suggested that when the government procurement increased by 1 dollar, the private 
R&D investment increased by 9.3 cents. 
Meanwhile, looking into the changes in R&D investment in each industry, we may see 
that though the absolute level of R&D investment throughout the country has increased 
both in the baseline scenario A and the comparison scenario B, there are some industries 
where the R&D investment has decreased relatively in the comparison scenarios in 
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comparison with the baseline scenario. The reason why the R&D investment has 
relatively decreased in some industries is that there are some industries of which the scale 
has been reduced due to the changes in industrial structure during the process of 
increasing defense expenditure. This is because even though the investment and output 
have been expanded in terms of absolute size both in Scenario A and B, the investment 
and output of some industries in the comparison scenario B (5% of annual increase in 
defense expenditure) have declined more than those of baseline scenario A (3% of annual 
increase in defense expenditure), which seems to be caused by the distribution ratio of 
defense expenditure among industries and the forward and backward linkage effects that 
occur in the dynamic process. 
 
Table 24.  Increase and decrease in R&D investment 
                                                   (unit: ten billion won) 
Sum of increased 
investment (A) 
Sum of decreased 
investment (B) 
Change in total investment 
(C = A + B) 
1,030.5 34.0 996.5 (1.0%) 
 * Aggregate during the whole simulation period 
 
On the contrary, the R&D investment has increased in the knowledge-intensive 
industry centered around a manufacturing industry. The industries in which the R&D 
investment has increased due to the defence procurement include the ‘wood and paper 
products’, ‘petroleum and coal products’, ‘chemicals, drugs and medicines’, ‘non-metallic 
mineral products’, ‘basic metal products’, ‘fabricated metal products except machinery 
and furniture’, ‘general machinery and equipment’, ’electronic and electrical 
equipment’, ’precision instruments’, ’transportation equipment’, ’public administration 
and defense’ industry. Most expansion of investment caused by defence procurement 
took place in the electronic and electrical equipment (72.3%), transportation equipment 
(8.8%), general machinery and equipment (7.0%), chemicals, drugs and medicines 
(4.90%) industry. The reason why the increase in R&D investment has been concentrated 
on a part of industries is that the relevant industries form a greater part in the defence 
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procurement. And the second reason is that such industries are knowledge-intensive 
industries where the proportion of knowledge capital as a production factor is high. 
Though the demand increases on a similar scale, the knowledge-intensive industries 
respond to the change more sensitively than others. 
 
Table 25.  Proportion of R&D increase by industry            (unit: ten billion won) 
Industry 
Total investment 
in the scenario A 
Total investment 
in the scenario B 





Wood and paper 
products 
94.9 95.2 0.3 0.03 
Petroleum and coal 
products 
144.2 144.6 0.5 0.05 
Chemicals, drugs and 
medicines 
7,428.4 7,479.3 50.9 4.94 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
506.0 509.8 3.7 0.36 





671.3 675.9 4.6 0.45 
General machinery 
and equipment 
4,408.7 4,480.5 71.8 6.97 
Electronic and 
electrical equipment 
54,065.5 54,810.2 744.7 72.27 
Precision instruments 2,970.8 3,007.9 37.1 3.60 
Transportation 
equipment 
6,300.9 6,391.8 90.9 8.82 
Public administration 
and defense 
379.2 379.4 0.2 0.02 




Due to the increase in scale of defence procurement, the GDP and gross output 
increased, so that the GDP and gross output in the comparison scenario B have increased 
by 0.05% and 0.27% respectively, in comparison with the baseline scenario. 
 
Table 26.  Effect on GDP and gross output                    (unit: trillion won) 
Baseline scenario A Comparison scenario B Difference 
GDP Gross output GDP Gross output GDP Gross output 
30,268.0 93,571.2 30,283.2 94,005.1 15.2 (0.05%) 254 (0.27%) 
* Aggregate during the whole simulation period 
 
However, in terms of output at the industrial level, we may identify the strong growth 
in the knowledge-intensive industry centered around the manufacturing industry. The 
cause of occurrence of this phenomenon is similar to the cause of occurrence of 
difference in the R&D investment level among industries. Figure 15 shows the changes in 
output of each industry, in which the output in the comparison scenario B has increased 
higher than that of the baseline scenario A. In Figure 15, we may confirm that the general 
machinery, electric and electronic equipment, precision device, and transportation 
equipment industry have a strong growth in comparison with the gross output of the 






* S2: Mining and quarrying, S5: Wood and paper products, S7: Petroleum and coal products, S8: 
Chemicals, drugs and medicines, S9: Non-metallic mineral products, S10: Basic metal products, S11: 
Fabricated metal products except machinery and furniture, S12: General machinery and equipment, 
S13: Electronic and electrical equipment, S14: Precision instruments, S15: Transportation equipment, 
S18: Construction, S25: Public administration and defense 
Figure 15.  Change in output according to the increased defence procurement 
 
On the other hand, the procurement limited to weapon system has also increased the 
R&D investment in the defence industry. The annual average increase rate of weapon 
system procurement has increased from 7% (in the baseline scenario C) to 9% (in the 
comparison scenario D), the R&D investment in the defence industry has increased 30.5% 
from the baseline scenario C. 
 
Table 27.  Effect on total R&D investment level of defence industry 
                                              (unit: ten billion won) 
















65,304.0 1,695.0 50,900.3 2,212.2 
517.2 
(30.5%) 
* Aggregate during the whole simulation period 
* ( ): Percentage change from the baseline scenario C 
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This implies that when the weapon system procurement increases by 1 won, the 
demand for R&D capital goods increases by 0.153 unit. The reason why the effect of 
weapon system procurement is bigger than the defence procurement effect is that the 
government occupies most of the sales in defence industry, so that the increase in the 
weapon system procurement is directly connected to the sales and R&D investment of 
defence industry. 
On the other hand, the elasticity of defence industry's R&D investment with respect to 
weapon system procurement was 1.078, so that we can understand that the R&D 
investment of defence industry responds to the changes in the scale of weapon system 
procurement sensitively. That is because the defence industry has a high level dependence 
on the defence procurement. And also, due to the relatively small R&D investment scale 
of the existing defence industry, the rate of change of the R&D investment scale of 
defence industry has been changed a lot in comparison with the rate of change in the 
weapon system procurement. Therefore, the elasticity of R&D investment with respect to 
weapon system procurement is relatively bigger than its elasticity with respect to defence 
procurement. The sensitive response of R&D investment level of defence industry to the 
changes in defence procurement scale is well illustrated in Figure 16. The rate of change 
in variables presented in Figure 16 represents the increase amount in comparison with the 
baseline scenario C, which is expressed by percentage. We may identify that the R&D 
investment of defence industry is sensitively responding to the changes in weapon system 
procurement scale through Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16.  Dynamic effect of weapon system procurement 
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Figure 17 illustrates the dynamic trend of GDP according to the changes in the weapon 
system procurement. We may see that as the weapon system procurement increases, the 
GDP increases as well. The GDP increases by 0.21% from the baseline scenario C in 
2030. There may be two reasons why weapon system procurement and the GDP increases 
simultaneously. Firstly, the increase in weapon system procurement can expand the 
production of defence industry. Meanwhile, the increase in production of defence 
industry may cause the demand for goods in the other industry. In short, a backward 
linkage effect takes place. Secondly, the R&D investment of defence industry increases, 
which leads to a continuous increase in knowledge capital as well. The increased 
knowledge capital of defence industry cause a spin-off effect on the private sector, so that 
it can play a role in improving the productivity of each industry. When considering the 
fact that the scale of defence industry in the base year was 0.32% of the total economy, 
we may assume that the reason of increase in GDP is caused by the spin-off effect that is 
mainly created by the knowledge stock of defence industry rather than the backward 
linkage effect of defence industry. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Dynamic change in GDP 






5.5.1 Summary and policy implications 
 
The defence procurement, which is defined as a special type of public procurement, has 
appeared to be effective to induce innovations. The effects of defence procurement 
appeared to be similar to the existing studies regarding commercial demand. On the other 
hand, the effect of weapon system procurement on the investment of the defence industry 
was much bigger than that of defence procurement. 
The difference is caused by the following reasons. Firstly, the defence procurement 
includes the purchase of general goods along with the weapon systems that demands 
technological innovations. And the proportion of defence procurement in the total 
economy is relatively low. On the contrary, the weapon system procurement demands the 
goods in which the cutting-edge technologies are embedded and it forms an ever-greater 
part of the defence industry market. Accordingly, the weapon system procurement has a 
considerable effect on the structural changes in the defence industry. 
These results provide the following policy implications. When considering the 
influence of defence procurement on innovation activities in the private sector, it is 
judged that it will be effective to help new technology-based firms to put the wheels in 
motion by implementing procurement policies aimed at such firms. Secondly, the weapon 
system procurement has a relatively small effect on overall economy, though it has a 
great influence on the activities and growth of the defence industry. This is due to the 
small scale of current defence industry, and the lack of demand for the goods produced by 
the defence industry, which is because such goods cannot be used as an intermediate 
goods in the other industry. Accordingly, it is required to make efforts to develop dual-
use technologies under the collaboration between the private and defense section at the 





5.5.2 Significance of study and future research 
 
By reflecting the defence procurement and details of expenditure in this study, the 
effect of the defence procurement on the private innovation activities has been analyzed. 
If the defence procurement is applied to the industrial policy-making process on the basis 
of the results of this study, the useful guideline for an industrial policy design can be 
obtained, which helps predict the effect at the national and industrial level. 
However, as mentioned above, in order to analyze the effects of defence procurement, 
it is required to consider the indirect demand creation effect, along with the direct demand 
creation effect. When considering the fact that the defence procurement accounts for a 
small part of the total market, the interest in indirect effects seems to be reasonable. 
And also, this study is limited to the analysis of investment-inducing effect according 
to the demand creation, so that it is required to evaluate the effect by promoting 
competition in procurement process, or using other policy means simultaneously. The 
primary purpose of defence procurement is not focused on inducing innovations of 
relevant industry (enterprise), but maintenance of defense function, it is expected that 
when the defence procurement goes side by side with other means, the effect will be 
much bigger. 
Such analytic studies can be carried out in accordance with the development of the 
contract system for defence procurement. Current procurement contracts designed for the 
defence industry are concluded mainly in the form of cost-reimbursement contract. When 
the contractor is guaranteed to make up for costs by the government, there is no incentive 
for the enterprise to lower the cost. So, it is difficult to expect the response to the 
inducement like the tax incentive and subsidy. On the other hand, in the case of fixed 
price contract, the defence industry seeking to maximize the profit will develop and 
produce the relevant product by inputting the lowest cost under the terms and condition 
regarding the quantity and price, which have been decided according to the negotiation 
with the government. In this case, the defence industry will make a decision on 
investment activities in response to the incentive policy of the government. Accordingly, 
the quantitative analysis on the relevant effect in the process, in which various systems 
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are developed in order to promote innovation activities of defence industry, is expected to 




Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary and policy implications 
 
In this study, the effects of the subsidy and tax incentive, which are the typical policy 
means from the viewpoint of 'supply-push', and the procurement, which is the typical 
policy means of the 'demand-pull' policy, have been analyzed. Prior to such analyses, in 
Chapter 2, the goals of policy means have been examined by applying the various 
investment-inducing policies, which have been implemented by the government, to the 
analysis framework suggested by king et al.(1994). And then the mechanism and 
institutional characteristics in which each investment-inducing policy have impacts on 
innovation activities. 
In Chapter 3, the recommendations of the System of National Accounts, which 
encouraged enterprises to capitalize R&D investments, were examined, and then the 
knowledge capital that was newly formed on the basis of the capitalization was reflected 
in the SAM. 
In Chapter 4, the effects of subsidy and tax incentive has been analyzed by constructing 
the CGE model, in which the knowledge capital specialized in the industry, along with 
the physical capital, is used as a factor of production. Before analyzing the CGE model, 
the inter-industry technology flows in which the knowledge capital creates spillover 
effects and affects the productivity of other industries have been examined. And also, an 
investment model has been reviewed, in which the policy variables that have an impact 
on producer's investment-related decision-making are considered. According to the 
analysis, both the subsidy and the tax incentive had a positive effect on the total R&D 
investment of the private sector. Among them, the tax incentive appeared to have bigger 
investment-inducing effect than the subsidy, which resulted in the difference in the level 
of knowledge assets. And in the long run, the result had a considerable influence on the 
GDP. 
In Chapter 5, the effect of defence procurement on innovation activities has been 
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analyzed from the viewpoint of 'demand-pull' policy. In this study, the defence 
procurement has been divided into two categories, which are defined as the overall 
defense expenditure and the procurement limited to weapon system respectively. In order 
to review the channel through which the defence procurement is related to the R&D 
investment, the static and dynamic effects of public procurement on innovation activities 
were examined. And the characteristics of defence procurement that can be separated 
from the general procurement have been discussed. In order to carry out the analysis, the 
'government' defined as a main institution of economy in the existing SAM has been 
divided into 'administration government' and the 'Ministry of Defense'. And the total 
defense expenditure was defined as defence procurement, so that a SAM in which the 
details of relevant account are reflected has been constructed. On the other hand, in order 
to examine the effects of weapon system procurement, the defence industry was separated 
from the existing industrial classification system of the I-O table, so that a SAM in which 
the defence industry is reflected as a separate industrial account has been constructed. 
According to the analysis, it has been identified that the two types of defence 
procurement have a positive impact on the innovation activities in the industry. In the 
defence procurement, all the goods from overall industries are purchased, while the 
weapon system procurement is engaged in purchase of goods provided only by the 
defence industry. Due to the bilateral monopolistic and oligopolistic structure of the 
defence industry, which sells all the products to the Ministry of Defense, except for the 
quantity to export, the R&D investment of defence industry was very sensitively 
responding to the increase in weapon system procurement. 
On the basis of the results in this study, the following implications for policy may be 
presented. Though both the subsidy and tax incentive support the R&D activities with 
financial resources from the viewpoint of supply-push policy, it appears that tax incentive 
is relatively better. Above all, it is because of the market-oriented characteristics of tax 
incentive. Even though the subsidy itself has various merits, it is required to understand 
the production activities and investment environment of the beneficiary in order to make 
it work in a correct manner (Anex, 2000). However, it is very difficult for the government 
to figure out overall environment of various industries and grant proper subsidy in reality. 
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Therefore, when planning to support R&D activities all across the industries, it is 
necessary to consider the application of tax incentive first, which is an indirect means. 
Accordingly, in order to overcome the weak point of tax incentive, which is slow due to 
going through the tax law-related procedure, the policy makers have to prepare flexible 
schemes for application of tax incentive, so that the policy can induce an optimal 
investment activity in the fast-changing economic situation. In addition, the preference 
for government subsidy with biased view shall be reviewed. 
Secondly, though the tax incentive appeared to be more effective means, the tax credit 
scale and the effective tax rates showed a considerable difference even when the equal tax 
credit rate was applied. It means the tax credit benefit is concentrated on specific 
industries. Theoretically, the tax incentive is designed to provide equal opportunities, 
however, in reality, it has been confirmed that it is an inequitable system as the benefit is 
concentrated on knowledge-intensive industry which has paid attention to innovation 
activities (Surrey, 1970; Heaton, 1981). The current tax incentive system applies 
differential tax rates according to the size of enterprise, but all the R&D investments 
qualify for equal tax remission. Accordingly, it is desirable to consider differentiation of 
the degree of tax benefit by establishing industrial groups that show clear difference in 
terms of innovation tendency and capacity. 
Thirdly, it is required to supplement the fault of tax incentive that may bring about 
severe gap in the investment level and growth of each industry. This phenomenon is 
caused by the fact that the tax incentive is an ex-post method for support. If the decision-
making of actual investment is fully left to the market, the industry with poor investment 
environment will slow down the investment activities, so that it will have a bad effect on 
growth and the industry will be caught in a vicious circle. The tax incentive, which cannot 
take an action for such industries in advance, will cannot overcome the limitation as an 
ex-post support. On the other hand, the subsidy system enables the government to support 
the industry without investment demand (intention), and it is helpful to mitigate the gap 
in capacity in comparison with tax incentive. Accordingly, it is required to select proper 
policy means in consideration of industrial environment (Bollinger et al., 1983). The 
government needs to subsidize centering around the industries which lack innovation 
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capacity. In short the direct and indirect means shall be mixed properly as the direct 
assists the indirect. 
Fourthly, though both the general defence procurement and weapon system 
procurement had a positive impact on innovation activities, the weapon system had 
relatively bigger effect. This is mainly because the scale of weapon system procurement 
accounts for an ever-greater part of the sales made by the defence industry. Accordingly, 
the government shall make an effort to help specific industry, which the government 
plans to protect and foster, to maintain the capacity through continuous government 
procurement. In addition, the government shall design a procurement policy to promote 
innovative effort in advance, and make close collaboration among public agencies in 
order to exercise purchasing power in a specific market. 
 
6.2 Significance and limitation of study, future research 
 
In this study, the effects of subsidy, tax incentive and procurement on the industrial 
R&D investment has been analyzed. The differences between this study and the other 
literature, in which the qualitative and econometric analysis regarding R&D policies, are 
as follows. 
Firstly, the effects of subsidy and tax incentive have been dealt with a lot through 
foreign and domestic literature. However, most analyses carried out by them are limited 
to specific policy means, or the direct or indirect comparison is limited though two types 
of policy variable are included in an analysis model, because the scales of variable are 
different from each other. In this study, the effect of each policy has been analyzed on the 
basis of identical analysis framework and dataset, and the results have been compared and 
evaluated, so that it was possible to identify relatively effective policy means. 
Secondly, the effects of defence procurement suggested by this study are expected to 
be used as an useful reference as there are not sufficient domestic and foreign literature in 
which the effects of defence procurement are analyzed in a econometric method. In 
addition, it will be helpful for the decision makers setting up policies at the industrial 
level because this study has classified the degrees of benefit after dividing the effects of 
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defence procurement by industries. 
Thirdly, only the partial effects of policies were reflected in the existing studies. The 
policy support changes the investment patterns in the industry, and the changed level of 
investment affects the output, which is reflected in the investment activities again. The 
full effect of policy is analyzed by capturing such flows. In this study, a model is used, in 
which the transactions among industries, the transaction between the industry and other 
main institutions of economy are reflected. Furthermore, the significance of this study is 
that the full effect of policy has been measured by reflecting the spillover effect of 
knowledge stock which has been accumulated as a result of R&D investment. 
Fourthly, the existing studies are limited to the measurement of effects which represent 
the relationship between the R&D policy and the private investment. In this study, the 
effects of each policy means on economic growth has been analyzed, including analysis 
of the degree of effects on innovation policies. Accordingly, this study has provided the 
foundation on which the degree of achievement of ultimate policy purpose, which is 
aimed at making the innovation policy induce technological changes, and inducing the 
economic growth through the technological changes. 
Fifthly, in this study, the knowledge-based CGE model has been constructed in order 
to analyze the policy means, and then several knowledge-based SAMs have been 
constructed, which are needed for implementation of the relevant models. The CGE 
model may consider the characteristics of knowledge capital as a public goods by 
reflecting the knowledge capital as both a direct factor of production and a factor that 
creates the spillover effect. And the significance of this study is that it has provided a 
analysis framework that can analyze various policy variable in the future by including the 
investment model that responds to the policy variable into the CGE model. 
On the other hand, the knowledge-based SAM presented in this study has derived the 
knowledge capital accounts by separating the R&D transactions from the I-O table, which 
provides the basis on which the SAM is constructed, excluding the researcher's 
assumption as much as possible, unlike the methods used in the existing studies. In 
addition, in Chapter 5, the SAM has been constructed, to which the Ministry of Defense 
and defence industry account are added. In each SAM, the details of national defense 
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expenditure, that includes the purchase of weapon system, are classified by industries, 
and the details of expenditure of defence industry, which has been differentiated from the 
existing industrial classification system of the I-O table, is reflected separately. The 
dataset constructed in this study is expected to widely used to evaluate various policy 
variables, including the R&D policy, in the future. 
However, despite the significance of study, there are several limitations, which shall be 
supplemented in the future. 
Firstly, the investment function applied to this model is limited to several variables 
such as value-added, user cost of capital, and distribution coefficient. Many empirical 
studies have suggested various factors that have significant effect on the decision making 
of R&D investment. The investment function in this model shall be expanded to include 
various policy variables that have critical effects on private investments. 
Secondly, this study has analyzed the subsidy, tax incentive and procurement 
individually. But the government implements policy means with various viewpoints at the 
same time. So, in order to maximize the effect, the optimal policy mix of direct, indirect, 
supply-push and demand-pull policies shall be pursued. 
Thirdly, in this model, the assumption of small open economy was applied, due to the 
lack of data. As a result, it was not possible to consider the effect of Korea on the global 
market. But when considering the fact that our proportion of foreign trade is getting 
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비록 일부 경제학자들에 의해서 시장실패(market failure)의 존재 여부에 
관한 비판적 시각이 제기되고 있지만 시장실패는 정부가 민간의 투자 활동에 
개입하는 정당성을 제공한다. 정부가 이러한 시장실패를 치유해야 한다고 믿
는 상황에서 정부가 수행해야 하는 작업은 크게 두 가지다. 우선, 정부 주도
로 연구개발을 수행하여 민간 부문에 기술을 이전할 수 있다. 이 경우 정부 
기관 연구소는 사회적 수익률이 높은 반면 사적 수익률이 낮은 연구개발 과제
를 수행하여 사회적 효용을 제고시킬 수 있다. 둘째, 민간의 투자를 활성화시
키는 다양한 정책을 시행하여 사회가 바람직하다고 판단되는 수준까지 투자를 
유인하는 것이다. 
현재 한국의 경우 민간의 연구개발 투자는 총 연구개발 투자에서 상당한 비
중을 차지하고 있으며, 민간 부문은 국가의 연구개발 역량을 결정짓는 주체이
다. 따라서, 국가가 기술 변화를 통해 지속적 성장을 이루기 위해서는 무엇보
다 민간 부문의 투자 활동이 활성화되어야 한다. 이러한 맥락에서 정부는 민
간 부문의 투자를 촉진시키기 위한 다양한 유인 정책을 시행 중에 있다. 
우리나라를 포함한 대다수 국가들이 공통적으로 시행 중인 연구개발 투자 
유인 정책으로는 조세 지원, 보조금 지원, 금융 지원, 인력 지원, 공공 조달, 
법·제도적 인프라, 기술이전거래, 기술 지도 및 자문 등이 있다. 이와 같이 
다양한 정책수단들이 고유한 정책적 목적을 가지고 활용되고 있는 가운데, 민
간의 혁신 활동을 활성화시키기 위해 정부가 어떻게 자원을 효과적으로 할당
시켜야 하는가에 대한 논의가 부각되고 있다. 
공급주도(supply-push) 관점에서 보조금과 조세 지원 제도는 가장 중심적
으로 활용되고 있는 정책 수단이다. 보조금과 조세 지원은 혁신 활동에 필요
한 재원을 지원한다는 측면에서 유사한 기능을 발휘하지만 보조금은 정부 개
입의 정도가 높은 직접 수단인 반면, 조세 지원은 간접 수단이라는 상반된 특
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징을 지니고 있다. 따라서, 효율적으로 정책을 설계하기 위해서는 두 정책 수
단의 효과를 상호 비교·평가한 결과를 토대로 정책 수립이 이루어져야 한다. 
그러나, 기존의 대다수 실증연구들은 각 정책 수단을 개별적으로 분석하고 있
어 상대적으로 우수한 정책 수단이 무엇인지에 대한 시사점을 제공하는데 제
한적이다. 
한편, 수요견인(demand-pull) 정책은 경제학자들의 논쟁을 통해 그 중요
성이 인정되어 왔지만, 대다수의 정부들은 주로 공급주도 정책들을 시행해 왔
다. 그러나 최근 들어 유럽연합과 회원국을 중심으로 공급주도 혁신 정책의 
한계점이 제기되고, 수요견인 정책이 적극적으로 도입되고 있다. 우리 정부도 
수요견인 정책의 중요성을 인식하고 이를 시행하기 위한 제도적 장치들을 보
완하고 있다. 
이러한 맥락에서 본 연구는 공급주도 관점의 대표적 유인 정책 수단인 보조
금과 조세 지원의 효과를 비교·평가 한다. 이와 함께 수요견인 정책의 대표
적 수단인 공공 조달 중에서 정부의 지출 비중이 높은 국방 조달의 효과를 분
석한다. 
본 연구 목적을 달성하기 위해서 지식기반 연산일반균형모형을 도입한다. 
본 연구에서 제시된 모형은 지식을 자본으로서 간주하고, 노동과 물적 자본과 
함께 지식 자본을 생산요소로서 활용한다. 아울러, 지식 자본은 외부 경제에 
파급효과를 창출시키는 원천이다. 본 모형을 운용하기 위해서 2008 국민계정
체계와 OECD(2010)의 권고안에 따라 지식을 자본화하고 그 결과 형성된 지
식 자본을 새로이 계정에 반영한 지식기반 사회계정행렬을 구축하였다. 
본 논문의 연구 결과 보조금과 조세 지원 정책은 모두 민간의 연구개발 투
자를 촉진하는데 효과적이었다. 그러나, 상대적으로 조세 지원이 보조금보다 
효과적인 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 시장중심의 의사 결정을 통해서 투
자 활동을 유도하는 것이 효과적인 정부 개입 행위임을 보여주는 것이다. 이
와 함께 정부의 직접적 개입 수단을 효과적으로 적용하기 위해서는 사전에 정
부가 각 산업의 생산 및 투자 환경을 정확히 파악해야 함을 시사한다. 한편, 
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국방 조달을 일반적 국방 조달과 무기체계에 한정된 국방 조달로 구분하여 분
석한 결과, 두 경우 모두 민간의 투자를 촉진시키는 효과를 보였다. 특히, 무
기체계 조달의 효과가 상대적으로 크게 나타났는데, 그 이유는 방위산업 시장
에서 국방 부문의 구매가 차지하는 비중이 절대적으로 높기 때문이다. 
본 연구는 기존의 문헌들과 다음과 같이 차별화된다는 점에서 의미를 지닌다. 
첫째, 동일한 자료체계와 분석 모형을 활용하여 보조금과 조세 지원 제도의 
효과를 직접적으로 비교·평가한다. 둘째, 국방 조달의 투자 유발 효과를 산
업별로 구분하여 제시한다. 셋째, 기존 연구가 유인 정책의 부분적 효과
(partial effect)를 분석한 것인데 반해, 본 연구는 투자 활동의 변화에 따른 
산업의 성장과 지식자본의 파급효과를 반영한 정책의 전체 효과(full effect)
를 측정한다. 넷째, 각 정책수단이 혁신 활동과 경제 성장에 미치는 효과를 
분석한다. 따라서, 기술변화를 통해 경제 성장을 유도하려는 혁신 정책의 궁
극적 목적이 달성된 정도를 계량적으로 평가한다. 다섯째, 본 연구에서 제시
된 지식기반 사회계정행렬과 연산일반균형모형은 향후 다양한 정책을 평가할 
수 있는 토대를 제공한다. 
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